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CHAPTER I
THE REICH CONCORDAT AND CO-ORDINATION 0? CATHOLIC
ORGANIZATIONS
In 1933? the emerging Third Reieh encountered a 
political-spiritual rivalry with the smallest sovereign 
state in the world. Foundations for the Reich-Vatiean 
conflict during World War II began with Bismarck and the 
unification of Germany under Prussian leadership * In 
1870, Vatican Council I declared the dogma of papal 
infallibility which Bismarck regarded as an arrogation 
of state rights. He felt that it detracted from the 
supreme authority that the King and Chancellor should 
exert over the new German Empire,, Bismarck*s desire to 
appoint ecclesiastics and control education resulted in 
the Kulturkampft a contest between the leaders of Germany 
and the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church which 
led to the expulsion of the Jesuits from Germany and the 
"May Laws” aimed at state control of the clergy. Bismarck 
also abolished the salaries and religious orders of recu­
sants to bring the clergy under state control.
By 1878, despite persecution of the Church that 
accompanied the Kulturkampf, State and Church reached an 
understanding which made co-existence possible. This 
was largely due* to the rise of the unique Catholic 
Center Party which had a solid Catholic membership drawn 
from such disparate elements as to be capable of entering 
into either a conservative or liberal coalition. The 
Centers, holding the balance of power between the Social
1
2
Democrats and the National Liberals* brought about 
Church-State co-operation by siding with Bismarck against 
the other two parties in support of a weakened version 
of Bismarck’s isolationist tariff bill,, Bismarck saw 
the need for co-operation with the Center Party not only 
to influence the one-third Catholic German population 
but as a political force. Stilly no final settlement 
of the respective rights of Church and State resulted.
World War I provided circumstances* when the 
United States entered the war and internal German events 
brought about a situation seemingly conducive to peace* 
in which the Center Party could exert its political 
influence. I-n July of 1917p the Center Party’s con­
servative majority supported the annexationists in their 
attempt to bring Belgian* French* and Russian terri­
tories into Germany’s domain. The liberal minority* 
convinced that Germany could not win the war* proposed 
a Peace Resolution with no annexation and no indemnity. 
Social Democrats and Progressives joined the newly 
oriented Center in favor of the resolution. The Allies 
were unreeeptive to the new proposal. The Vatican* 
too* maneuvered diplomatically in support of restoration 
of Belgium under the conditions of the Peace Resolution 
in an effort to encourage a compromise peace. Allied 
failure to take advantage ©f the peace proposal curbed 
Center Party activity during the First World War and 
caused Pope Benedict XV t© cease diplomatic initiatives
3
and t© return t© appeals for peace on humanitarian grounds. 
Between 1©70* when the Vatican lost the last trace 
of its temporal army as Rome became the capital of a new 
Italian Kingdom* and 1919* the Vatican experienced a 
transformation in its manner of handling international 
problems„ In World War I* it became obvious that Vatican 
representation of all Catholics* irrespective of nation­
ality* combined with its humanitarian goal on earth to 
demand that the Holy See pursue a course of the strictest 
neutrality,, To do otherwise indicated its partiality to 
one country* resulting in a decreased ability to promote 
its objectives in the neglected country.,
- The problem became more acute when one of the 
factions at war found it expedient to hinder Vatican 
policy toward that country*s Catholic population., The 
Vatican had to remain neutral despite secular pressure 
applied to national Catholics in order to forego their 
increased persecution in the offending country, Vatican 
policy tried to avoid this dilemma by making non-political 
peace proposals based on an appeal to all humanity* re­
gardless of the political persuasion of the individual 
belligerents, Benedict XV's adherence to this policy 
caused the Central Powers to regard the Vatican as 
pro-Ally* and the Allies t© regard it as pro-German,
The Vatican learned that its new wartime policy— a 
strange blend of national politics* international di­
plomacy* and neutrality— was unwieldy.*
k
Vatican international policy was hampered hy a 
similar situation on the State level because the Church 
had to refrain from engaging in national polities, With 
■the loss of Vatican temporal power, the philosophy of 
separating Church and State became particularly appli­
cable! the church being supreme in spiritual matters 
and the state foremost in political affairs. Theo­
retically, the Church gave up its right to engage in 
politics on any level in order to assure peaceful 
existence within the nation and stringent international 
neutrality,
Qn the other hand, since the Church recognized 
State secular supremacy, it had to advocate that its 
members give allegiance to the legally constituted 
authority. Within this framework, the Vatican strove 
to fulfill its basic function of obtaining the best 
possible conditions for Catholics within the State,
This situation leads to political conflict 
that may result in a concordat, an agreement between 
the pope and a government for the regulation of ecclesi­
astical matters, A concordat is devised to delineate 
a "way of living1' by which the State yields its right 
to interfere in most spiritual affairs while the Church 
agrees to become non-political. By this method the 
philosophy of separation of Church and State becomes a 
reality founded upon the words of a treaty. The Vatican 
negotiates away its right to treat politically with the
5
State -either through itself or the Catholic Church ©f the 
nation,, Nevertheless* when its national programs are 
threatened* the Vatican mast resort to national politics 
and international diplomacy to protect Catholic interests* 
This abrogates the rights assured to it under either the 
philosophy ©f separation of Church and State or a con­
cordat „■
v0n July 31? 1919* the newly adopted constitution 
of the Weimar Republic upheld the undisturbed exercise 
of freedom of religion under State protection and did 
not impose a State Church*1 During the inter-war period 
the Vatican*s superior doctrinal development and organi­
zational capacity helped it gather strength in the wake 
of weak and unstable lay governments*
By-1933»- the Roman Catholic Church had evolved 
into a supra-national entity with persuasive influence 
over the moral* ideological* and political actions of 
more than 35® million persons in Europe* Income and 
budgetary figures are not published* but the Vatican*s 
immense global holdings in finance* property-* and 
membership caused the secular powers of the world to 
regard the Vatican as an institution capable ©f influ­
encing the thought ©f entire countries* Diplomatic
..jB’oS* 'War Department* Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression"'(Washington„" 19&6) * IV* 6dB* Hereafter cited 
isTlfl This ’is" the Constitution of the German Reich* 
TharTGhaptir* Article 135-137» The Vatican generally - 
fears a State Church because it detracts from the inter­
national power of the Holy See*
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relations with thirty-seven nations, exclusive of apos­
tolic delegates, and one of the best informed intelligence
2services in the world added to this prestige. The pope, 
as visible head of the Church, commanded only a 000 man 
temporal militia and an 108 area, but in fact, led an 
"empire" camparable in wealth and power to many lay 
governments,
This supra-national entity is directed by a highly 
centralized organization, having functions comparable to 
the foreign services of secular countries, directly re­
sponsible to the pope,^ The Vatican uses these agencies
p  ............................Camille M, Cianfarra, The Vatican and the War 
(New York, 19l|^), 66-67. Hereafter cited as cianfarra.
The Vatican had more than thirteen hundred bishops 
throughout the world who sent periodical reports to the 
Holy See. In addition, the numerous Nuncios and apostolic 
delegates, having access to the same information as lay 
ambassadors, sent both political and ecclesiastical news 
to the Papal Secretary of State,
The Roman Catholic Church functions through a 
strict hierarchy. The pope is the supreme authority who 
delegates much of his power to twelve collegiate bodies 
called congregations, three tribunals, and four offices. 
These assemblies form the Curia, or Church Government.
The Congregations are comparable to the departments of 
state of lay governments. The cardinals, most of whom 
reside in Rome although a few are heads of dioceses, 
constitute the Vatican Senate, Apostolic delegates have 
only a religious mission to lay governments but may act 
as intermediaries with the lay authority in practice.
They have access to the same sources of information as 
nuncios, who ar© charged with "a diplomatic mission.
This same political mission extends to internuncios.
The papal envoys ©f ambassadorial rank are nuncios while 
an internuncio is comparable to an envoy extraordinary 
dr minister plenipotentiary. The function of both is 
to foster good relations between the Vatican and the lay 
state while attending t© the state of thê  Church in their
7
to disseminate information and protect its international 
flock by formulating policy, programs, and directives 
intended to stabilise adverse pressures applied by lay 
governments#
On January 30, 1933i> Adolf Hitler, a Catholic, 
became German Chancellor and proceeded t© amass sweeping 
totalitarian powers under the aegis of the National 
Socialist German Workers5 Party (NSDAP)# The Vatiean*s 
inability to reconcile its ultramontanism with the 
National Socialist belief in Party supremacy in all 
aspects of life gave rise to immediate moral and ideo­
logical opposition. Hitler and the Nasi hierarchy 
clearly saw the delicate problem of superimposing 
National Socialism upon religion. They undertook the 
political manipulation of the German Catholic Church and 
the Vatican so as not to become liable to their suasive 
moral and political power#
Conflict first occurred on the political level 
within Germany# Paul von Hindenburg, President of the 
Weimar Republic, appointed Hitler t© head a cabinet 
based on a parlimentary majority of the Reichstag. The
iTssigned' territory. Bishops have authority to govern 
the Church outside of Rome in conformity with canon law 
and papal directives. "'They are the link between the 
Holy See and the parish priest# All ranks are directly 
responsible through the hierarchy to the pope# For 
further information sees Cianfarra, 63=67| Robert A. 
Graham,*) Vatican Diplomacy? A Study of Church and State 
on the ln¥ernallbbal."Flan^TPr Inc eton, New Jersey, 1939), 
23 "and' " 1 2 6   Her'e'slttercited as Graham.
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Nazi Party*, supported by the conservative Nationalists, 
held only 2I4.7 of the $ 83 seats and lacked the necessary 
votes. The Center Party, the party of the golden mean 
that normally elected betxjeen sixty to seventy members 
to the Reichstag, held the balance of pox̂ er between the 
Right and the opposition Left, Hitler began negotiations 
with Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, leader of the Catholic Center, 
to secure an electoral majority. The Chancellor said that 
if negotiations failed he would dissolve the Reichstag 
and hold new elections.
Kaas submitted questions and suggested guarantees 
designed to protect the Center Party. Hitler immediately 
repudiated these- provisions, intended only for discussion, 
as excluding a basis for agreement and called for new 
elections.^- Kaas protested to Hindenburg too late.
Hitler had already obtained a decree from the President 
setting the date of March 1933, as the time for a new 
election. On February 17, the Prussian Minister of the 
Interior, Hermann Goering, ordered his police to open 
fire on members of parties hostile to the government.
Thus a terrorist campaign began which, although directed 
at Communists and Socialists, counted many Catholics among
^"Allan Bullock, Hitlers A Study in Tyranny (New 
York, 1962), 255«58o Hereafter cited as Bullock. Bullock 
and other competent historians believe that Hitler pre- 
raedit&tedly used the submitted provisions as an excuse to 
call for new elections.
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its victims.
The Nazi's intensified election campaign gained 
impetus when an alleged Communist revolution and the 
burning of the Reichstag building gave Hitler an oppor­
tunity to decree the revocation of individual liberties 
guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution. The decree of 
February 28 contained many other provisions that allowed 
the NSDAP to assume vast powers and culminated, on 
March 5* in a Nazi-Nationalist coalition with a bare 
majority in the Reichstag.
The Nazis now began a drive for passage of an 
Enabling Act to allow the government to deviate from the 
Constitution, conclude treaties with foreign powers, and 
enact laws drafted by the Chancellor without the co-oper­
ation of the Reichstag. They needed a two-thirds majority 
to pass the Act as a constitutional amendment. The ne­
cessity for such a large number of votes again plaeed 
Hitler in contention with the Center Party. It had 
actually increased its proportional representation in the 
Reichstag during the election.
Hitler*s March 23 Reichstag speech masterfully 
convinced the opposition parties that it was to their 
advantage to vote for the Enabling Act. Its appeal to 
the Catholic Church Was singularly successful. Promising
< ........George Seldes, The ¥aticans Yesterday— Today
"Tomorrow (New York, 193i0» 336» Hereafter cited as Seldes.
GoerTng^planned to eliminate all opposition. Influential
Catholics were included intentionally, not accidentally.
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peace and Christianity as the foundation of Germany’s life,
Hitler declared that the "Government r̂ill devote its care
6to the sincere living together of Church and State."
The speech evoked an official memorandum from the Fulda
Bishops’ Conference. It stated that, although the German
bishops had adopted a decidedly oppositional attitude
toward National Socialism, subsequent official German
statements convinced them that their earlier prohibitions
7and warnings must now be disregarded.1 The historically 
opportunistic Center Party, believing the speech to be 
a guarantee of Church rights in Germany, voted with the 
two-third majority for passage of the act.
Meanwhile the NSDAP began to extinguish the 
"Catholic political movement" throughout Germany. It 
brutally attacked Catholic associations such as the
National Convention of Roman Catholic Journeymen and the
8Catholic Benevolent Association. Leading bishops com­
plained to the Chancellor about the methods employed.
Hitler sympathetically assured them that such.incidents 
were undesirable, were not directed specifically against 
Catholics, and that Catholic associations would not be
6NCA, VI, 10k.
7Ibid,, 105. The Pulda Bishops’ Conference began 
as an advTsory Assembly of Prussian and Upper Rhenish 
bishops. After 1933? It included all twenty-five German 
bishops. They directed German Catholic opinion. Quite 
often it did not reflect Vatican policy.O
Seldes, 337-38.
disturbed by the new regime if they entertained no tenden-
9cies hostile to the government.
The State1s demand that influential Catholics and 
their organizations stay strictly out of polities began 
to solidify as Hitler molded Germany into a totalitarian 
nation. On April 28* the Chancellor clearly outlined this 
necessity to the bishops of Germany, They had presented 
grievances to him concerning deprivation of the freedom 
of the Catholic Church* schools* associations, and the 
dismissal of Catholic officials purely because of their 
ideology, While forcefully rejecting the idea of any 
renewal of the Kulturkampf and speaking of the Church 
with great regard* Hitler insisted that it simply fulfill 
its spiritual mission and keep its organizations aloof 
from party politics,
Gn June 2k» the Reich followed up this warning 
by -assimilating the Christian (Catholic) Trade Unions 
into the German Labor Front, The Catholic Unions -had 
escaped the general State take»over of unions a month 
earlier purely as a concession to their Christian nature. 
But they continued to use their special position to 
remain undisturbed by National Socialism while promoting
12
politieal Catholicism,,
The replacement of Catholic union leaders with 
National Socialists corresponded with conflict in the 
areas of education*, youth organizations*, and press 
facilities. Reich-Church tension became so hostile 
in fields where both powers claimed jurisdiction that 
the necessity arose to draw clear lines of authority 
within which Church and State could contain themselves. 
The Vatican could no longer divorce itself from the 
relations between the Reich and the German Catholics 
and*,- searching for a way to protect its German member­
ship*, resorted to national political activity designed 
to negotiate a concordat similar to those with the 
German States of Bavaria*, Prussia*, and Baden.
Germany took the initiative in instigating a
concordat by sending a devout Catholict Franz von 
12Papen# to Rome to see the Italian Head of State and
NCA*, III*, 383«81|... The spirit of the German 
attitude' is captured by the Director of the Office of 
the Organization of the German Labor Front in'NCA*, IV*, 
i©J?5>s Mlt is "above all “the Catholic party leaders whom 
the Trade Unions have taken over who should be removed 
from the associations, those men who . . .  are main­
taining their connections with politieal Catholicism 
just as they always have.”
12Fra~nz von Papen (1879*=,1959) i member of Catholic 
Center Party| Vice-Chancellor under Hitler*,"January 3©*, 
1933«^August*, 193ijL; Special Plenipotentiary for'the Saar*, 
November i933csJian©' 193^1 negotiator of’”the Concordat#" 
Ambassador to Austria# July 193hraFebruary 193®l Plenipo­
tentiary Minister Extraordinary on special mission to 
Austria*, July 1936j Ambassador to Turkey*, April 1939- 
August 19l|4»
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placate the Vatican* Papen hoped to use the concordat
not only to ease tension with the Vatican but to pacify
the Cabinet Conservatives1 demand that basic Christian
principles be incorporated into the government’s
1^statements of policy* J
later* Benito Mussolini pointed out to Papen the 
momentous effect that a successful agreement with the 
Vatican would have on world opinion toward Germany* He 
noted that such an act would establish the new regime’s 
prestige abroad for the first time* He told the German 
Embassy in Italy that by enticing the Vatican to conclude 
a concordat* Germany could relieve its isolated position* 
win a moral victory* and gather favorable Catholic opinion 
throughout- the world* This would place Germany on a 
better footing for diplomacy with the lay nations,1 "̂
The German Ambassador to the Holy See passed this 
information on to the Foreign Ministry. He stressed that 
the possibility of a concordat proved important enough 
to upset enemy powers who were ”using all their influence
in order to dissuade the Vatican from concluding a treaty
15with Germany,” ^ Despite foreign opposition, preliminary
“̂ Franz von Papen* Memoirs (New York, 1953)s> 2?8. 
Hereafter cited as Papen.
^fypGFP* Cfl I, 636. These thoughts occurred to 
leaders of “the He i ch, but Mussolini’s beliefs added 
impetus to concordat negotiations*
1 5 -Ibid.* 610-11.
lfc
discussions with the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal
16Eugenio Pacelli, cordially progressed to a discussion 
of the final draft*
German policy toward the Vatican during negoti­
ations, indeed throughout the war years, centered around 
the two explicit demands that Catholic influence he 1) 
absolutely and finally removed from political matters, 
and 2) relegated to a purely Christian role as determined 
by the State* The Vatican, which never openly endorsed 
national Catholic political parties, bargained away the 
Center Party in an effort to conclude the concordat.
The Social Democrats, Communists, and Nationalists 
were already defunct when, on July $ 9 the Center declared 
itself dissolved in accordance with Hitler*s wishes. 
However, sporadic anti-Catholie outbreaks hindered con­
clusion of the concordat. Hitler displayed his genuine 
concern by issuing orders to rescind former measures 
against Catholics in order to appease the Vatican and
17promote conditions conducive to signing of the concordat. ’ 
His desire to bring internal peace succeeded and, on July
' ‘ l6Eugenio Pacelli (1876-1958): Ordained 1899? 
promoted to Secretary of the Sacred Congregation“for 
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, . 191i|.| consecrated 
Archbishop of Sardes, 1917? Papal Nuncio to Bavaria,
1917? Papal Nuncio to Berlin, 1925“29? made a cardinal 
and Secretary of State,“1929? traveled extensively in 
both Americas and Europe? made Camerlengo in 1935? 
elected as Pope Pius XII and reigned from March 2, 1939
to 1958.
1TPapen, 281.
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20* 1933s Papen and Pacelli ratified the first important
foreign treaty entered into by the Third Reich*— the
German-Vatican Concordat,,
,The Concordat theoretically delineated the entire
gamut of legal relationships between Church and State*
but the heart of the document* the provision without
which the Reich would not sign* was the regulation of
"politieal Catholicism" contained in Articles 31 and 
1832o Political Catholicism* originating as a reproach 
against the Roman Papacy during the Kulturkampf* became 
the vortex of National Socialist agitation toward the 
Catholics. Article 31 guaranteed protection to purely 
religious organizations and their respective Christian** 
oriented affiliates„ Organizations extending beyond 
these limits to add social or professional interests 
were similarly protected provided that they remained 
absolutely non-politiealo
The State also guaranteed the right of regular 
worship, to members of sport and youth organizations 
falling under State control,, Members of these organ­
izations received the right of exemption from partici­
pation in activities not in harmony with their religious 
beliefs„ Although the one-party state had become a 
reality by the time Papen and Pacelli signed the document*
10See Appendix A* 18?° 91 for selected articles 
from the Concordat,,
16
Article 32 removed the last possible opposition by flatly 
excluding the clergy from political parties (except the 
NSDAP) and activities on their behalf.
The majority of the articles proved unsatisfactory. 
Article I contained the usual clause pledging freedom of 
religion. Articles 5 through 10 described the legal 
status of the clergy, and 11 through 13 diocesan boundaries 
and juridical religious bodies. All Articles depended on 
favorable interpretation and, in some cases, the status 
of German civil law. Under Article lip the pope appointed 
the bishops who assumed office only in the absence of 
political objections by the government. The selected 
bishops then, by Article 16, swore a loyalty oath to the 
Reich.
The Vatican obtained its major victory in Articles
19 through 25 which guaranteed the Catholic educational
system by providing a basis by which Nazi inroads in this
area could be combatted. Most of the remaining articles,
between 25 and 31? regulated marriage, prisons and other
institutions, and the language to be used in church 
19services.
; Problems of practical application of the Con= 
cordat8s terms became the subject of numerous crises even 
before the final ratification. Misinterpretation, or.
19See Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi 
Germany (New York, 1961$.), 79=66 for a superb explanation 
of the Concordat terms. Hereafter cited as Lewy,
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narrow interpretation* precipitated most crises* but -the 
true reason was more fundamental* The Church grossly 
misunderstood the lengths to which National Socialism 
would go to uphold its totalitarian ideas, and the Reich 
failed to realize how steadfastly the Church would cling 
to its basic doctrines* The document offered various 
opportunities whereby divergent views could be reconciled 
by "joint agreement,” but neither camp foresaw its beliefs 
as totally exclusive of the other’s.
The NSDAP«s method, and that of Hitler, was to 
"jointly agree" only when a number of solutions acceptable 
to the Reich were proposed and the Vatican accepted one 
of them* This worked well for Article 27 whereby the 
Reich nominated a number of Army Bishops, and the Holy 
See appointed one "so that no one can be appointed by
„ 20the Vatican to whom the Reich Government does not agree." 
However, this method did not succeed in areas where Ca­
tholicism was more firmly entrenched.
Article 31 provisions for regulating Catholic 
politieal activities were a constant source of irri­
tation, but the first clashes occurred in the field of 
youth education which seemed to be stabilized by Article 
21. This article provided that religious instruction be 
taught in accordance with Catholic principles as an
20DGFP, C, I, 622. Letter from Papen to Hitler.
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integral part of secondary* senior* and vocational school 
currieulums# Nevertheless* National Socialist requirements 
that teachers join the NSDAP* teach in an atmosphere of 
anti-Semitism* and remove crucifixes from the classrooms 
became irreconcilable with Catholic beliefs in humani- 
tarianism and the display of the visible Church#
Another acute problem arose concerning German 
assimilation of Catholic youth into organizations directed 
by the State# Section ij.* Article 31 pre-supposed differ­
ence of opinion in this respect and specified that members 
of these bodies need only participate as far as their 
religious conviction would allow# Here again, as National 
Socialism gradually inculcated its beliefs into the organ­
izations* the Church found its principles in opposition#
The satisfactory solution of resulting disa­
greements never occurred under the Nazis and, as Germany 
expanded to Western and Eastern Europe, new differences 
emerged when the Concordat did not sufficiently cover 
situations arising in newly incorporated and occupied 
territories. Finally* the statement of Article 33,
Section 2* that? "Should differences of opinion arise 
regarding the interpretation or execution of any of the 
articles of this Concordat* the Holy See and the German
Reich will reach a friendly solution by mutual agreement
21. o o ■#" became untenable#
21See Appendix A* 190#
19
Still9 in July 1933# the Concordat initially satis- 
fied both the Vatican and Germany,, Eminent Catholics now 
considered the Reich as a bulwark against eastern communlsms 
and Cardinal Pacelli assured the German Catholics that their 
position in the nation was secure* Hitler saw many ad­
vantages for the Third Reich. Considering the Vatican1s 
stand against national Socialist doctrine the mere act of 
negotiation pleased him. More notably, the accomplished 
fact caused Catholic withdrawal from most political ac­
tivity, Also, proper manipulation of the Concordat terms 
would allow him to prevent the Vatican from concluding 
further treaties with the individual German states* This 
measure, to stop Vatican exploitation of German political
divison by forming separate concordats, greatly influenced
22German desire for the Concordat. Most importantly, he
realized that the conciliation, seemingly impossible a few
months before, earned him support from all over the country
as Man unreserved recognition of the present regime! • *
» 23« o
r "Anti-Catholic measures increased in Germany im­
mediately after ratification of the Concordat* On July 
25, the government promulgated a sterilization law of
-2%onradHeiden, Per Fuehrer; Hitler*s Rise to 
Power (Boston, 19^4), 63I4JT -Hereafter cited as Heiden, 
Der-'Fuehrer „
23DGFP, C, I, 653I Papen, 280*
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untold repugnance to the Church. The "Law for the Pre­
vention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring" had been 
approved on July 1^ but was put off until the 25th so as 
not to jeopardize conclusion of the Concordat. From this 
time forward the Reich carried out a conscientious policy 
Of "co-ordinating" the German Catholics. Co-ordination 
meant to construct a quasi-national Germanic Church which 
would pursue interests parallel to the National Socialist 
principles of the State. -
Attempts to achieve this result caused Germany
to over-step guarantees decreed in the Concordat, In
October, the Vatican presented the Foreign Minister with
a list of specific .points of discord arising from German
violations of the document. The Vatican expressed the
opinion that the situation differed "from the tragic
experiences of the Kulturkampf of the past only by its
2k-greater harshness and depotism." Yet Germany showed 
little inclination to negotiate about these differences 
until the middle of December. At that time Hitler 
approved the sending of a special representative to 
communicate directly with the Vatican rather than through 
Diego von B e r g e n , t h e  Ambassador—to the Holy See. The 
Reich took this action only after Ambassador Bergen
2k-DGFP „ C. II, 25.
25lbld.. 9. Diego von Bergen; German Ambassador 
to the Holy See, April 1920-Apri-l 19^3.
21
repeatedly stated that the Holy See displayed a profound 
distaste for German failure to discuss the Concordat 
breeches, BergenJs warning that the Vatican was beginning 
to advocate an outright schism with the Reich resulted in 
a direct and open display of Germany's willingness to 
consider the breeches,, This proved to be a highly suc­
cessful maneuver,
Of\Pope Pius XI had already written a Christmas 
speech denouncing Germany in the bitterest terms for 
violating the Concordat in regard to the education of 
youth and persistent ill-treatment of Catholics all over 
Germany,, "All the world was expecting a very sharp pro­
nouncement against us by the Pope*, , , ." Bergen wrote 
to the Foreign Minister, 11 and we succeeded only by dint 
of the greatest effort, and by use of all the diplomatic
means at our disposal, in eliminating bit by bit the harsh
27ideas already set down in writing," Pius XI rewrote the 
speech and attacked only the sterilization law while delet­
ing all other anti^German passages. The special repre­
sentative's presence successfully stopped the Christmas 
denunciation and caused further action concerning the list
^Ambrosi© p'ajnlen Achille Ratti,(1857-1939)° Apos- 
tblic Visitor to Poland, the Baltic States, ̂ and. Russia, 
1918? Papal Nuncio to Boland, 1918-1921f made a cardinal, 
1921| elevated to Archbishop of Milan, 1921 j elected Pope 
Pirns XI on February 6 , 1922 and served to March 1939? 
greatest political achievement was the Lateran Treaty with 
Italy, 1929,
27DGFP^ :C, II, 281*, 27?,
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of breeches to lapse into oblivion simply because of
oRcalculated inaction by the Reich.
Co-ordination of the German Catholic political 
apparatus continued in 1934 manifested by State 
take-over of the great array of daily nex^spapers, 
weeklies, and periodicals of the Catholic Press. In 
February, the Reich Director of the Press subordinated 
Catholic publications to the NSDAP. The following year 
Germany pointed out that the Church no longer needed a 
press as the Concordat provided for government pro­
tection of the Church. Finally, with the outbreak of 
war the press remaining in existence complied with 
demands of the NSDAP to join their propaganda campaign. 
However, reduction of the press to a shadow of its former
power negated the great benefit that this may have had 
29for Germany,
30The appointment of Alfred Rosenberg, author of 
the pagan and racist The Myth-of the 20th Century, as
28The special representative, Rudolph Buttmann, 
periodically appeared at and disappeared from the Vatican 
throughout 1933 and 1934* Buttmann made prolonged excuses 
for his absence only to return xdien the Vatican applied 
great pressure. Subsequently, he would refuse to converse 
and leave again. See; DGFP, C, II, 25* 172-73* 240, 247.
29Lewy, 143-148.
30Alfred Rosenberg (1893~1946)“ early associate 
of the Nazi movement! head of the Nazi Party Office for 
Foreign Policy' and Ideology, 19331 Reich Minister for the 
Occupied Eastern Territories, 194-11 official Nazi phi­
losopher and author of many' other treatises on Nazi doctrine 
besides The Myth. Inclusion of The Myth on the Catholic
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director of ideological training for the NSDAP hindered 
further negotiations concerning practical application of 
the Concordat. The Vatican looked upon his appointment 
as a confirmation of German plans to exterminate Christi- 
anity and to replace it with a united Germanic Church 
under the leadership of National Socialism* The Reich 
merely explained that the Vatican need not worry since 
no one was obliged to read the book. During the summer 
of 193ij- the Nazi !,Roehm Purge" of military elements in 
opposition to basic Reich policy, including many Catho­
lics, and an abortive Nazi putsch in Austria over­
shadowed direct concern about this appointment.
In May, a month after Rosenberg’s appointment, 
Ambassador Bergen became quite anxious about the de­
terioration of Reich-Vatican relations and sent a long 
communique to the Foreign Minister to that effect.
Bergen pointed out that a clash with the Vatican was 
inevitable because German maneuvers to frustrate imple­
mentation of articles of the Concordat not favorable t§ 
the Reich had become less effective. The Concordat was 
a major treaty with a foreign power which led Bergen to 
conclude that if an actual discharge of obligations was
Index over-joyed Rosenberg who believed this contributed 
greatly to its circulation. The work evoked many violent 
attacks from the bishops which might otherwise have been 
avoided. Many circles maintain that Hitler’s failure to 
read and censure the book was a blunder on his part.
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not carried out the Vatican would discredit German fi­
delity. Bergen knew this would encourage other foreign 
powers to cast "doubt on the credibility of all the
political agreements and commitments proposed by us 
31[Germany]." Such an action would also have an 
unwanted reaction in the highly Catholic countries and 
hinder German plans to re-occupy the Saar.
The Reich accepted Bergen's advice and intensi­
fied relations with the Vatican aimed mainly at reaching 
some agreement over the Concordat that would satisfy the 
Holy See. Negotiations, although rather unproductive, 
proved successful enough to pacify the Vatican for the 
moment. By August 5,- Minister of the Interior Goering 
felt that problems arising from Nazi interference in 
Church matters had dissipated enough to order all State 
and Party authorities "to refrain from making any kind 
of disparaging remarks either about the Church's re­
ligious and moral doctrines or about ecclesiastical
32institutions and persons." Thereafter, when Hitler 
became Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor as well as Commander- 
in-Chief of the Armed Forces upon Hindenburg’s death, 
Reich-Vatican relations returned to more normal channels.
Throughout 1935 and early 1936 conditions remained
31DGFP, C, II, 8I4.I-I4.2 .
3 2Ibid., Ill, 291-92.
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much the same. Germany continued to impose National 
Socialist principles and totalitarian ideals upon the 
Church* but open friction became less obvious. Dis- 
cussions of Article 31 virtually disappeared as the 
Foreign Ministry continued to promise settlement of 
outstanding questions* and the Vatican steadfastly 
demanded practical proof of the German intention. The 
situation matured into a German-Vatican rapprochement 
because the Vatican feared that Communist-supported 
Popular Front governments in Spain and France would 
allow atheistic communism to sweep into Europe. By 
January 28* 1936* Germany pursued the eradication of 
political Catholicism and co-ordination of the Church 
only to a degree that would not develop into open 
conflict with the Vatican.33
Yet* pressures to incorporate Catholic organi­
zations into the State and to replace Christian beliefs 
with those of the &SDAP continued. Article 33- neither 
satisfactorily defined what associations could remain 
active nor to what degree the youth movements could 
retain religious instruction outside of the standard 
State supported program.
As the years passed and the totalitarian State 
became more cohesive* the Keich more and more believed
33DGFP, C» IV* 1010.
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that Catholic youth associations over-stepped their vaguely 
described bounds into the realm of political action. Here 
they clashed with the Hitler Youth. Minor prohibitions 
placed on the Church organizations, without interference 
by the German Bishops or the Vatican, accumulated until 
complete abolition of the Catholic youth caused grave 
concern at the Holy See.
On December 1 , 1936* Hitler outlawed the Catholic 
Youth Association and named Baldur von Schlrach as "Youth 
Leader of the German Belch.H The Nuncio to Berlin, Mon- 
signor Cesare Orsenigoreflected Vatican opinion by 
strongly protesting against what amounted to compulsory 
enrollment of the entire German youth into the Hitler 
Youth. "Indeed, the 108,000 Hitler Youth of 1932 swelled 
to 5»400;00'by the end of 1936 and to 7,700,000 in 
1939*35 Catholic rights to religious instruction in 
schools and to maintenance of theological schools and 
seminaries as stipulated in Articles 20, 21, and 23 of 
the Concidrda;t steadily'lost ground and protesting Catho­
lics were confined to concentration camps. These and 
other pressures culminated in 1937 when.the Reich-Vatican 
conflict reached a peak.
34Cesare Orsenigo (1873-1946)i Apostolic Nuncio 
to Hungary and Poland, 1929; Papal Nuncio to Berlin, 
1930-1945; influential in negotiation of the German- 
Vatican Concordat.
35NCA, V , 113..
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The more courageous leaders of the episcopate sent 
a delegation to pressure Pope Pius XI into taking a stand 
on German suppression of Catholics, The Pope needed no 
urging because the Reich repeatedly failed to respond to 
his communications and had now all but terminated negoti- 
ations over the Concordat, Pius XI penned an encyclical 
concerning the condition of the Church in Germany entitled 
Mit Brennender Sorge ("With Burning Anxiety”). The Vatican 
instructed that the document be smuggled into Germany, to 
prevent a ban on its being read. Copies were made and 
sent to all the parish priests and bishops to be read from 
the pulpits.
The specific and explosive character of the anti- 
German pronouncements caught the Reich by surprise. The 
encyclical of March lij.* 1937s went directly to the heart 
of German fears that lack of agreement over*.and breeches,^ 
of, the Concordat would be placed before the world as an 
unfulfilled treaty, Pius XI devoted lengthy passages to 
the Reich!s "unwritten law" of arbitrary misinterpretation, 
evasion, and open violation of conditions agreed upon by 
the two powers.
Governments are rarely named in encyclicals 
regardless of what offenses they have inflicted upon the
J U.S., Department ©f State, Documents on German 
Foreign .Policy, 1918-1911.5, Series D, (1937*
‘(Washington: 195b“l96ij.), I, 93b, Hereafter 
DGFP o
cited as
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Church. In this way the Vatican can maintain a neutral 
position by making humanitarian appeals to the world at 
large. But “Anxiety1 minced no words and the Government 
of the Reich saw its title in print. Clearly, the Vatican 
had no intention of compromising with a state that sowed 
the seeds of hatred and hostility while persecuting the 
Church with “machinations that from the beginning had no 
other aim than a war of extermination."
The Reich8s reaction would determine the fate of 
the Catholic, population in Germany. Various authorities 
suggested diverse methods of coping with this delicate 
problem. Ambassador Bergen informed the Foreign Ministry 
that the' encyclical must be ignored, and the unfavorable 
effects neutralized by timely factual replies in the hope 
that the storm would pass over.^ The Foreign Ministry, 
rejecting this view, regarded "Anxiety" as a call to
battle but reserved its. official opinion until a later
39 kOdate. Hans Kerri,^ responded by accusing clerics of
hostile acts against National Socialism that had jeopard-
ized any possible agreement in the preceding years. The
3^For the complete text of "With Burning Anxiety" 
sees Harry C. Koenig (ed.)„ Principles for Peace; Se- 
lections from-Papal-Documents„ Leo XIII to Pius XII ’
{Washington, 19k3) 5 Hereafter cited as Koenig,
38DGFP» I, 934-35.
39Ibid.„ 938.
^0The post of Reichsbischof originated in 1933
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official response followed none of these lines.
Action taken at the top of the Reich hierarchy 
cane directly from leaders of the Nazi Party, The men 
who reflected the ■ultimate hostility toward the Church 
had now gained control of all aspects of German life 
and government. The official line accused the bishops 
and archbishops of violating Article 16* the compulsory 
loyalty oath stating that they must strive for the 
interests of the Reich while endeavoring to avoid acts 
detrimental to it, Reich leaders failed to halt the 
reading of "Anxiety” from the pulpits but* using the 
"breeches” of Article 16 as their justification* abso­
lutely forbade any reproduction or dissemination of 
the encyclical.^
To neutralize its effectiveness Joseph Goebbels* 
the Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment* 
launched a campaign of accusation against occupants of 
the monasteries. Two old charges left dormant since the 
Concordat negotiations of July 1933 were now reopened.
with Pastor Ludwig Mueller in that position, Gn September 
28, 1935s Hans Kerri was mad© Minister for Church Affairs 
and* displacing the Protestant Mueller* began a program 
to incorporate all German churches into a Nazi National 
Church with a' Christian basis. The divergent views of 
Hitler* Ribbentrop, Hinaaler* and Bormann, sabotaged his 
every effort, Kerri was also Minister of Space Planning 
which resulted in his dubious unofficial title of "Minis­
ter of"Space and Eternity.” Kerri died in 19ij.l and the 
post remained vacant.
^DGFP* I* 935»
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The Reich again claimed that the clergymen committed 
treason by illegally exporting money from Germany and 
resumed the so-called "immorality t r i a l s . F e w  
currency violation cases came to court but the immo- 
rality trials appeared by the hundreds» Nazi controlled 
daily newspapers ground out sordid details of alleged 
illicit relations between priests and nuns and charges 
of homosexuality among the clergy* Restrictions on the 
mass media greatly hindered Catholic refutation of these 
charges* The campaign effectively caused a large segment 
of the German population to regard the clergy as sex 
criminals*
Nevertheless, in May of 1937* the means of diplo­
matic couanunieation remained open in an effort to find 
some basis for an agreement that would relieve the great 
tension that had built up* On May 29® even this last 
hope of achieving a reconciliation was extinguished* 
George Cardinal Mundeleins Archbishop of Chicago de­
livered a speech charging the "paper-hanging” Fuehrer 
and "crooked Propaganda Minister” with engineering 
atrocious propaganda methods concerning the morality 
trials,A3
^DGFP 9 I, , 9l|.5i'H Gerhard “Ritter, The -German 
Resistance;-Carl GoerdeIer*s -Struggle Against Tyranny 
(!N@w 1‘orky l95’6 ) 9 ' 54* Hereafter cited as Hitter*
^3BGFP5 I, 968I Cianfarra, 101-102*
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Enraged at this personal attack* Hitler prompted 
a declaration stating that " * the conditions necessary for 
a normal state of relations between the Reich Government 
and the Holy See® no longer e x i s t e d . B e r g e n  tried to 
persuade the Vatican to reprimand Cardinal Mundelein.
The Vatican answered that it was powerless because of 
the irrefutable facts* and that though he was a Catholic 
Cardinal he was not an official of the Roman Curia,
Hitler then ordered the suspension of the immorality 
trials until further notice, but the damage was done.
In his Christmas speech of 1937 the Pope forcefully de­
nounced the brutal, violent, and deceitful religious 
persecution throughout Germany,
Throughout 1938 and early 19399 Germany embarked 
on a consistently negative course to consolidate its 
position against the German Catholic Church. The Reich 
closed down the remaining Catholic schools, forbade 
publication and circulation of papal messages, and re­
lentlessly denounced alleged Vatican violation of rights 
defined by the Concordat. Martin Bormann,^ Deputy of
W pGFP„ I, 993*
^Martin Bormann (1900-' )i Head of the Party 
Chancery| Secretary of the’Fuehrer (succeeding Rudolph 
Hess in 19ij.l) I Reich Leader and Reich Minister? member of 
the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich? 
General in the Secret State "Police (S.S.)j appointed 
Party Chancellor in Hitler*s"political testament of April 
29, 19V5l missing and rumored killed in an attempt to 
escape from Berlin on May 2, 19^5*
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the Fuehrers issued a regulation banning members of the 
clergy from the NSDAP on the grounds that conflicts of 
an ecclesiastical-political nature must be avoided* He 
later amended the decree to include all Germans wh© were 
even ’’closely connected” with the Church.^ This sig­
nificant step affected a very'large part of the German 
population* Soon the Catholic students* associations 
throughout Germany folded* the national Young Men*s 
Association collapsed* and the last distinct traces of 
the German Catholic political apparatus passed into 
obscurity*
It is significant that the German Catholics so 
easily accepted repression of the Church in Germany* 
Acquiescence existed because of the not uncommon belief 
that a new and greatly improved era was coming into 
existence* All of Germany felt the impact of revo­
lutionary years that produced hope* self-confidence* 
pride* and the establishment of a new military might 
that had been lost in the frustrating wake of the Peace 
of Versailles after World War I* Much of this hope 
was fulfilled between 1933 and 1939. New jobs were 
created and prosperity returned while Germany moved 
from one triumph to another under its new foreign policy. 
Most people realized thht sacrifices had to be made in
Ill* 606*
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other areas if the dream were to come true. One of those 
areas was the German Catholic Church,
In retrospect, it appears that reduction of Catho- 
lic influence in Germany was a gradual and methodical de- 
Christianization of Germany at the order of Hitler, More 
truthfully, this reduction occurred as National Socialism 
gradually matured within a totalitarian state, which, by 
its very nature, had to subvert the Church to the State, 
This is nothing unique in history. Totalitarianism 
cannot condone the existence of another strong and hier­
archical organization— the Catholic Church had become 
a state within a state— inside its borders.
By 1938, the Nazi Party controlled all aspects 
of German activity. One of the few remaining avenues of 
opposition revolved around traditional aspects of Christi­
anity such as individual beliefs, family life, and the 
Church itself,^ In 1939, the Party effectively removed 
this treat. Strong.Nazis like Bormann apd Rosenberg 
now even rejected the Idea of a State Church, They argued 
that no close relationship of any kind could exist between 
a National Socialist State and the Catholic Church, 
Furthermore, they believed that the Church hierarchy 
rejected National Socialism and would not'help the State
Zf-7Ernst Welzsaecker, Memoirs of Ernst von Weiz- 
s^cker (Chicago, 1951) » 169.. Hereafter cited as Welz­
saecker,
31+
. . .  ~ 2+8 m  time of crisis.
Hitler believed the same thing but had a much
different attitude about how the Vatican should be
handled, Whereas Bormann, Rosenberg, and their followers
truly wanted to uproot the Church and its members, Hitler
knew that this would cause it to pull together. He also
knew that it was greatly to his advantage to keep the
Vatican from taking a public stand against Germany. He
solved the problem of eradicating the Catholic Church
without alienating the Vatican by tactfully manipulating
• ' li.9negotiations concerning implementation of the Concordat,
By opportunistically opening, intensifying, and suspend­
ing negotiations it was possible for the Reich to suppress 
political Catholicism.
Hitler also had the insight to refrain from direct 
attacks on the international Church. Rather than entirely 
severing communications xtfith the Vatican and brutally
closing down Church activity altogether, he used indirect 
50methods, Reich take-over of Catholic youth and schools 
on the grounds that it was necessary to further the Hitler 
Youth and NSDAP doctrine is one example. By cautiously
^8NCA, III, 167“69.
Ii9Waldemar Gurian, "Hitler's Undeclared War on the 
Catholic Church," Foreign Affairs, XVI, 270. Hereafter 
cited as Gurian.
^ ° I b i d . 26
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infringing-on traditional Church rights and justifying 
the infringements by narrowly interpreting the Concordat9 
Hitler reduced the Church to submission.
CHAPTER I I
GERMANY USES CATHOLIC SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION
To understand fully the mood of "new era” confi­
dence that helped the National Socialists co-ordinate 
the German Catholics, one must examine the simultaneous 
triumphs of Hitler’s territorial expansion. Less than 
a month after the signing of the Concordat, Hitler 
announced that "because of the denial of moral and 
material equal rights to Germany he was withdrawing 
from the Disarmament Conference and the League of 
Nations. On the same day, October 1^, 1933* the Fuehrer 
announced that Germany would hold a plebiscite on 
November 12 to allow the German people to voice their 
opinion of this action. There was no doubt that the
people, remembering the loss of the First World War and1
the humiliating Treaty of Versailles, would react favor­
ably in this Instance and that an adverse stand by the 
German episcopate would have no decisive effect on the 
outcome. Nevertheless, the new government took measures 
to assure that the bishops would conform.
The principle method used to bring the bishops 
into line was to extol the virtues of German nationalism 
while indirectly repressing any opposition. Vice- 
Chancellor Papen, the Catholic protagonist of the Con­
cordat, accompanied Hitler to a mass meeting in Essen 
and urgently requested his ’’Catholic fellow-cltizens” to
37
reward the new Chancellor’s recognition of Germany’s 
Christian basis with their vote of confidence in the 
upcoming plebiscite,J-
Most bishops believed that the regime’s foreign 
policy merely expressed the German nationalism of which 
they themselves were an intricate part and needed no 
convincing. Yet, the few prominent clergymen who could 
not forget Nazi ill-treatment of their brethren and. the 
difficulties arising under the Concordat demanded that 
concessions be made for their support. These sparse 
demands immediately met with National Socialist reprisals 
in the from of prohibitions on their press outlets and
restrictions on the context of their sermons. On
November 12, 1933, the overwhelming majority of the 
bishops, reflecting public opinion of the German people, 
followed their nationalistic instincts and supported 
Hitler, the Nazi Party, and rearmament by voting their
approval in the plebiscite,
German ambition to re-occupy the Saar, a mining 
area placed under control of the League of Nations after 
World War I, caused a more difficult problem. Initially, 
the Saar, with its nationalistic German population, could 
have easily been incorporated into the Reich with no
1NCA. YI, 102-03.
2Lewy, 181,
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objections from the Vatican,, The area was seventy per 
cent Catholic and strongly predisposed to Germany because 
its Catholic population looked to the bishoprics of Trier 
and Speyer^ for leaderships Ambassador Bergen, aware.of 
the tendency of these people to follow the German bishops 
and the pope, requested that the Holy See refrain frbm 
signs of partiality toward France because it would turn 
the people of the Saar against Germany.
Pacelll, the Vatican Secretary of State, laid 
bare the problem by informing the Ambassador that Pius 
XI and the Saar clergy no longer welcomed German advances 
In that area. This attitude arose because of delays in
2icarrying out the Concordat*s provisions in Germany. On 
December 8 , 1933. Bergen informed Pacelli that the govern 
ment Intended to conciliate questions arising from the 
Concordat as quickly as possible and to consider the 
Vatican's Ideological objections to the sterilization 
law.^ Further efforts to influence the Vatican Included
The bishoprics of Trier and Speyer were within 
the Reich proper. These bishops followed the typical 
policy of the German bishops which was to support the 
state to which they owed allegiance. See; Appendix B, 
192-93 locations of German diocesan boundaries.
fypGFP. C, II, 167-70.
5Ibid.. II, 196. This Is the July 25, 1933. "Law 
for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring.1* 
Germany had proclamated the law despite strong Vatican 
opposition.
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the special appointment of Papen to rally support in the 
Saar. By the year*s end, conditions stabilized to such 
a degree that the Vice-Chancellor sent a highly optimistic 
message to the Foreign Ministry. He reported that the 
Vatican*s representative to the Saar viewed the territory 
as a German country which should be returned to the Reich.^ 
Events during the first half of 193^ caused the 
accommodating Catholic outlook to decline rapidly. Con­
tinued deliberation over implementation of the Concordat* 
the ”Roehm Purge” that.took Catholic lives, and the as­
sassination of Austria*s Catholic Chancellor caused the 
Vatican to disregard German attempts to secure its support 
in the Saar. German foreign poliey now became more inter­
twined with Vatican reaction to the condition of the German 
Catholic Church. Successful reoccupation of the Saar with 
a minimum of hostility from the population was desirable. 
This necessitated a relaxation of conflict in the Reich 
in order to secure Vatican approval which would, in turn, 
insure a favorable plebiscite from the Catholic population.
Itfith this in mind, the government again swayed the 
Vatican by undertaking intensified negotiations toward
settlement of Concordat disputes and relaxing pressure on
7the Church in Germany. Again, the bishops thought of
6DGFP0 C 9 II, 195=96.
7L@wy, 127.
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their patriotic duty to the country to which they ©wed
allegiance and, influenced by the intense pro-German
feeling within the Saar* gave their support to Hitler*
Gn January 13, 1935* the Saar plebiscite indicated a
resounding approval of the new expansionistic foreign
policy by producing a ninety per cent vote for the
Saarss return to Germany*
The final phase of Hitler8s reclamation of land
lost in Western Europe under the treaty of Versailles
succeeded without opposition from the Vatican. By this
time, Germany had achieved a general rapprochement with
8the Vatican and the German Catholics. Hitler replied 
to a Franco-Soviet treaty of February 2?, 1936, by in­
vading the demilitarized Rhineland and denouncing the 
Locarno Pact as incompatible with the treaty. The
Rhineland bishops joined the crowds that enthusiastically
9greeted the troops as they crossed the Rhine bridges.
By July 18, Reich-Vatican relations remained 
relatively good as another totalitarian-minded leader 
destined to play an ambiguous role in the fate of 
Hitler®s Germany marched his Nationalist' troops against 
the Loyalists of Republicah Spain. Generalissimo 
Francisco Franc©10 recognized the importance of having
®DGFPo CB IV, 1010. Also sees Chapter I, 25.
9Lewy, 201.
10Francisco Franeo (1892- ) i made a General,
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the Spanish Catholic’s support for his plans while, at 
the same time, creating a commonly acceptable ideology 
among the various fighters for liberation that he had 
assembledo
At the outset, the Vatican supported Franco 
because of persecution the Republican government had 
earlier directed against Catholicism,, The Vatican’s 
support was reinforced by the fact that Franco fought 
against a government that was backed by Russia, Russian 
projection of atheistic communism into any area of 
Europe alarmed the Vatican, In 1936. the Holy See Up- 
held the Rome-Berlin Axis for the very reason that it 
too appeared to be a bulwark against communism. But, 
since Germany granted aid to Franco’s Nationalists 
during the Spanish Civil War, and Spain had a predomi­
nately Catholic population, problems Inevitably resulted 
because of the Reich’s treatment of its Catholics,
The Vatican’s mood of benevolence toward Franco 
paralleled developments in the Reich and could not help 
but change as Germany more clearly supported the Nation­
alists while increasing suppression of German Catholics,
1926? returned to Spain from Morocco as a Rightist War 
Minister, 1934; exciled to the Canaries by Leftist forces, 
1936; became head of the revolutionary forces, June 1936; 
defeated the Loyalists in August 1939; despite his claim 
of neutrality in September 1939s he remained close to the 
Axis; given life tenure In Spain and can elect his own 
successor by a law of July 6, 194?«
Thus* the Vatican*s natural tendency t© ally with Germany 
in the mutual fight against Russian ideology and the 
Spanish government became untenable because of conditions 
in the Reich*
In December* it became clear that even though 
Germany participated in the British sponsored neutrality 
agreement t© keep the Spanish Civil War locals it con­
tinued to supply Franco with military aide The Vatican*s 
attitude toward the Nationalist cause waned because ©f
11Germanyss obvious intent to remain involved in the war 
and the conditions in Germany that gave rise to the 
encyclical !,With Burning Anxiety®11 Franco adopted the 
German view that the Vatican must not be allowed to
interfere with governmental operations and banned the
12document from Spain* The Holy Seess hostile policy
perplexed both Germany and Italy* They could not
understand how the Vatican justified such a position
11while they carried on a fight against communism*
What promised to become an open Reieh-Vaticam 
break with dire consequences for Franco was smoothed 
over by further diplomatic maneuvering by the Reich®
After September 13* 1937*. Hitler repeatedly referred to
“̂ ^Hugh Thoma'So The "Spanish Civil -War (New York 
1-961), 358«> Hereafter cited as Thomas. '
12 ■ . .DGFPn III* 293-9j? *
13Ibid09 26?*
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National Socialism as the ideology that would cause the
destruction of eommmnism and Spanish soil as the
battlefield upon which this war would be waged* Also*
German suppression of the Pope’s encyclical* resumption
of the immorality trials* and demands upon the Vatican
concerning Cardinal Mundelein resulted in a Vatican
policy of reserve designed to promote a compromise over
Ikthe internal German situation* ^
On August 28* the Holy See committed itself to
15the support of the Nationalists* The Spanish Catholic 
hierarchy* exclusive of the Loyalist Basques* never 
wavered from this stand* However* the copnitmeht did 
not relieve Germany from frustrating experiences induced 
by Vatican actions* In December of 1937? Lope Pius XI 
again denounced the persecution of Catholics ih"1 the 
Reich*
Throughout 1938* the German Ambassador in Spain 
sent reports to the Foreign Ministry advising that the 
Church’s influence on Franco greatly added to Germany’s 
difficulty in bringing him directly and concretely into 
the Reich’s orbit* Germany’s main efforts.to advance 
totalitarian aims in Spain revolved around the Falange®
'^For events taking place in the Reich sees 
Chapter I* 27=30* The reserved Vatican policy did not 
result in better relations* In 1938-39* conditions in 
the Reich became worse*
15DGFP* III* i+82; Thomas* 1+50=51.
Franc,© wholeheartedly supported this organization but 
refused to implement its principles in a rapid and 
explicit manner as'desired by Germany because of ob-
T £Sections from the Vatican, Furthermore, tfye Ambassador 
reported, the Vatican swayed the Generalissimo’s 
brother-in-law and Minister of the Interior, Serrano 
Suner, so profoundly that he allowed the State to be 
subjugated to the Church 7
Germany believed its co-ordination of the German 
Catholic Church to be more important than trying to 
appease the Holy See in an effort to take Church 
pressure off the liberation movement. In 1937-38,
while the Vatican did its utmost to exert pressure on
!
Franco and his followers, the Reich reached the peak of 
its suppression of the Church, During this time, the
i
Reich made no conciliatory moves toward the Holy See as 
a direct result of hindrance of its policies in the 
Spanish Civil War,
The only Impediment Germany used to stem Vatican 
interference In Spain was the constant reference to a 
united front against Russian communism. Even this call 
arose as a common idea in Europe rather than being 
directed exclusively toward Rome, On March 27, 1939,
1 6DGFP. Ill, 660,
17Ibid., 8^8,
it looked as if this would he enough to cement German-
Italian relations with Spain without causing either a
German or Spanish break with the Vatican.
Disregarding Vatican pleas for a truce* Franco
launched a campaign* long desired by Germany* in
Catalonia. In early March* the Nationalists secured
their objective and on March 27 Spain joined Germany*
Italy* and Japan in their pact against communism. The
Spanish Civil War brought these nations much closer
together ideologically. The Vatican indirectly lauded
Germany by profusely congratulating Frane© and the forces
X8that supported him.
Franco turned his attention to achieving harmony 
within Catholic Spain after his victory. It could not 
be assumed, that the Nationalists would continue to over­
look the ill-treatment of Catholics in Germany once their
position was consolidated* when the Vatican remained an
19integral part of their life and culture. In relation 
to events in Spain* the German-Russian Non-Aggression 
Pact of August 23 was a blunder. The German movement 
toward Russia-decreased the Spanish desire-to continue 
to-seek German aid. The German invasion of Poland and 
suppression of its Catholics later in 1939 did not help
19
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Allison E. Peers* The Spanish Dilemma (London*
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the German cause either. On September I4., 1939® Spain 
declared strict neutrality. Pranco!s New Year’s Eve 
speech implicitly confirmed Spain, Italy, and the Catho­
lic Church as the defenders against the common enemy, 
Russia. It made no mention of Germany.
Prom 1939 to 1943® Hitler unsuccessfully tried to 
bring Spain into the war on the side of Germany. Spain’s 
adherence to the Axis in '■19̂ 1 would have .greatly enhanced 
German possibilities in North Africa. Hitler, not 
wishing to risk an invasion of Spain, could not .get 
Franco’s voluntary help. This is partly attributable 
to the refusal of Serrano Suner to forget his reser­
vations toward the Third Reich as a result of its perse­
cution of German Catholics.20 In 19^1® Hitler confided 
to Mussolini that this man, and the improved position
the Church had gained in Spain after Franco’s vietory,
21frustrated his-preparations to occupy Gibraltar.
Hitler did not blame Franco for not allying with Germany,
but "the systematic sabotage perpetrated by his Jesuit
22brother-in-law. . . . "  Serrano Suner.
In 191+-2, Goebbels * placed the blame for Spain’s
p n . . .DGFP9 X, 97-8.
21Gale&zzo Gian©, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London, 
19^8), lj.19. Hereafter oiled as Ciano^s Papers.
2?Adolf Hitler, The Testament of Adolf Hitlers The
Hitler-Bo-rmann Documents, February-April 1943 (London
23refusal to aid Germany squarely on Franco and the Vatican„ J 
It is clear that Hitler's failure to ease conditions in 
Germany for the Catholics and to pacify the Vatican was 
an integral aspect of his inability to bring Spain into 
the war0 In spite of this, Hitler's neglect did not alter 
the total picture -that evolved since the beginning of the 
Spanish Civil War.
Germany and the Vatican were more gravely con­
cerned with events that developed in another area.
Germany's need to absorb Catholic countries, and the 
Vatican's desire to forego any repetition of conditions 
now present in the Reich collided. On March 12, 1938, 
Germany's annexation of Austria caused the first instance 
of grave hostility on an International scale.
Vatican officials looked upon Austria as a Catho­
lic stronghold against communism as well as socialism.
They directly supported its independence„ In 193^» the 
Nazi regime began to supplant this defense against 
communism with anti-Christian ideologies and lay grounds 
for a struggle that would last into the latter years of 
the war. Throughout May and June of that year, Austrian 
Nazi's bombed vicarages and the residences of archbishops.
The Nazis later found the Catholic Church to be one of
^Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries 19^2-19^3 
(New York, 19^8), 63, 119. 166. Hereafter cited as Goebbels.
^8
2kth© strongest organizations opposing them,^-
The May.=June bombings subsided at the insistence 
of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss* staunch advocates 
Benito Mussolini, Mussolini found Hitler in a concili­
atory mood because of his involvement in the June 30 
”Roehm Purge” and the question of succession to Hinden- 
burg. The Fuehrer needed a period ©f tranquillity t© 
consolidate his position. The February declaration of 
France and Britain to support Italy in an attempt to 
uphold Austrian independence also influenced the decision 
to stop the bombing. But ©verzealous Austrian Nazis 
failed to heed the Reich8s policy and undertook a putseh. 
On July 2j??, the putsch abruptly failed but the Nazis, 
murdered Dollfuss,
The Reich found itself in aggravated..-tension with 
the Vatican.and facing the. loss of Mussolini*s backing, 
Germany immediately took..successful steps.t$ correct, 
this turn ©f ©vents, ; While the Reich appeased both 
opponents by reducing anti-Catholie decrees in the 
Reich* th© crowning touch was the dispatch ©f Papen 
as Minister-Extraordinary to Austria, The mere presence 
of Papen^former Center Party member* non-Nazi* devout 
Catholic* and instigator of th© Goncordat— sufficiently
^NSA* iv* 310,
2 $For the status of ©vents in th© Reich during 
this period sees Chapter I* 2^,
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comforted both factions in Rome to bring about a quiet
ending to the year,,
From 1934 to 1935s Papen, feeling that he appeared
like a M'Catholic in wolf's clothing*8” worked diligently
for the German annexation of Austria. Despite constant
frustration by the Vatican's most vociferous Austrian
27representative* Theodor Cardinal Innitzer, Papen ex­
ploited not only his own reputation as torch-bearer of
28the Catholic cause but that of his wife. During July
of 1938* Papen instituted many political manipulations
to-promote a peaceful annexation of Austria, On July
11, an Austro-German agreement stated Hitler's recognition
29of Austrian sovereignty while Kurt von Sehusehnigg,
^Papen, 351®
Theodor Innitzer (1875-1955)s Cardinal* 1933? 
Archbishop'of Vienna, 1938? censured by Pope Pius XI for 
his political recommendation of Austrian union with 
Germany, 1938? threatened by German occupying forces,
1939®
OP\In his memoirs, Papen unswervingly claims that 
he remained in power and carried out his duties only in 
order t© deter Nazi brutality toward th© Catholics and to 
secure the best interests of the German people. A few 
scattered sources substantiate this idea. The majority 
of sources maintain that Papen, although somewhat of a 
dullard, consciously and voluntarily worked directly for 
the best interests of the Third Reich and all its ramifi­
cations. For the latter vieTw see: NO A, VII, 105 and NCA,. 
Supplement B, 1149=50.' One of the main affidavits filed 
against Papen at Nuremberg was submitted by the American 
Minister in Vienna, Mr. George Messersmith (NCA, IV, 319). 
Hitler awarded'Papen the “Golden Party Badge“ and made 
him a Nazi member for his fine collaboration in Austria.
^Kurt von Schuschnigg (1897- )s Minister for 
Justice in the Dollfuss Cabinet, 1932? Chancellor of 
Austria, 1934~1938| imprisoned by the Nazis, 1938=1945®
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Dollfuss* successor, declared Austria a state dedicated
te formulating policies in line with those of Germany.
This, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War a few
days later, brought the Vatican and Mussolini mueh nearer
30to recognizing German policy in Austria.
Other attempts met with failure. Papen suggested
that Nazi attacks on the Church be stopped to assure a
peaceful Anschluss. Although Hitler accepted this idea,
31Goebbels and Martin Bormann later negated it. On
another occasion Bormann suppressed Papen*s plea to
3 2allow an article, written by a prominent Catholic and
depicting a conciliation of National Socialism and the
Christian viewpoint, to be distributed in Austria.
Papen viewed the use ©f the article as "a political
33necessity of the first order. . . The Vatican was
hostile to this work, and Germany missed a chance to 
enhance itself in the eyes of Austrian Catholics in 
regard to annexation.
The most important event of this period was a
reorganization of the German Foreign Office which began
\
as a purge of !lund© sir able” elements in the army. By
3°Papen, 369=71.
31Ibid.fl 357.
32b i'shop Alois Hudal, then residing in Home, 
wrote the .article ”The 11th of July from the Catholic 
Point of View.-1
33NCA, Supplement Ag %66.
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February 4 p 193©? the office of Foreign Minister passed 
t© Joachim von Ribbentrop*^ while Ernst vnn Weizsaecker^ 
later became State Secretary of that office, Simultane­
ously* the Eeich recalled three key ambassadors! Herbert 
von Mrksen arrived from Tokyo* Ulrich von Hassell^^—» 
replaced by Hans von Maekensen^1 —-from Italy* and Papen 
from Vienna, Th© purg© allowed Hitler to gain supreme 
command of the army and to place the Foreign Office under 
control of men who would d© only as told. Hassell had
seldom agreed to opinions of the Reich when they became 
more noticeably under the influence of the MSDAP, Papen 
experienced the same thoughts and his astonishment at 
the recall gave way to thoughts ©f being replaced by 
more active members ©f the Party,
^Joachim von Hibbentrop (1893-1946)° Hitler ls 
advisor on''foreign policy* 1933# Ambassador at Large* 
1935# German Ambassador 'to London* 1936-1938? Reich 
Minister for Foreign Affairs* 1930^1945 (succeeding 
Imerath).
^Ernst von Weizsaeeker (1882-1951)? Head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry* 
1936-1938? Siate Secretary* April 1* 1938-April 19431 
German Ambassador t© the Holy See* April 1943-1945®
Ulrich von Hassell (1881-1944)? German Am­
bassador to Italy* 1932-1937? became diplomatic ad­
visor to anti-Hazi underground| took part in the July 
2G* 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler? tried and condemned* 
executed in 1944°
■^Hans von Maekensen. (1883-1947)? son of Field 
Marshal von Maekensen? German Minister in'Hungary* 1933- 
1938? State Secretary t© the Foreign Ministry* 1937- 
1938? Ambassador in Italy* 1938-1943#
38Papen* 406~©7o
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Just as th© government used this period t© eon-
solidat© its totalitarian position within the Reich
proper* so did it strive to transmit this principle into
th© out=lying* contiguous traditional German states. ■ In
1937? Chancellor Schusehnigg realized the impossibility
of maintaining a dictatorial one-party government that
excluded Nazis from the Cabinet. Nazi demonstrations
continued to break out in Austria against both the
Chancellor and th© Church. Hitler met Schusehnigg at
Berchtesgaden and demanded that he grant an amnesty to
Austrian Nazi political prisoners and* more importantly*
39'include the pro-Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart^ in the 
cabinet as Minister of the Interior. Schusehnigg had 
no alternative.
Germany feared no resistance from the Vatican as 
political reports disclosed that the Catholics also 
pressed for the resignation of the Austrian Chancellor 
in favor of their'own candidate*, Provincial Governor 
Franz Gleissner.^-0 Although the Church aided the Nazi 
oriented change* it was not prepared for th© appointment
-^Arthur Seyss-Inquart (1892=1946)s Councillor of 
State* 19371.appointed Minister of Interior and Security* 
1938? p bs t=Anschiuss Chancellor* March 11-15* 1938* Heich 
Governor of Austria (Ostmark)* March 1938=May 1939I Deputy 
Governor General of Poland* 1939=194.0# Beieh Commissioner 
for the Occupied Netherlands* May 194©“1945f".appointed 
Foreign Minister in Hitler's political•testament* April 
!945o
^°NGA* VI* 2710
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of-Seyss-Inquart* This caused grave apprehension at the 
Vatican,,
Sehusehnigg’s continued insistence on the inde­
pendence of Austria finally resulted in the mobilization 
of German troops on Austriads border,, Increased pressure 
from Germany forced the resignation of the Chancellor 
and th© Austrian president* The Mazis elevated Seyss- 
Inquart to Chancellor* Within two days*, March 12-13?
1938? Germany completed the Anschluss and declared 
Austria a province of the German Reich*
Th© 100 per cent Catholic nation lost its inde­
pendence* The Vatican became pessimistic because of 
fear of German intransigence against the Austrian Catho­
lics* The appointment of Seyss-Inquart*, rather than 
Gleissner*, as Chancellor of Austria furthered this 
frame of mind* So did thoughts of National Socialism ; 
as the predominant ideological force behind German foreign 
policy* These circumstances could only result in the . 
same sort of Catholic suppression that now prevailed in. 
Germany* Yet, as Hitler stated*, th© Anschluss was merely' 
the application of the World War I Wilsonian principle 
of self-determination*
Papen declared that the inclusion ©f/.sueh' a great 
number of Catholics in Greater Germany would strengthen 
its Christian front* He.said that a strong Christian 
front*would benefit both the Church and Germany by
5^
creating a stronger buffer against communistic infil-
tration of Europe* In truth* Hitler had made up his
mind on this question more than a decade earlier. In
Hein Kampf he noted that the Hapsburg monarchy used
religion as a purely political idea to oppose Orthodox
Russia which* from the German viewpoint* was !,a cata-
1l2strophic idea0,,H" The Fuehrer carried out.the thoughts 
in Mein Kampf rather than the verbal statements made by 
himself and Papen.
From the first day of the Anschluss until the 
end of the‘war* Germany followed the same" policy toward 
the Church in Austria as it did in the Reich. Catholic 
youth organizations fell under German control* schools 
were closed* and the Nazis took over th© Catholic press. 
Germany experienced the same difficulties with the Holy 
See in Austria as it did in the Reich* and Hitler called 
for the always successful plebiscite to be held in 
Austria on April 10. Bergen informed th© Foreign Office 
that the Austrian Foreign Minister's placing of his 
entourage under the jurisdiction of the German Legation 
caused nothing more than official recognition at the 
Vatican, He also reported that the Holy See would not
^Tapen* 3^8°
""^Adolf Hitler* Hein Kampf (Boston* 19i}3)* 93» 
Hereafter cited as Hitler* ~Hein Kampf. Hitler' is here 
discrediting the idea of "political Catholicism."
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take an official stand on Reich action in Austria until
Hitler wasted no time in gathering support from 
the Austrian episcopate for the upcoming plebiscite. He 
sent Papen back to Vienna (with no explanation)* where 
he arranged a meeting between the Fuehrer' and Cardinal 
Innitzer. The Fuehrer surprised everyone by reversing 
his policy of invariably avoiding any conversation with 
high Church dignitaries^" and accepted this meeting. 
Innitzer, urged on by thoughts of German patriotism and 
Hitlerian expressions of the right of self-determination* 
promised the. undivided loyalty of the Austrian Catholics 
in return for the extension of Concordat guarantees to 
Austria.^ The terms included; freedom of religion* 
youth membership in Catholic organizations* and Catholic 
rights in youth education. Hitler* encouraged by the 
support of such a prominent Vatican representative*
with the Vatican. Innitzer correctly assumed that 
Germany would not honor this treaty when Austria was 
incorporated into th© Reich and attempted to have the 
German Concordat extended to Austria. Germany did not 
want this because it would further the Vatican's power 
in German territory. In"the final analysis the Reich 
did not extend its Concordat to Austria. Furthermore* 
it rescinded’the Austrian treaty. Various German 
authorities found-diverse legal methods to achieve this 
end and the intra-departmental eocrnxunications for this 
period are qui-te interesting. See; BGFP* I* 603-Oij.j 
NCA* ill* 1+83-95.
after the plebiscite
DGFP* I* 1026-27.
HGA* Supplement A* 5>01.
In June of 1933 Austria concluded a Concordat
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astonishingly agreed to every provision.^*
In regard to the forthcoming plebiscite* the Reich
won a huge success at the conference,, In March* the
Austrian episcopate issued a declaration urging support
for union with Germany. Innitzer8s authorization moder-
ated the indignation of United State's Catholics eon-
ii7eerning German policy. On April 10* Austrians polled 
a vote of nearly 100 per cent in favor of incorporation 
of their country with the Reich, Bishop Johannes Sproll 
was the only prominent Prelate to oppose the incorporation 
by failing to vote at all.
The Vatican1s decision to await the plebiscite 
before taking a stand on Germany's entrance into Austria 
gave Hitler an opportunity to sway the episcopate. The 
Vatican tardily took steps to correct the impression that 
it* through the Austrian hierarchy* condoned Germany's 
aggressive tendency toward the Austrian Catholics. The 
Vatican summoned Innitzer to Rome where his reception* 
first by Secretary of State Cardinal Paeelli and later 
by the Pope himself* was anything but cordial,, Recalling 
the Cardinal's earlier anti-Nazi posture and opposition 
to Papen* Pius XI asked for an explanation ©f his sudden 
political somersault. Innitzer related the promises
^ N C A * Supplement A* 501f Papen ijlj.2-ij.3c 
^7BGFP* I* 619o
made to him by the Fuehrer*
On April 6, Bergen reported to Berlin that
Innitzer was virtually forced to retract his support of
the annexation of Austria because of the Pope's "morbid
irritation” with policies of the Reich*^ The Vatican
said that the Austrian bishops had acted without the
knowledge of the Holy See and that Innitzer, acting as
head of the Austrian Church, now rescinded his en~
couragement of the Anschluss, From this time forth,
no changes regarding concordat negotiations in Austria
could be undertaken by the local bishops without the
h.9agreement of the Vatican,^
Further Vatican attempts to regain control ©f 
the situation in Austria came too late as the all~ 
persuasive March episcopal declaration gave Germany a 
political victory from which th© Holy Bee could not
'j ■recover* Germany viewed the Anschluss as a resounding 
vietory in which the Austrian Catholic Church fully 
participated* Any other efforts by the Vatican to 
interject stronger authority over these Catholics would 
seem offensive to German rights* As the weeks passed, 
and Pope Pius XI became convinced that he could negotiate
' ^ DGFP* "I, 1031'%' Cianfarfa, 116-18,' There are 
many accounts describing . to just what extent Innitzer had 
to be "forced” to retract* It'is'quite evident that he 
still believed in Hitler's assurances at this time*
^Cianfarra, 118*
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n© concrete guarantees for the Austrian clergy* his 
statements turned more anti°German«
On May 3* 1938? the Pope hoped that a visit by 
Hitler to Mussolini would he extended t® the Vatican so 
that new negotiations might be opened, However* Hitler 
decided to punish the Pope for his belated pressure in 
Austria and turned down th© opportunity to see him.
As the Fuehrer quieted Mussolini»s fear of the new 
German conquest* the Pope ostentatiously retreated 
from Rome, He closed the Vatican galleries and museum* 
which Hitler planned to visit* and commented that the 
prominently displayed swastika was not the cross of 
Christ,
Amid the Hazi=Fascist display of light* music* 
and color* the darkness of the papal state across the 
Tiber stood out as a vivid reminder of the acute Reich~ 
Vatican tension now prevailing. Reports from the 
Ambassador to the Holy See confirmed the German hope
Ithat this maneuver* directed at impressing the Pope 
with German power in Italy* proved successful,
Bergen aptly expressed the attitude of the Reiehs "In 
view of the present German-Vatican tension and th© 
repeated brusque statements of the Pope* omiting the 
visit appeared to me appropriate and the only dignified
^°DGFP, I* 1036-37.
cou3?se„,,y
Adhering to this attitude, the Foreign Office 
directed Bergen to demand that the Vatican recall Bishop 
Sproll, the only Bishop not voting in the April plebi­
scite 0T Paeelli received Bergen coldly before refusing 
th© request on the grounds that, although Sproll8s action 
may have been inept, participation had been voluntary so 
there could have been no violation of a legal obligation,,
In early July, .the Gestapo led Nazi Party members in
Codemonstrations against the bishop*s residence*
Nuncio Orsenigo complained to the Reich govern­
ment only to be answered with grossly false charges that 
the demonstrations merely exemplified how low the bishop5s 
position had sunk in relation to the people he supposably 
served. On th© 23rd, the Party imported a crowd of over 
two thousand to march on th© residence, but the action 
got completely out of hand. Th© violence and destruction 
alienated the Rottenburg non-Nazi populace and greatly 
embarrassed the Gestapo.
The Vatican continuously refused to recall Sproll. 
Pending negotiations between the Reich and the episcopate 
encouraged Bergen to request that the recall be forgotten
^1DGFPa I, 1036-37o
^2Ibid., 1038-39o
5 3 ^ ™  t ™  nr t t
In an effort to decrease the resistance of the Holy See.
By taking his advice the Reich could have continued to 
consolidate its position in Austria without great animosity 
from the Vatican. But the. Party obviously considered the 
situation well enough in hand to make an example of the 
bishop. The Political Department of the Foreign Ministry 
overruled Bergen and decided to remove Sproll forcibly 
from his residence in Rottenburg. Goebbels received 
instructions to enlighten the public about Sproll's gross 
violations of civic duty as the Gestapo executed the 
removal. 55
The negative attitude Germany adopted toward the 
Vatican when Hitler refused to visit the Pope In May of 
1938 continued throughout the summer in the same pattern 
as that manifested toward Bishop Sproll. This policy 
placed great pressure on the Holy See to maintain some 
semblance of diplomatic contact with the Reich in order 
to protect German and Austrian Catholics.
Having placed the Vatican on the defensive.
Hitler's jnovements in Czechoslovakia proceeded with no 
notable interference from the Holy See. Germany now 
controlled Austrian economic resources and Catholics, 
while being in a position to outflank Czechoslovakia on 
three sides. As In the Saar, the Rhineland, and Austria,
6T
the Sudetenland population was overwhelmingly German 
Catholic. Bergen had earlier reported that Pius XI 
refused to heed Prance's request that he protest against 
German activity in the Sudetenland ©n the grounds that 
it was a process of self-determination in which the 
Church could have no political interest.
The secular nation's attempt to appease Germany* 
as exemplified by the Munich Agreement* hinged on the 
same consideration. Gn October i* 1 9 3 Germany exer­
cised her rights under the Agreement and* t© the 
applause of the Fulda Bishops5 Conference* increased
th© Catholic population of Greater Germany by ten per 
$7cent. Th© Sudetenland cam® under German control.
In March of the following year* Hitler upset the 
diplomatic equilibrium by occupying the rest ©f Czecho- 
Slovakia which had been guaranteed protection by France 
and Britain. For the first time th© Reich extended its 
rule to a non-German population. It was a ’momentous 
demonstration of Hitler's readiness to extend Germany's 
need for ”living space” beyond racial boundaries. 
Ironically,, the only major concession went to a Catholic 
priest* Monsignor Joseph Tiso* Premier of Slovakia. He 
gained autonomy for his state while the rest of Czech©~ 
Slovakia became a German protectorate. Germany had now
56DGFP» VI* 7k°
^7L®wy* 218-19.
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established a large, consolidated land mass in Central 
Europe that gave it a strategic position t© threaten 
the- entire continent.
Directly after Hitler!s failure to visit the Pope 
©n May 3» 1938, the Ambassador t© the Holy See began t© 
take an entirely different attitude concerning Reich 
policy than did th© Reich authorities working with the 
Vatican,, By May 2$9 Bergen came to the conclusion that 
the Pop© had been sufficiently put in his place and that 
th© time had com© for Germany t© develop a positive atti= 
tude toward the Holy See# He emphatically believed that 
Germany should not incur the wrath of this great spirit- 
ual power, but should make the influence of the Church 
serve th© interests of th© Reich»s foreign policy•
Bergen also wanted to keep the clergymen in the German 
camp in order to "utilize them for our Germany8s 
national aims.” Surely this policy had been most 
effective in negotiations ranging from implementation of 
the Concordat all th© way t© the plebiscite in Austria# 
Reich authorities, under th© hold of a now mature 
National Socialism, insisted upon following a negative, 
policy throughout the year# The Ministry for Ecclesi­
astical Affairs adopted the view that th© international 
Church was detrimental to National Socialism and, 
therefore, took little account of proposals from the
^8DGFP, I, 101*2.Ml ll I “  ̂ “
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Vatiean Embassy while not answering communications from
the Holy S@© at all, The few exceptions were iiasuf=
ficient and biased,
Th® Foreign Ministry followed the same eours© as
the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Ribbentrop
made it clear t© Oraenigo that some day the problems
with th© Church would be solvedp but that the time for
such a settlement had not yet corned® Weizsaeeker, the
new State Secretary^ informed Bergen that in th© ©yes
of Berlin a positive attitude was being pursued andp
in regard t© th© German clergyp the fight with the•
Church was not a frontal attack but was restricted to
6lseparating "the sheep from the goats,"
Germany!s victory in securing near complete 
dominance ©ver the German Catholics as well as those in 
the annexed territories was n©w obvious. In sh©rtp 
Germany inflicted a political defeat upon the Vatican 
by subjecting its faithful t© th© will of National 
Socialism without precipitating a R@ieh~Vatiean split,
A rupture in relations would very probably have resulted 
in a Vatiean appeal t© the Catholics of the world t© 
share in its enmity toward Germany, Mow Germany was in 
a position t© consolidate its new position in relation
• ̂ 9BGFP, Ip 101*1 •
60Ibid,P 101*5.
6lIbid,p 101*6,
to the Vatican just as it had don© in th© R®ieh proper*
CHAPTER I I I
GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VATICAN DURING 
THE POLISH CRISIS
March-Qctober 1939 
Prom 1933 to 1939p German leadership laid the 
ground-work that provided a lever for negotiations with 
the Vatican during th© Polish Crisis® The Reich8s 
authority now extended over the Saarp the Rhin@landp 
Austriap and Czechoslovakia® Germany had consolidated 
a formidahl© land mass in Central Europe« Th© Reich 
itself was a highly totalitarian state directly r@» 
sponsive to th© principles of National Socialism® The 
Concordat proved t© be th© vehicl® by which the Nazis 
dictated their wishes t© th© German Catholic Church®
Quit® ©ftenp th© Vatican objected to harsh 
measures used by th© Nazis and t© their overriding 
authority in areasp particularly Catholic education^ 
that traditionally belonged to th© Church® Howeverp 
Vatican desire to co-exist with Nazi Germany remained 
param©untP and the position of th© Catholic Ghureh in 
all1 the Reich territories was gradually subordinated- t© 
German domination® By March 1939? th® Catholic Church 
struggled for survival in the Reich8s sphere of influ®- 
enee, Germany had maneuvered th® Vatican into a dilemma® 
If .the Holy See took an anti-Nazi standp th© Reich could 
easily nationalize th® German Catholic Church®
Germany8s advantageous political position was
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compromised by th© personality ©f Pope Pins XI, The 
Pope desired'good relations with Germany but had vi©«
ilently opposed Nazi co-ordination of th® German Gatholio 
Church* While facing th© difficulties of implementing 
th®’Concordatg Pius XI often pushed his demands t© the 
point ©f nearly causing a severance ©f Reieh^Vatican 
diplomatic relations« Secretary ©f State Pacelli always 
cam® t© th© rescue and tried to smooth over th© ©rises, 
Nazi intervention in Catholic education intensely 
angered Pius XI9 and the repeated failure ©f Germany t© 
answer his communications prompted the Pope to issue a 
politically oriented encyclical accusing Germany ©f 
fostering ware1 Thus9 th© Vatican*, although it did not 
contest the annexation ©f the Sud@tenlandp could not be 
relied upon to refrain from siding with the Western 
Powers if Germany made further advances in th© East*
On February 10*, 1939*, Pius XI8 s death gave Germany 
an opportunity t© better its political position in i>e= ■ 
lation to the Vatican* Ideological conflict divided 
Emrop© into opposite c amp s—* totalitarian and democratic*®*, 
each ©f which wanted th® Pop®8© moral authority on its 
side if a crisis occurred* February was a time ©f 
feverish diplomatic activity in Rem® because b©th. factions 
tried t© influence th© ehoie® ©f a pop© politically
' X'MGA* V* 1079* This is th© encyclical “With 
Burning Anxiety,” The.Reich regarded it as a call t© 
battle * Also see? DGFP*, I*, 93®*
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predisposed to their activities. Diego von Bergen urged 
the Sacred College of Cardinals to select a pope sympa­
thetic to Hitler's plan for expansion in the East. He 
asserted that Germany wanted, to assist 11 in elaboration 
of a new world which wants to raise itself upon the ruins 
of a-past, which, „ 0 o has:-no longer any reason to exist,”2
The Sacred College of Cardinals would make the 
final decision and their deliberations took Cardinal 
Eugenio Pacelli into consideration, Pacelli/ a former 
Papal Nuncio to Berlin, was Germany's favored candidate.^
On March 2, 1939 s, the Sacred College elected Cardinal 
Pacelli, who became Pope Pius XII, as their Supreme 
Pontiff, Vatican officials rejoiced, and Mussolini, 
whom Pius XI tormented because of his close relatlonsliip 
with Germany, ’’promised to send the Pope some advice on 
how he can usefully govern the Church.”4
The German outlook toward Pius XII was optimistic.
Plus 2s diplomatic experience and his knowledge of inter­
national political affairs indicated that he understood
^Quoted in Cianfarra, 23. By November 5, 1937s
Germany had begun to develop Its plans for ’’living space”
in the East, See; G.M. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dic­
tatorship; Based on an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi 
Germany (Nfew"York, 1950), 100, Hereafter cited as Gilbert.
‘’S oo .-'Saul Frledlander, Plus XII and the Third Reich;'
A Documentation (New York, 1966),: 8. Hereafter cited as
Friedlaender.
4Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-19^-3; The 
Complete Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano.
Ttallan"“Mlnister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943 (New York 
1946), 36. Hereafter cited as Ciano, Dldrles.
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the causes of war. Furthermore, the Pope had. signed, the 
Concordat when he was Secretary of State and grasped 
German political conditions as a result of his nunciature 
in Germany,, The Reich hoped that he would use his inter- 
national acumen and understanding of German conditions to 
appreciate its need for expansion in the East. Leaders 
of the Third Reich regarded Pius XII as very ”Germano- 
phile.
Succeeding events justified German optimism.
Pius XI had often shown that his moral duty, rather than
political expediency, dictated his actions. On March
6, the new pope reversed this tendency by writing to
Hitler and expressing his desire to come to terms over
6problems in Germany. He also ordered the Vatican press 
to temper its anti-German position.
Further negotiations involved the appointment 
of a Secretary of State, the Vatiean Foreign Minister.
Pius XII had the authority to make the appointment, and 
the Axis launched a drive to secure a sympathetic man 
in this capacity. Ultimately, Pius appointed the former
7Nuncio to Paris, Luigi Cardinal Maglione, to this
^Ciano, Diaries. 5. Of., Clanfarra, and
Oscar Halecki, Eugenio Pacelli: Pope of Peace (New York
_. _  , % «_ _  ~n~~n~T*' —  —     iiiiiiiiiiiii»»lS iiiTiinia— iiiiiiii— w n w i1951)* 138,
6dgfp, VI, 601.
7' Luigi Maglione (l877”19ijl|.): Representative of 
the Holy See in Switzerland, 1918-1920} Titular Archbishop 
in Palestine, 1920} Nuncio Apostolic to Switzerland, 1920- 
1926} Nun,ei© Apostolic to France, 1926-1936} Cardinal,
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position* Press reports released by the -Wes-term Powers
claimed a victory, asserting that Maglione was pro-Freneh
and prone to favor the West*
Ambassador Bergen told a different story to Berlin,,
He explained to the Foreign Ministry that Maglione had
always maintained good relations with the Embassy at the
Vatican and that he held a friendly attitn.de toward
Geiraany* The Ambassador, aware that Maglione »s sentiment
must be fostered, recommended that the German press be
8restrained in its assessment of him* The NSDAP controlled 
the press and, because of doctrinal conflict with the 
Ghurch, editorialized hostility toward high-ranking Gath©- 
lie leaders* Germany carried out this request during 
the next few days* By March 13, 1939, the German Foreign 
Ministry believed its relations with the Vatican to be 
the best since 1933«
On March 15, Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia 
in Czechoslovakia* Pius XII and Maglione were visibly 
dismayed as this action not only hindered Pius XII's 
conciliatory policy toward Germany but subjected another 
six million Catholics to Nazism* More importantly, this 
deterioration in the European situation ominously fore- 
shadowed the crisis now developing in Poland. The Polish
1935? Perfect of the Sacred Congregation, 1936-1939? 
Secretary of State, 1939-19l|4«>D
DGPP, VI, 29o
population was seventy-five per cent Roman Catholic* and 
various estimates placed the number of Poles residing 
through out Europe between fifteen and twenty millions. 
Poland8s predominant Catholicism was one of the reasons
Qfor the country8s traditional anti-German sentiment.'
For -Germany to advance further in this direction 
without becoming subject to the Vatican8s power* it had 
to be conciliatory enough to appease the Holy See. 
German-inspired Hincidents” occurred in many Polish 
cities* adding.to the Vatican8s dejection. On March 17? 
Bergen., cabled the Foreign Ministry. He disclosed that 
recent developments threatened to cause an undesirable 
change, in the attitude of the Holy See. Bergen also 
stated th-at the Vatican press had stopped attacks against 
the Reich and that “there was no question that the German 
press must continue a restrained objectivity towards 
Vatican a f f a i r s . A g a i n *  the National Socialists in 
charge of the press complied and immediately put the 
recommendation into effect. This effort temporarily 
appeased the Vatican. These events* although only a 
portion,of the total picture that aided in formulation 
of Germany8s strategic plans* were considered in the 
deliberations for Hitler8s next move.
^Ciano* Diaries* 33° 
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On March 21, Hitler demanded the return of Danzig 
and extra-territorial rights in the Polish Corridor, The 
Non-Aggression Pact signed by Germany and Poland in 193i| 
was endangered, and a subsequent Anglo-Polish Agreement 
to defend Poland brought the situation to near crisis 
proportions. However, Germany had now established cordial 
relations with the Holy See and a new Vatican policy arose. 
The Pope abstained from intervention in German affairs on 
the political level and avoided the more personal in­
fighting that Pius XI had engaged in, Vatican criticism 
of German treatment of Catholics became doctrinal,^*'1'
In April, Germany and the Vatican established
better relations, more as a result ©f American policy
than of German instigation. President Franklin D,
Roosevelt had asked Germany and Italy to abstain from
aggression against thirty states for ten years. The
proposal was public, addressed t© th© two specific heads
of government, and asked for a guaranteed time limit
before any country took further action. The time limit
would allow America to strengthen her armaments if so 
inclined, Bergen telegraphed Berlin to inform the
11Cianfarra, llf9o Pius XII always tried to dis­
regard purely temporal problems in favor of protecting 
the Vatican’s neutrality by not naming names and staying 
on the world-wide humanitarian level. Sees DGFP, IV,
598 (telegram from Bergen to Berlin) and Lewy, 200,
Bergen regarded Pius XI as inflexible and unpredictable. 
See: DGFP, G, II, 3» Weizsaecker believed that if Pius 
XI hacPTTved any longer relations between the Reich and 
the Church would have failed completely. See: Weizsaecker, 282,
72
government that the Vatican severely criticized this 
proposal because it viewed all three points as being 
conducive to hostilities
On April 25 s> the Foreign Ministry again received 
an indication that the Vatican would remain inactive 
concerning the Polish question,, Pius XII received a 
group of German travelers in audience on that date and 
Bergen reported the Pope’s statements "We rejoice at 
the -greatness of Germany,, at her resurgence and her 
prosperity, and it would be false to maintain'that We 
do not desire a flourishing, great, and strong 
Germany, 3
A great Germany was precisely what Hitler had 
in mind. Three days later, the Fuehrer delivered a 
blistering speech to the Reichstag denouncing Roosevelt, 
repudiating the. Anglo=>German Naval Agreement of 1935„ 
and declaring the German-Polish Non~Agression Pact of 
193U- void. Secretary of State Weizsaecker, the person 
in the Foreign Ministry most intimately involved with 
Reich”Vatican relations, was alarmed at this development. 
It was unreasonable, he thought, to proclaim the Polish 
Pact void publicly when it had already been rescinded 
in fact,1^ But Reich strategists considered developments
12DGFP, VI, 300o 
^Quoted in Friedlaender, l60 
izsaecker, 1810
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in Poland more important than the rapprochement with the 
Vatican,,
Hitler8s Reichstag speech, as surely must have 
been expected, caused new problems with the Vatican, The 
Holy See moved toward purely political pronouncements by 
asking Berlin, Warsaw, Paris, London, and Rome to abstain 
from rash decisions that might lead to war. All the 
nations agreed, and the seemingly innocuous request 
became the first step in up-grading Pius's attempts at 
peace from a specific concern with Germany to inter­
national importance. The Vatican now embarked on an 
effort to secure world peace rather than peace between 
Germany and Poland specifically.. This left the Reich 
to wonder whether or not it would be included in further 
negotiations„
On May ty, the Fuehrer received Cesare Orsenigo, 
the Papal Nuncio to Berlin, who had been detailed by the 
Pope to present a plan for a conference of five Great 
Powers of Europe, The conference would include Germany, 
Italy, France, Britain, and Poland-but not Russia,
Hitler realized' his distressing position and spoke to 
Orsenigo with unusual charm. He expressed "his real 
gratitude to the Holy See" and promised that he would 
get in touch with Mussolini at once to discuss the 
problem,^
•^DGFP„ VI, ^26-27. The only other occasion on
?4
Hitler, sent. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the. Foreign 
Minister.,. on a personal mission to Italy, Ribbentrop. 
told- the. Italian Foreign Minister that the conference 
could not be. accepted because it would place Germany 
and. Italy, in a numerically inferior position to an 
English^-French-Polish block which would inevitably, 
follow. When Ribbentrop instructed his State Secre­
tary to convey the news to Orsenigo many changes were 
made so as not to offend the Vatican,' Welzsaecker 
delivered the message in unfathomable terms. The 
’’points of dlssentlon" of the German-Polish dispute had 
not yet been ’’properly ascertained;, „ , „ the present 
atmosphere also did not seem to be sufficiently favour­
able," and finally, the conference ’’must unfortunately 
from the -beginning be considered as not too promising,.’'̂"7
Orsenigo anticipated such an answer and chided 
Weizsaecker with remarks pertaining to the Vatican’s 
recent stoppage of press attacks against Germany, and the 
very grave points of friction that still existed in
"| OGerman relations with Austrian Catholics, Now, on 
May 23, it was apparent that German refusal of the
which Adolf Hitler personally met with a high. Church 
dignitary was in Austria, There he conferred with Cardi­
nal Innitzer to secure his support for the Anschluss,
•^Clano’s Papers, 283,—ctgmari »i ir .. u
17DGFP. VI, 481-82,
•^Ibid,„ 519o Germany now used the treatment of 
Austrian Catholics as a bargaining point just as it did 
with the German Catholics,
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Vatican's peace proposal had alienated the Holy See, 
However, this tense mood could not last long.
On May 22, Germany had signed a treaty of military 
alliance with Italy, and the Rome-Berlin Axis reached its 
peak of solidarity,, German-Italian relations became 
much closero The Reich could now gain by maintaining 
good relations with Italy and with powers that could 
influence or be influenced by Italy, The Vatican's in­
separable entanglement with the city of Rome and Italy's 
-overwhelmingly Catholic population caused the Reich to 
reassess its policy, Another source of pressure on the 
Reich to resume friendly negotiations, with the Vatican 
arose from the desire to bring Spain solidly Into the 
Axis sphere. Any friendship between Germany and the 
Holy See would make the preponderantly Catholic Spanish 
people more disposed toward Germany,
Bergen realized as early as, May 16 that the Holy 
See must be placated and- told the Foreign Ministry his 
views in no uncertain terms. He sent a memorandum 
reviewing- the fact that since the accession of Pius XII 
many quarters steadfastly hoped for a lasting friendship 
between the Reich.and the Catholic hierarchy. To this, 
he added that the Italian people desired a normalization 
of German-Vatican relations because the new tension caused 
great anxiety among these people and the Papacy, The 
most unsettling disclosure of the message pointed out
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that Italy blamed Getnfany for causing the Vatican to turn 
toward France* This put "a heavy strain bn the A x i s ,  "-1-9
Because of this situation, Bergen deemed a settle- 
ment with the Curia as "desirable and expedient on grounds 
of foreign policy" and suggested^a plan of action. He 
wanted to clear the air of all existing mistrust and 
displeasure by proclaiming a press truce'. The National 
Socialist press had only haphazardly applied the previously 
ordered restraints. Then it would be possible to under­
take a solution of individual problems arising under the 
Concordat when Germany annexed Austria,^® Bergen believed 
that these measures would lead to a solution of all 
problems with the Vatican.
The Foreign Ministry was extremely slow in analyz­
ing the memorandum, but by June 8 Bergen had the authority 
to seek a settlement of problems outstanding with the 
Vatican, Ribbentrop even supplied him with the contents 
of the proposals he should communicate. The Pope admitted 
Bergen to a private, prolonged audience wherein he re­
ceived Bergen with great delight after the Ambassador 
made it clear that he was seeking friendly relations.
The Reich had taken note of the gestures of good will 
expressed by the Vatican, stated Bergen, and the Foreign
19DGFP. VI, 516-17. 
20Ibid.. 518,
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Minister had decided that "a new epoch had dawned for
21German-Vatican relations,” The Pope replied that he 
desired friendly relations with Germany although he wanted 
Nazi measures in Austria curtailed. The Pope did not 
speak of the Polish problem in detail which indicated 
that he would earnestly accept Bergen’s offer. The 
meeting resulted in a benevolent understanding that con­
ditions would improve.
In reality German feelings toward a settlement 
was divided, Heinrich, Himmler,^ Reichsfuehrer-SS, 
indicated that the circle of men around him at this time 
favored an understanding with the Vatican and believed 
that Church and State could dwell peacefully together,^3 
Ribbentrop, Weizsaecker, and Bergen were all members of 
the Foreign Ministry involved in the initiation of the 
June 8 settlement. It must be assumed that Hitler 
supported the actions of that agency because Ribbentrop 
seldom undertook anything on his own.
21DGFP. VI, 690,
22Heinrich Himmler (1900-19^5): took a leadipg 
part in the ’’Roehm Purge”, 193^; Chief of the German 
Police; Reich Minister of the Interior, 19-̂ 3; Reich 
Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Folkdom;
Chief of the Waffen SS; made unsuccessful peace overtures 
to the Allies, 19^5; expelled from the Party, dismissed 
from .̂11 offices, and ordered arrested for treason by 
Hitler in 19^5; committed suicide after capture by 
British troops, May 19^5.
^ciano, Diaries . 86.
78
On the other hand, secrecy shrouded the settle­
ment as If it might be considered a step backward by 
certain Nazis in the Belch, Ribbentrop instructed Bergen 
to inform the Pope that discretion was absolutely neces­
sary to carry out the agreement successfully. Bergen's 
report to Ribbentrop after the audience carefully noted 
that the Pope promised strict prudence from the Vatican, 
Opposition centering around Hermann Goering, Joseph 
Goebbels, and Alfred Rosenberg did e x i s t . H o s t i l e  
anti-Vatican feeling centered around the inner members 
of the NSDAP which could not reconcile itself to Vatican 
demands in Germany and Austria. All three were closely 
connected with the National Socialist Party and executed 
orders emitting from the Party Chancellery.
By June 10, the Polish situation again flared up 
as a result of various accusations made by the pro-Nazi 
Danzig Senate and the denial of such by the Polish govern­
ment. The German Foreign Ministry's attempts to pacify 
the Pope were not completely effective, and Pius dis­
regarded all other problems to concentrate exclusively 
on initiating diplomatic activity designed to promote
DGFP. VI, 690; Friedlaender, 22-24. All three 
men held various offices at this time. Most importantly, 
Goering was Trustee for the Four Year Plan and number two 
official in the Nazi regime, Goebbels held his usual title 
of Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, and 
Rosenberg remained head of the Nazi Party Office for 
Foreign Policy and Ideology.
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peace.
His Holiness declared himself available to act as 
an intermediary between Poland and Germany. Yet, the Foreign 
Ministry's anticipation of Vatican hostility resulted In a 
beneficial effect in another area. Weizsaecker met with 
the Nuncio to Berlin and commented on the anti-German attitude 
of the West Poland clergy. On July 6, the Nuncio returned 
the visit and informed Weizsaecker that the matter was being 
corrected by higher authorities,2-5 This achievement eased 
religious tension further and corresponded to the general 
improvement of German-Polish relations between early July 
and mid-August.
Before mid-August, Germany could combat Vatican 
activities against it when the Holy See expounded moral 
appeals to the world. At that time Germany did not want 
the Vatican involved in political affairs of the Reich.
When the Polish Crisis deepened, the government changed 
its policy. At this point, Britain became intensely in­
volved in the negotiations and developments leading direc­
tly to the outbreak of hostilities. The Vatican now 
achieved a new respectibility in international affairs as 
the Western Powers began to gather strength from all 
quarters. It became the spiritual leader of efforts to 
maintain peace, and diplomatic activity between the Vatican
2%xFP, VI, 865-66.
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and the major powers of the world Increased tremendously, 
Germany now recognized the Holy See’s humanitarian attempts 
to keep the peace on a world-wide, doctrinal level as a 
definite threat. The Reich now wanted to draw the Vatican 
into the political affairs of Germany so that concessions 
could be made which would keep the Holy See from declaring 
an anti-German stand to the world.
The Foreign Ministry, on August 17, received infor­
mation that the Vatican had consulted with the Polish 
Ambassador to the Holy See, and it looked as if the 
Pope might intervene for Poland. Bergen reported that 
the Polish Ambassador was convinced that a territorial 
change in the Free City of Danzig would be answered by 
military occupation by Poland, and that Britain and France 
would come to Poland’s aid.
Following events surprised both the Foreign 
Minister and Bergen. The Vatican restrained its policy
of seeking peace through international moral pronounce-
/
ments and negotiated directly with Germany and Poland 
in the Danzig affair. The British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs became aware of the situation when
/ .
he received a communication from the British Ambassador 
to Italy, The Italian Ambassador to the Holy See informed 
the British Ambassador that the Vatican intended to nego-
2 6 DGFP, V I I ,  1 0 4 .
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tiate with Poland because a successful mediation of the
Polish question would make Germany prone to discussions
about the condition of Catholics within the Reich0 The
Vatican apparently asked Poland to let Danzig revert to 
27Germany.
This Information unsettled the British Foreign 
Ministry because it indicated that the Vatican now 
supported German policy in Poland. Britain dispatched 
its Ambassador to the Vatican to ascertain if the plan 
existed. The Holy See categorically denied it. The 
Papal Secretary of State contradicted this denial by 
telling the same British Ambassador that he had sent a 
telegram, to the Nuncio In Warsaw. The telegram in­
structed the Nuncio to tell the President of Poland 
that If he returned Danzig to the Reich, Hitler would 
negotiate on questions of the Corridor and minority
pOproblems. The Vatican had reverted to intervention 
in the political affairs of the Reich so that It could 
maintain its protection of Catholics in Germany, Austria, 
and Czechoslovakia.
On August 30, the German State Secretary for
27'Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1939 (London, 19^9-1955 )V VI, 293-9^.■ Here­after cited as DBFP. The Vatican will not release its 
documents for this period so it is not absolutely certain 
that.it wanted Danzig to return to Germany; Nevertheless, 
the British believed that the Vatican offered this solution.
28DBFP. VII, 4.03.
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Foreign Affairs was still analyzing his information and
considering the possibility of negotiations with the Holy
See as the intermediaryWeizsaecker must have been
befuddled by Orsenigo's visit and his request that the
State Secretary remind the proper authorities that certain
Catholic clergy and students were exempt from military
30service in case of mobilization. Orsenigo's actions 
reflected the Vatican's feeling that war could not be 
avoided. The Vatican had returned to intervention by 
moral appeals to the world powers.
Weizsaecker did not know th,at the Holy See had 
curtailed its political involvement with Germany a few 
days before. During this period, the British Foreign 
Ministry had more information about German diplomacy 
with the Vatican than did the German Ministry. The 
latter had also been by-passed when Germany m,ade the 
decision that caused the Vatican to resort to inter­
national moral appeals.
Hitler» the German High Command, and upper echelon 
Nazi leaders had undertaken a pro-Eusslan campaign without 
regard te the foreign Ministry's opinion of the Vatican's 
reaction. The threat of atheistic communism infiltrat- ■ 
ing Western Europe was the most dreaded of Vatican
^Frledlaender, '31.
•^DGFP.. VII, 426. A secret agreement to the..
Concordat of which Weizsaecker had never been informed 
stipulated this exemption.
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dreams, and with the possibility of this becoming a 
reality the Holy See stopped negotiating with the Foreign 
Ministry about internal German political affairs.
On August 23, Germany and Russia signed a ten 
year Non-Aggression Pact which high-lighted German dis­
regard for the Vatican's desires in this area. The 
Pact was signed because of political expediency. The 
desirability of a friendly Russia on the eastern border 
was more advantageous to the Reich than trying to stop 
Vatican moral appeals. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry 
could be relied upon to attempt to pacify the Vatican,
Pius XII fully understood the consequences of the 
Pact. The next day he broadcast an appeal to all govern­
ments and mankind to refrain from a bloody conflict and
31return to conscientious understanding.-' The British 
government reacted favorably to the appeal, but Hitler 
and Mussolini completely ignored it.^2 It was clear, 
for the time being, that the strategists who directed 
the German government had slight regard for any pressure 
the Vatican might apply. While the Foreign Ministry
31Great Britain, Documents Concerning German- 
Pollsh Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities 
Between Great Britain and Germany on September 3 , 1939 
(New York, 1939)'» 139• Pius XII took this step only 
after his personal appeals to the German and Polish 
governments failed. See; Cianfarra, l$2-83„
32Clanfarra, 185»
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evaluated, its Information about Polish negotiators and 
Papal mediation, the Reich made the decision to attack 
Poland1,33
On August 31s Pope Plus XII made a final pre- 
war appeal. Again, he directed, it at Germany and Poland, 
but this time designated each by name, ^  All prior 
appeals had been worded in general terms and theoreti­
cally directed to all mankind, but now Germany's attitude 
forced the Pope to the extreme position of chastizing 
individual governments, . Copies were sent to the major 
powers of Europe, and the British continued their advo­
cacy of the Vatican's effort. But the Pope appealed 
too late, and the Party leader's belief in conquest 
overshadowed all problems that the Vatican's power might 
cause. Hitler overruled his professional soldiers and 
on September 1 invaded Poland without a declaration of 
war.
Germany did not disregard the possibility of the 
Holy See’s Indignation entirely. On August 22, the 
Reich had made plans for pacification of the Vatican 
after the attack on Poland, An official proclamation 
by the' Fuehrer would be issued, when time allowed, to 
guide such activities. The Reich proposed to develop
33DGFP, VII,
-̂fyprlnclples. 586.
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basic principles as guidelines to be followed until the 
Fuehrer., could act. The government would issue a statement 
to the Vatican couched in friendly terms emphasizing 
assurances, that there would be no more expropriation of 
Church property in Austria..
Germany also planned to tell the Holy See that 
the Reich wished to settle many other minor problems 
immediately. The Papacy considered one such problem as 
particularly important. It concerned Bishop Rusch, the 
Vatican appointee as Apostolic Administrator for Inns- 
bruek-Feldklreh. who had been appointed without the 
consent of the German government. Innsbruck-Feldkirch 
was not in Germany, and the Vatican continuously struggled 
to salvage its rights to appoint administrators in these 
outside territories. Germany maintained that the Con~ 
cordat. which supposedly guaranteed the Church's right 
to make these appointments, did not extend to these 
areas. Thus, Germany had the sole right of approval.
If Bishop Rusch remained, it would be a Catholic victory 
and a precedent that would be difficult for Germany to 
overcome.
35DGFP,. VII-, 196-97.. This conflict of views arises from Article I k  of the Concordat and Article I k ,  
Paragraph 2 of the Supplementary Protocol. See: Appendix
A. 188, 191o This. Article maintains that the Vatican can 
make the appointment only if there is no objection "of 
a general political nature" by the government. Confusion 
arose when it could not be decided if t|ie Concordat 
extended to certain areas outside the Rjgich. ?
86
The proposal further suggested, that, with the 
Fuehrer’s approval, details of the plan should be sent 
to the Reich Minister for Church Affairs and the Reichs- 
fuehrer-SS for implementation,, Viewed in its entirety, 
the proposal proved to be the most far-reaching and 
impressive consideration ever undertaken by any agency 
of the R e i c h , 36 Hitler and his subordinates knew that 
the Vatican would be agitated and unpredictable when 
Germany occupied Poland and that steps would have to be 
taken to placate the Holy See before it reciprocated 
with rash actions.
By September 6, Pius had neither appealed for 
world peace nor bemoaned the fact that another Catholic 
country had fallen to German advances. Two idealistic 
considerations influenced the Vatican in this respect. 
First, a period of little international activity might 
help to urge Germany to make peace with Poland and,
t '
secondly, Germany might set up a buffer zone in Poland 
against Soviet Russia, The Director of the Political 
Department, within the Foreign Ministry, took a more 
practical stand in his communication to Bergen, The 
Director informed the Ambassador that France and England
36DGFP„ VII, 196-9?« The plan to pacify the 
Vatican was one part of a general outline describing 
how the various European countries should.be handled 
after the invasion of Poland, Unfortunately, it is 
unsigned so that the issuing agency cannot be deter­
mined.
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had asked the Vatican to declare Germany the aggressor in 
the conflict, but that the Pope refused to do so. The 
reason was that he did not wish to jeopardize the Catho- 
lies already under German authority, ^
Germany’s hold on its Catholic population placed 
the Papacy in an embarrassing position. National Social­
ism influenced all Germans. The bishops within the Reich 
and the annexed territories were Germans who adhered to 
German policy. These persons sympathized with Reich
j.policy toward Poland and publicly declared their position,
i • •
The German Army Bishops caused even more embarrassment to 
the Vatican. They boosted the soldier’s morale by being 
readily available to administer Extreme Unction. They, 
too, were German by nationality and did not hesitate to 
urge the soldiers on to a swift and total victory. Vati­
can doctrine condones ’’just” wars only, and the bishops 
assured their flock that a ”just" war existed in Poland.
Germany’s co-ordination of the German Catholic 
Church and imposition of authority on Catholics in the 
outside territories without causing a split with the 
Vatican now paid off. If Pius XII took a stand against
37Friedlaender„ 33® These facts come from the 
text of a telegram from the Director of the Political 
Department to Bergen6 It is a manuscript from the 
relatively unpublished Bonn archives. These are not 
documents captured after World War II, but papers that 
often, relate specifically to government relations with 
bishops and the Vatican,
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German aggression, he would, alienate the National Social­
ist Catholics and risk increased suppression of those 
who resisted the regime, ^
Anti-Catholic suppression increased after the 
invasion of Poland, and Nazi authorities improvised 
rather unique methods to subordinate the Church within 
the Reich to a greater degree. They closed down churches 
with the excuse that they were too far from air raid 
shelters and that the occupants would be injured in an 
attempt to reach Safety. Germany reduced the number of 
previously muzzled Catholic reviews and journals because 
it needed paper for the war effort.^9
The Fuehrer introduced more extreme measures in 
Poland when he decided that the clergy, along with various 
other groups, must be exterminated in an effort to induce 
unconditional s u r r e n d e r B y  September 18, the Pope 
could no longer remain silent. He addressed a pilgrimage 
in Rome with a didactic speech against the totalitarian 
state and the men who lead it. The address definitely 
referred to Germany and Italy. But Germany had now 
entered a new phase of activity which nullified any plans 
Pius may have entertained.
-^Friedlaender, 35.
-^^Cianfarra, 190.
MCA, VIII, 590. From an affidavit by Erwin 
Lahousen, Chief of Abwehr Section 2,, relating the events 
of a conference in the Fuehrer’s train.
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The Reich and Russia launched a "peace-offensive" 
designed to place responsibility for continuation of the 
war on the Western P o w e r s O n  September 19, 19391 
Vatican circles took a particular Interest when Hitler 
said that the West did not have to fear- world conquest 
by Germany» The German Ambassador to Italy instructed 
Mussolini to make open statements that conditions in
t. L •»Poland would not lead to war. As a result Italo-Vatican 
relations became much better.
The Vatican, in effect, supported the Axis by 
urging England and France to accept a settlement.^2 
Although the Vatican's motive may-have been the desire 
to end the war and save the Polish Catholic population, 
the result was support of the Axis' need for a breathing 
spell under the banner of a compromise peace. However, 
Germany could not take full advantage of the Vatican's 
wavering attitude because itsmajor concern changed from 
Poland to Russia.
On. September 29, the Reich and Russia partitioned 
Poland. The partition subjected Polish Catholics to a 
state that decried religion in any form and threatened 
the West with communism. The Vatican faced the most
^Bullock, 573o
IxOCianfarra, 192. The Vatican newspaper repro­
duced portions of Mussolini's statements.
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serious dilemma of the Polish Crisis, Mussolini hnd 
his Foreign Minister also abhorred the turn of events, 
but German evaluation of the political scene placed the 
need for Russian participation above the combined impor­
tance of Italy and the Vatican,, Yet, the Vatican only
j r .
mildly denounced the partition.
The Pope merely observed that; "Despite unjust
persecution, the Polish Catholics-must persevere in prayer,,
ixkand in the practice of good works." The Vatican’s placid 
reaction may be partly attributed to Mussolini’s-great 
expectations for a favorable solution of the problem of 
Russia’s westward advances, He based his hopes on a 
speech Hitler planned to deliver on October 6 „ ^  Neither 
Mussolini'nor the Vatican knew that the speech was a 
facade, and that Hitler, having secured his eastern border 
with Russia, was making plans for the invasion of the West. 
Germany’s grandiose plans for Eastern "living space”
j
relegated consideration of the Vatican to insignificance. 
The day following his speech, Hitler took the step that 
precipitated an Irreparable schism between Church and
^Clahfarra, 190-01, Mussolini and his Foreign 
Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, were just-as taken back as the 
Vatican, As leaders of a Catholic country they could not 
condone communism. Sees Ciano, Diaries, 152=53«
i . . .
^Bullock, 55^“55« The dates of the "peace- 
offensive” are September 19-£3, 1939.. Hitler was still 
committed to a speech on October 6 as ^ result of com­
mitments made during this period.
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State by appointing Heinrich Himmler Reich Commissioner for 
the Strengthening of German Folkdom in the annexed portion 
of Poland. Himmler's belief that National Socialism 
must destroy Christianity at all costs made him suitable 
for his duty„ He intended to eliminate the Polish in­
telligentsia,, the Jewish population, and the clergy, 
with the ultimate goal of implanting National Socialism 
as the supreme ideology. A week later, Germany organized 
the Government General to maintain public order and life 
amid the confusion.
Hitler decided upon retributive justice for the 
Catholic Church in recompense for the Vatican peace pro­
posals of August and the role the Church played in under-
47mining German culture and tradition in Poland. Through­
out Poland, the Reich closed down many Catholic institutions, 
including monasteries, schools, and charities, in an effort
to simulate procedures that had already taken place in 
kRGermany. It made Poland the prototype of a "New Order" 
that was to prevail, in all Eastern territories under the 
Reich’s authority by initiating a policy to subjugate 
"inferior races," neutralize or exterminate the clergy, 
and use forced labor to exploit natural resources.
Weizsaecker, 281.
4.7Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations. 
19^1^19^ (New York, 1953)9 381. Hereafter cited as Hitler, Conversations.
*%CA. Supplement B, 1391.-.,
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The Fuehrer took little or no precaution to ease 
the reception of this radical action at the Vatican, 
Political strategists at the Holy See pondered different 
methods of approach to the situation until Pius resolved 
to abandon the tradition that a new pope's first encycli­
cal explain the program to be followed under hisguidance. 
By October 20, his staff had drafted an encyclical to 
suit the state of affairs, but His Holiness rewrote it 
many times. On October 2?, Pope Pius XII delivered the 
most politically oriented speech to be released from the 
Vatican during his reign.
His first encyclical castigated the totalitarian 
state and the state that rescinded treaties unilaterally.
He then turned to an indictment of conditions, implying 
National Socialism and communism, that directed youth 
toward a goal that would turn them from Christ, The Pope 
extended sympathy to countries that might be placed under 
such circumstances without any mandate. Finally, the
Pope condemned conditions that raised "a piteous dirge
itoover a nation such as Our dear Poland,” '
Explicit extension of- sympathy to a country desig­
nated by name moved the encyclical to the political sphere. 
His implicit censure of Germany and Russia was too obvious 
for even a political dullard to misconstrue. The world
k9 , 592-615, This is the encyclical
Summl Pontlficatus,
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knew that the Vatican had declared that It neither gave 
up the struggle for world peace on the doctrinal level 
nor the rights of individual Catholics on the political- 
plane,, All the' ill-will, suspicion, and mistrust that 
was latent hetween Germany and the Vatican now came into 
the open. This caused many quarters to be apprehensive 
of the German reaction.
The Reich government quickly understood the 
significance of the document and took immediate steps 
to suppress the undesirable influence it would have pn 
Catholics in'Germany and the annexed territories. Nazi 
publications printed a distortion of the text in an effort 
to lessen its effect. ^  Reinhard Heydrich,-^ Chief of 
the Security Police and Himmler's assistant, reported his 
precautions and views to the Reich Chancellery. Heydrich 
showed how well Germany summed up the situation by ob­
serving that;
The encyclical is directed exclusively against 
Germany, both in ideology and in regard to the 
German-Polish dispute. How dangerous it is as 
regards our foreign relations as well^as our 
domestic affairs is beyond discussion.^-
5°Cianfarra, 200.
-^Reinhard Heydrich (190*1— 19^2); Chief of the 
Security Police; head of the Reich Security Main Office; 
Himmler's assistant until 19**2; Reich Protector for 
Bohemia and Moravia, 19̂ -1; in revenge for his assassina­
tion in Prague in 19^2 the Czech village of Lidice was 
obliterated.
^Quoted in Friedlaender, -37 o' This is a letter 
from Heydrich to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Hans Lammers.
9^
On November 5« the reading of the Pope ’ s words from 
the pulpits caught Heydrich off guard,, His report stated 
that only scattered readings occurred on that day because 
the lesser Catholic hierarchy were informed too late to 
disseminate the message, He now proceeded to take pre­
ventive measures, under directives already established 
for such occasions, and issued orders to hinder all churches
from having the encyclical read. He stopped all other forms
of communication entirely,, The Reich Ministry for Propa­
ganda and Public Enlightenment took appropriate steps to 
prohibit discussion of the Pope's words by the press.^ 
Nevertheless/ Reich leaders did not want to cause a direct 
break in relations with the Vatican, Prevention of dis­
semination of the encyclical was carried, out in a legalis- 
tic and relatively mild manner.
Throughout this period Germany viewed the Vatican 
as a supra-national state with the power to influence 
international decisions and intervene in local political 
affairs at will if not checked by a secular power. The 
Vatican proved its ability to do this time and again 
during the Polish Crisis, Finally, the Reich concluded 
that the Holy See was a de facto secular state and must
■^^Friedlaender , 37.
5^F0r confirmation of this view see; Friedlaender, 
38, He concluded "that the Nazi leaders wished to avoid, 
for the duration of the w^r, an open and irremediable 
rupture with the Holy See, with all the consequences that 
this would involve,"
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be treated, as such in order to gain concessions on a 
quid -pro quo basis.
By November 1939» German political leadersfor­
tified by National Socialism,, had greatly strengthened 
their hold on Germany and its. territories. They could 
effectively combat even the most extreme Vatican attempts 
at political maneuvers to ease the Catholic burden. 
Economically and militarily, Germany had become so power­
ful that the Vatican’s peace proposals were drowned in 
the clamor of secular natlops to assert their material­
istic diplomatic strength.
Ctf ,-'-'Germany1 s treatment of the Vatican as a secular 
power is quite apparent in a March 11, 19^0, meeting be­
tween Ribbentrop and the Pope. See: DGFP, VII, 896-97.
CHAPTER IV
GERMANY ENCOUNTERS MINIMAL VATICAN OPPOSITION
IN THE WEST
For Germany to continue its aggression, or even 
to consolidate its newly gained position, without Vatican 
interference, the Reich would have to again placate the 
Holy See, Germany had seriously offended the Vatican 
because of its co-operation with communist Russia. The 
Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939s and the partition 
of Poland between the two stunned the world. This policy 
continued in February of -1-940, when Germany entered into 
new economic agreements with Russia. The Soviet Union's 
advances into Finland added to the defection of -all con­
cerned Catholics. In February -and March, the Vatican 
launched a propaganda campaignagainst Germany via its
iradio station and Instructions to the clergy.
On March 11, 19^0, Hitler sent Joachim von Rib­
bentrop to attend an audience with Pope Pius XII in 4n 
effort to smooth over the discord arising from recent
events. The Fuehrer told Ribbentrop fthat coprse td take
2and what ideas to present. At the outset, Ribbentrop 
expressed concern for the fundamental relationship between
1- Cianfarra, 208. The Vatican supports its own radio 
station in Rome. Confidential instructions are Issued from 
the Holy'See'to the clergy of all countries. In this manner, 
policy decided upon at the top of the Catholic hierarchy can 
be spread throughout the clergy,1
2DGFP, V I I ,  896,
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National Socialism and Catholicism. He related that the 
Fuehrer believed a basic settlement to be possible, but 
that any such agreement must be comprehensive and lasting, 
not transitory as the Reich Concordat had proved to be. h 
However, two obstacles stood in the way of a lasting 
agreement at this time. One was the predominant view of 
the Catholic clergy in Germany that they should engage 
in political activity. The other, that Germany-was how 
involved in a struggle that demanded all Its efforts and 
which did not permit Hitler to be interested in any other 
problems at this time.
What the Fuehrer did want, Ribbentrop explained,
was a continuation of the present truce with the Vatican.^
Ribbentrop stated that the Fuehrer had made the preliminary 
concessions of paying one billion reichsmarks to the Church 
and stopping 7000 indictments of Catholic clergymen in 
Germany. He did this because he wanted to expand the truce.
Ribbentrop ended the conversation by pointing out 
what Germany had done for the Catholic Church. He noted 
that never in history -had such a radical revolution done 
so little Injury to the Church than did the Nazi take-over 
of Germany. In fact, he said, it was only due to National 
Socialism that communism did not destroy church life in
3"Truce!f was a strange word for Ribbentrop to use,
The Re ieh-Vatican conflict In the East had become very bad 
by this time. Obviously, the Foreign Minister wanted to 
convey feelings of optimism.
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Europe altogether. Nevertheless,r the Foreign Minister
admitted that Germany and Russia had established a lasting
relationship. He said that this -wAs possible because
National Socialism had become so strong that it made the
hGerman people immune to communism,
Pius XII tried to question Ribbentrop about protP? 
lems in Poland, Germany, and other territories, but did 
not insist on this discussion because the Foreign Minister 
repeatedly emphasised the possibility of a fundamental 
understanding at-a later time, Ribbentrop declared that
he and the Pope had had a cordial talk in which Plus
1 6 agreed to all that he said,
^DGFP, VII, 897-98, This information comes from 
an unsigned memorandum found in the German Foreign Minis­
try archives. It is generally believed that Ribbentrop 
wrote it himself. In 1966, the Pope's secretary-and 
personal confidant, Father Robert Leiber, stated tha,t 
this document-was unknown to him. He 'believes that 
Ribbentrop had it '’fabricated by someone in the Foreign. 
Office," For the complete report of Leiber*s comments 
on-this meeting--see: "Pius XII -and the Third Reich,"
Look (May 17, 1966), 3^-50. Leiber is here commenting 
on excerpts-frem Freidlaender’s Plus, XII and the Third 
Reich. Cianfarra also presents -ah' entirely different 
view than does-this document. See: Cianfarra, 209-10,
^DGFP, VII, 897, Leiber -said that the Pope also 
raised specific questions -about the controversy between 
Catholicism and National Socialism, To these inquiries,
Leiber reported, Ribbentrop answered that since thelGerman 
effort was concentrated on-war, he could not -answer them at 
the present. See: "Pius XII and the Third Reich," Look
(May 17, 196.6), 37,
^The former Ambassador to Italy, Ulrich von Hassell, 
says the meeting was entirely fruitless, Ulrich von 
Hassell, The von Hassell Diaries: 1938-19^ (New York, 19^7)*
131o Hereafter•cited as Hassell,
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Later that day, the Foreign Minister met with 
Mussolini to promote a meeting between Axis dictators.
The two men discussed the audience with the Pope and the 
contents of a letter sent to Mussolini from Hitler, 
Ribbentrop dispelled Mussolini’s fears of the German . 
friendship, with Russia and discontent with the Vatican 
in the same manner as he did the Pope’s, He told the 
Duce that a lasting solution between Church and State 
would come when the Church solved the problem of politi­
cal Catholicism, The Foreign Minister explained that he 
would deal, further.with the matter through the Nuncio to
Berlin, but that religious peace had meanwhile been 
7arranged,.'
Hitler had written to Mussolini about another reason 
why the Vatican should be grateful to Germany, He conten­
ded that if Germany had not retained control in the Govern­
ment General of Poland, the Church could not carry out Its 
basic function because of the hostility of the local 
populace there. Then the Fuehrer calmed Mussolini's dread 
of communism by stating that it was becoming a national,- 
as opposed, to international* ideology which implied that
Oit did not endanger the rest of Europe, Mussolini believed
7Clano’s. Papers, 358-59» Mussolini detested the Pope 
Mid the influence the Vatican had in Italy, Yet, when com­
munism threatened, he sided with the Holy See in order 
to keep the favor of the Italian Catholic population,
8DGFP, V I I ,  876, 78,
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the Fuehrer and decided that Germany and Italy had a common 
destiny.
\
Ribbentrop*s journey to Rome i*asa -success, The 
Vatican and Mussolini bellaved Hitler's statements about 
the weakness of eomm-unis®. They-also found comfort In the 
idea -that Germany -wanted to continue the religious -stale-?
i
mate rather than to oppose the Roly See* On March 12.,- 
the Russo-Flnnis-h- -Armistice added to the pacification of 
Vatican anxiety about German-Russ-ian aggression. By 
March 15 9 Europeans -generally thought -that. the Armls tlce, 
Ribbentrop-’©meeting- with Mussolini, -apd his audience -with 
Pius indicated the eomihg- of peace„9
On the other hand, Ribbentrop’’s--*vis It opened the
fo *way for the Internal German Opposition- ;to make inroads 
through the Vatican. The Holy -See,temporarily unworried 
about -advancing communism-and the persecution of Catholics, 
became receptive to overtures de^i^ned to reduce German 
military success.
^Hassell, 123.
i°The German opposition was made up of diverse 
groups not in close touch with one another. Most -members 
were military men. All were-against the regime1 because 
they thought Hitler-would lead the German-nation to ruin. 
Three groups -stand out. The J'Goerdeler circle," built 
around Dr. Karl Goerdeler, General Ludwig Beck -and Hassell. 
The "Kreisau circle,’’ led by Cpunt Helmuth von Moltke, -and 
one that' freq-uently ©perated in connection with the-Vatican, 
the "Canarls circle." The latter group included Admiral 
Wilhelm Canarls, head of the Abwehr (counter-intelligence 
department of the OKW). Other members were Dr. Joseph 
Mueller and General Hans Oster.
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On May 1, 19^0, members of the opposition used the
Vatican,as-an intermediary to -warn Holland and Belgium
of the impending invasion of the West. Dr. Joseph Mueller.
working in conjunction with Admiral Wilhelm Gandris and
General Hans Os ter, told the Belgian Ambassador to "the
11Holy See theexact date of the planned 4hvasion. The 
Belgian Ambassador told the governments of Belgium and 
Holland. They informed the Briti-sh-and French.
A week later, the German Security Service had 
intercepted and deciphered the message. Hitler -and the 
German High Command did not know the actual extent of 
the damage because the Security Service could not trace 
the persons responsible for the leak. Plans for the 
Western invasion were already being executed„ and Hitler 
decided to go ahead. French-and British passivity during 
the Polish Crisis, the easy elimination of Poland, and the 
German—Russian Agreement that secured the eastern frontier 
were indicative pf good military results regardless of 
the warning to Holland and Belgium.
On May 10, 19^0, the German Army carried out, with 
some modification, General Fritz Erich von Manstein’s 
adaptation of the Schlieffen Plan. The ..Army?assaulted the
11Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence (London, 1951), 
112-13. Hereafter cited as Colvin. Also sees Walter 
Schellenberg, The Labyrinth; Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg 
(New York, 195^)8 350-51» Hfreafter cited as SchelienbergI 
Canarls had dispatched a brahch of his intelligence network 
to operate directly thirough tihe Vatican.
102
Low Countries and France, The German Opposition’s 
warning turned out to be a benefit rather than a burden. 
The Meuse defense system had not been linked with the 
Maginot Line because Belgium insisted that its neutrality 
must be violated before it would, ally with France and 
Britain, Now, the Low Countries called for help.
The Anglo-French Army responded by racing into the 
area around the Dyle and Meuse Elvers, This action added 
to the effectiveness of the German plan. The Low Country 
offensive was a diversionary movement, and the main German 
force prepared1 for a thrust through the Ardennes Mountains 
into France, Even though Holland and Belgium had received 
the Vatican sponsored warning, and Anglo-French troops 
mobilized in the Low Countries, Germany overran the Dutch 
and. Belgian defense systems in five days.
Pope Plus XII took a strong stand and officially 
pledged the Vatican’s spiritual support to the Low 
Countries, Three messages came from the Holy See simul­
taneously. One went to"King Leopold of Belgium, one to 
Queen Wllhelmnll^.of Holland, and the last to Grand Duchess 
Charlotte of Luxemburg, Although the form of the three
telegrams differed, the political implications of their
12content, was the saqie. The Pope was quite--angry about
^ Principles-. 668-69. PiuaKMI called for the re­
establishment of Belgium independence and extended his 
sympathy to the countries that had been invaded ’’against 
their will and their rights,”
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the violation of Dutch and. Belgian neutrality and expressed
his sympathy to all three countries,, He clearly expressed
Vatican opposition to German aggress ion*
Vatican concern for the Low Countries did not
affect the. German bishops who continued to stand behind
Germany in the war effort0 The German press Ignored the
messages* and some National Socialist Catholic newspapers
■ . 13denounced Plus because of his anti-German posture*
The German Foreign Ministry feared that the Pope 
had sent the telegrams in reply to King Leopold's appeal 
to the Vatican* If this were trpe, Germany would have 
to withstand the full onslaught of Vatican opposition 
because Leopold had made specific chargfs against the 
Reich* Thus* the Vatican’s statement woiild be a'uni-
■j |ilateral condemnation of Germany* ■ The next day* May 11*.
1940 * ...Bergen?informed the Foreign Office that Pius did 
not intend the messages to be regarded as political 
intervention* A week later* Bergen was* informed that 
the Vatican statement was. not a reply to King Leopold’s 
appeal but had crossed it in transmission*'11̂
Hitler* bolstered by the great military victories-* 
remained calm throughout* It was Mussolini who became
13Lewy* 228*
4 hFriedlaender* 49* Telegram from Bergen to Berlin* 
May 11* 1940*
^ibld*,52* Telegram from Bergen to Berlin* May 18,
1940*
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incensed-at the Vatican's early anti-German position.
The Duce sent his Ambassador to the Holy See, Dino Alfieri, 
to demand an explanation of the VatlcanVs one-sided stand.
On May.-13* Alfietri had stressed that'the Vatiednls attitude
16 ' was. Irrevocably against the Axis. However, when he
encountered the Pope six days later, Pius told him-that he
had personally edited the words "Germany" and "invasion"
17in order to keep the Vatican aloof. The German Foreign
Ministry received this information from Italy. In nine
days, May,-f®-19, the Vatican's strong stand against
Germany withered away in the face of military victory,
and. Axis demands that the Pope refrain from condemning 
1 ftGermany. -
The Vatican also tried to keep Italy from joining 
Germany. Pope Pius XII and his Secretary of State,
Magilone, asked President Roosevelt numerous times to 
appeal to Mussolini. The United States sent a special 
representative, Myron C, Taylor, to the Vatican. Taylor’s
■^Clano, Diaries. 249.
1?DGFP, IX, 378-79.
■^Therb Is no doubt that Plus XII changed his 
attitude in the days following the telegrams to!the Low 
Countries. Friedlaender, on page 52, attributes this to 
growing caution at the vitlcan as a result of German 
military victories, Cianfarra, 227-29, gives two'other 
plausible reasons. One is that the Vatican is In the 
heart of Italy and Mussolini could easily have isolated
it. The other, that the Holy See gave up initiative in
the West because it lenew that military conditions would 
change in the-long,run. In either case, the Vatican’s 
submission in the West preserved its ability to Intervene 
under more favorable circumstances later.
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mission was to aid the Vatican in bringing about peace
and to collect intelligence information from: Vatican 
19sources, Roosevelt finally agreed and asked Mussolini
to remain a non-belligerent. The effort failed.
By June 10, 19^0, Germany had overrun Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium,-and Luxemburg-, The-well-
planned thrust through the Ardennes caused France to
rapidly crumble, Italy declared war on France and
England, Six days later, the Axis ••;tK:OTbughly, defeated
France, The patriotic German bishops applauded by
20ringing church bells throughout Germany,
Germany met no resistance from the Vatican during 
the conquest of France, The Vatican’s weak support of 
that country parallels, and may well be a result of, the
inability of the French Catholics to counter Germany in
21any effective way. Indeed, reports received by the 
Foreign Office encouraged the government more than did
^ C o r d e l l  Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New 
York, 19^8)^713, 7?7-?9o The United States did not have 
an Ambassador to the Holy See, Correspondence between 
President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII was largely ambigu­
ous and accomplished nothing. Sets Eugenio Pacelll (Pope 
Plus XII) -and Franklin ,D, Roosevelt, -Wartime Correspondence 
Between President RooSevelt and' Pope Pius XII (New York,
t w f f t -   .. .*"'■  -  ^ —  —
20Lewyy 228,.
2 *̂Cf,, Cianfarr-a, 2 k j 0 Relations between France -and
the Holy See had been good since World War I, so the Vatican’s 
labk of support cannot be said to come from -an ideological 
disagreement between the two. See; DGFP„ I, 1040, The 
French national Catholics readily backed Marshal Henri 
Philippe Petain’s (the Nazi sponsored leader pf Vichy France)
io6
Plus XII*s retreat on his. stand in the Low Countries„ In
late May, Bergen reported that confidential sources had
Informed him that the Vatican believed that Prance should
conclude a separate peace and leave Britain to carry on
the battle alone,22 On May 29, he told the Foreign
Ministry that the Vatican’.s Secretary of State thought
that Belgium should have capitulated in' fcjaas beginning
2 3and that France should do so now.
It soon became evident that Pope Pius XII had 
concluded that the war in the West would continue re­
gardless of Vatican attempts to keep the peace. Early 
in June. Pius turned to pleas for ■humanization of the 
war. He asked the belligerents on both sides to abide 
by the rules of international law when dealing- with 
non-combatants and occupied countries. After Italy’s 
entry into the war, the Vatican’s appeals became more
specific. While still urging Germany to show generosity
>
to France, Papal messages indicated that the gruesome
reality of a European-War had found its way to the Vatican,\ ft
Pius began calling for -abstention from indiscriminate
’’national reconstruction1’1 policy. The weakness of thq 
French Catholics to put up a serious fight against the Nazis 
is a result of the factionalized French political atmosphere, 
The Catholics had no p'dritical education-and never formed a 
political party for any effective resistance. For a good 
review of this subject see: Jacques Maritain, "Religion and
Politics in France,’’ Foreign Affairs (January 19^2), 266-81.
22DGFP, ■
2-^Friedlaender, 53°
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bombing., the use of gases, and persecution of peoples in 
occupied areas.
On June 28, 1940, Pius XII made one last try for 
peace. The countless dead and great devastation prodded, 
the Pope to make plans to address himself to the govern- 
ments^qx Germany, England, and Italy. -Before undertaking 
this initiative, he sounded Out the individual govern­
ments first. Magiione asked Bergen to determine German
feeling in regard to a mutual conciliation and an end
\
to hostilities. At the same time, Nuncio Orsenigo
oh.approached the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. Germany 
refused the Pope’s effort. The peace feeler failed, 
because the., Reich learned that London had not accepted 
the overture. The Foreign Ministry and the Nuncio placed 
the blame for this failure squarely on Britain.2-*
Although Germany faced many problems with the
p ̂Catholic population in Belgium and Holland, it had no 
24Pius' peace proposal had exactly the opposite 
effect he had expected. It encouraged Hitler to'open the 
Battle of Britain because he interpreted it as an admission 
that Germany could not be stopped in the West.
25DGFP, X, -49-50; DGFP, X, 318-19. It is extremely 
doubtful that Hitler would have accepted the proposal under 
any circumstances, but the German government was absolved 
of the biame in this instance.’
2.6The Belgian Catholics -made up the core of patriotic 
resistance to Nazism in that country and actively opposed. 
Germany until their liberation In--1-944. Political Catholi­
cism was at its best there. See; DGFP. VII, 499; DGFP. XI, 
343;--Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Hitler's Europe; Survey of Inter­
national Affairs. 1939-1946 (London.' 1 9 W .  484-65, 493°
great, problem with the Vatican in the West# Graver conflicts 
arose elsewhere* Germany and the Vatican continued to have 
ma^or disputes concerning Reich measures in: Poland.
Hereafter cited as Toynbee, HitlerIs; Europe. High Com­
missioner Seyess-Inquart was Constantly plagued by Catholic 
resistance in Holland. See: DGFP„ XI, 1216; Toynbee,
Hitler’ s Europe, -50'3-04j. Werner 'Warmbrtmn, The Dutch Under 
German. Occupation. 1940-1945 (Stanford, California, 1963)V 
137s 156-60, 189. French Catholics only, did not greatly 
resist the Nazis.
i
CHAPTER V
GERMANY TERMINATES NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VATICAN 
IN THE OUTSIDE TERRITORIES
I
After the invasion of Poland in 1939* and par­
ticularly after the German advance in Russia on June 22, 
19^1s the Reich attempted to mold its new territories 
into manageable divisions,, The Reich ultimately settled 
on three separate entities. The first included the 
annexed lands adjacent t(o the Reich. They were called 
the Incorporated Territories and consisted of Austria, 
most of Czechoslovakia, the Polish area around Poznan, 
Lodz, and the Reich district of Danzig-West Prussia.
The second took in occupied Poland and was referred to 
as the Government General. The Government General 
included Warsaw and Cracow. The third area covered 
portions of old Poland lying even further east and
parts of Russia, Germany called this the Occupied
1Eastern Territories.
The formation of such a plan took time. During 
the Interval, a great deal of confusion arose. It was 
not clear whether the Incorporated Territories should 
include Western Poland to the same degree as Austria, 
the Sudetenland, and other areas which were traditionally
 ....  ^United States, Civil Affairs Department, Trials
of.Major War Criminals before the International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg. 19^?°^9). IV. 510-11. Hereafter cited as TMWC.
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Germane If Poland were included on an equal basis, did 
this, mean the annexed area, the occupied area, or all 
of that nation? On the other hand, should the adminis­
tration of the annexed portion of Poland be similar to 
that of the Government General? Should decrees made in 
Poland and the Government General extend to Austria?
When the-Reich informed the Vatican of the government's 
position in regions not Included in the Reich, it was 
ambiguous as to which lands were or were not involved. 
The. resulting diiemma is clearly seen in Austria,
Poland, and Russian lands occupied by Germany.
Since-May 13, 1938i the date of the annexation 
of Austria, the Reich had followed a very strict anti- 
Catholic policy in that country. It closed most churches 
and schools while divesting many priests of State subsi­
dies and the right to teach religion to children. Many
priests were arrested and some sent to concentration 
2camps. Germany instituted many of these suppressive
actions to prepare Austria for a significant role in the
war effort. On March 20, 19^1, Deputy of the Fuehrer
Martin- Bormann decreed that the Reich must continue to
seize- the property of clergymen who violated laws set 
i ' '
up to regulate the war economy in Austria. The offenses
encompassed hoarding, malicious attacks against the 
^Cianfarra, 220.
I l l
State-,-..and-..illegal. possession of firearms..,. Bormann
and. schools as well as churches 0 The Vatican, regarded 
these, incidents as incompatible with the Reich Concordat.
A continuous battle between the Reich and the Holy 
See as to whether or not the Concordat extended to 
Austria had begun some time before,, In August 19^1,
State Secretary Weizsaecker relayed his government’s 
opinion, about this question to the Vatican. He pointedt
out that, the Concordat extended only to the Reich as it 
existed.in. 1933 when they ratified the document, Weiz- 
aae.cker_-emphasA.z.ed that this did not include Austria, 
the. Sudeienland., the Government General, or any other 
areas-not. in the Reich at that time. The Vatican., never 
accepted., this decision and continued to try to gain 
concessions in the Incorporated Territories on the 
grounds of the Concordat.
new problems for the Reich. One problem was the ne­
cessity of sustaining’the morale of the troops and 
civilian population of Germany and the outlying- dis­
tricts. Of course, this demand meant that the.Reich 
kus.t include, the Catholics in its plans. From September 
19^1 to February 19^2, Hitler followed a course, of re­
straint toward the Vatican. Germany's definitive decree
3re.fnsad_.to-. .pay...any .compensation for the property..
-...property included convents, monasteries
Germany’s attack on Russia in June 19^1 caused
3NCA, V I I I ,  250.
112
of the exclusion of Concordat provisions in. areas. ad­
jacent to the Reich was tempered by the Fuehrer. His
i
support of this exclusion was moderated by his belief
that, "the main thing is to be clever in this -matter and
not to look for a struggle where it can be avoided.
Hitler openly blamed the persecution of the
Church on staunch Party members. In September 19^1* he
orders d. Mart in Bormann to stop his campaign against the
Church, in order to boost the morale of Catholics in the 
German-domain.$ The Fuehrer's table talks with.-such men 
as.- Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, and Goebbels indicated that 
he had not given up his idea to eliminate the Catholic 
religion--in the German areas completely. However, the 
Fuehrer stated that he could not cope with the Church 
at this time. He also noted that he would not "be able 
to go on evading the religious problem-much longer.
Hitler's determination to postpone a final so­
lution of the religious problem was weakened by Bormann. 
On May 10, 4941, Rudolf Hess, head of the Party. Chancel­
lery.,- flew, to Scotland for unknown reasons. Bormann 
replaced-.Hess and began to draw the lines of internal 
administration tightly around him. His unrelenting 
anti-Vatican beliefs and ability to gain a position to
^Hitler, Conversations, ^9.
^Papen, ^81-82.
^Hitler, Conversations, 117, 2*1-7.
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Influence. Hitler's. actions, was. determinant. of future- . 
Reich-pel icy toward -the Holy See. Before the. end of the 
year, Bormann became second only to Hitler in leader­
ship of the.. Nazi. Party,
. On.. February 219 19^2 , Bergen began a drive, to 
ease tensions, -beween the Reich and the Vatican„ His
analytlcal-report of Reich-Vat lean, rel-a t ions asked., f or
a "radical, all-embracing solution" to all questions. .
outstanding-with the Vatican,, To achieve this end* 
Bergen stated that, he wanted the. National So c-ialis.t- 
leaders to withdraw measures that hindered such a .so­
lution*,?. .Goebbels entertained thoughts along, the ..same.
line, . He believed that the Party enforced too strong.
a policy-against the Church. This made it too easy for 
the Catholic, hierarchy to attack the State
Influenced by Bormann, Hitler took no notice of 
these, observations„ The Fuehrer's conversations of this 
period-..reflected the policy of the highest Party leaders. 
In April,.. .he..reiterated, statements reminiscent of the. 
early. years.of co-ordination of the Catholic Church, He 
spoke of. the priest*s attempts to undermine the policy 
of the..Nazi-Party, He thought it scandalous, that the 
Reich should subsidize the Church with 900 million
^Elledlaender, 158-59.
^Goebbels, I b l „
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marks. annually.. when- -the money could, -be. spent for -farms.
to be givan-tu-aoldiers-. who.. wanted to retire into agri­
cultural service..- The Fuehrer even .wanted~t©..reduce theI
subsidy- to. fif ty -millions-.annually to-be paid directly- 
to the_Jiprlncas-.of the. Church„" In this way, he thought 
they- could.-be bought off and would wholeheartedly support 
the.Relejn.^ Hitler had adopted the hard-line Party 
stand.
Hitler's order of June 22, 1942, severed Reich 
relations .-W-lth the Vatican in all areas except the 
Germany, of 1933-* The severance was handled in a tact­
ful but complicated manner. The Vatican had already 
refused, to recognize any political change in territory 
after.September of 1939o^0 From the Reich's point of 
view,.the.Holy See had-therefore automatically excludedt
itself-..fr©m-.any official connection with these terri­
tories., Since, the Reich controlled these areas, it
meant , that-there could be no relations concerning-them 
between, the-Reich and the Vatican. The Fuehrer now 
wanted to expand this state of affairs to include the
9Hitler, Conversations332-33»
lOpriedlaender, 160-61. Telegram from Weiz- 
saecker to Bergen on June 22, 1942. On January 18,
1942, the Vatican had sent a note informing. Berlin 
that it. would not recognize any territory taken by 
German.aggression after September of 19390 This note 
was not found in the Wilhelmstrasse files-. Again, 
the Holy See *s refusal to release its documents for 
this period pakes it impossible to confirm this 
assertion.
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regions annexed before September 1939« T M s  mould.—
include Austria, the Sudetenland-0 and Bohemia~Moravia<,
. . Since September 1939 was the date of the. Polish 
invasion.,-..and.- Hitler wanted to include the territories 
annexed, before, that date, relations would., .be. non-existent 
in any new land under German control,, The order further 
pointed-out. that the only competent German authorities 
in this, area- would be the appropriate local representa­
tive of the .Reich„ The only competent Church authority 
would be-the local representative of the Church„
. The.-aim was. to by-pass the- Vatican completely„
Thus,. the_.-P.arty Chancellery, which had.- taken over the . 
Reich's..-political. alfalrs.-,.rw 0uld.. have no political or 
diplomatic-links. with the Vatican,, The only contact
would, occur, through the- now..moribund- Ministry for
11Foreign Affairs.,, x The Fuehrer thought that an., answer
to any. Vatican-note -would be an admission of Vatican- 
rights . in.. German issues and-an encouragement for. it 
to maintain, official. contact -with .G.ermany.o ̂  Communis 
cations between the two powers rapidly tapered off„
11Frledlaender, l60~6l„ Hitler, Conversations„
448 „ .,Friedlaender calls. Hitler 's action of June 22 an 
”inexplicable---decision.0 " It is-apparent that the 
decision was influenced by the Party and Germany's 
military victories during this period0
TOHitler., Converaat 1 ons., 450 <, Welz.saee.ker 
emphas ized-t hat..-in.-answ.erirg-notes_ from. the. Vatican- .
concerning the autal.de- territories, "officials should
not refer to the Fuhrer's decision but should simply 
draw attention to the note from the Curia of January
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By July, Hitler began, formulating...plans.-.to., negate.- 
the Reich Concordat altogether. If this happened,, and 
the Fuehrer decided-to recall the.present German repre-
13sentatives to the. Holy See, they would never be replaced.
He also, found..ptl.eas.nr.a-...In the ..manner-by .which he withdrew.
himself,from, personal.. contact with the Vatican by shunning
tAthe Papal. Nuncio.. in Berlin.
During-this period, German:, conquest on the Eastern 
Front reached- its height . This placed the Reich in a. 
position to make demands upon the Holy See and to insist 
that they,be.carried out. But from October to December,
the m11itary super1ority of Germany decreased. In
October , the ..British .assaulted. El Alamein. The next 
month,..an.Joagl©-American..invasion force, launched: a- three­
pronged attack on North Africa. In December, the Russian's
18, 1942-,:. stating. that, for the duration of the war, the 
Curia. did-.not ..intend to recognize territorial changes
which had~taken place in the ln.ter.im; and. that-.they. .should
represent—the. refusal to negotiate on the. questions raised 
as a logical-consequence of that note.. Church representa­
tives of the., regions .outside the frontiers of the old 
Reich had no authority to negotiate as representatives of 
the Vat lean...with the local German authorities/ f* See; 
Frledlaender, 162, The author paraphrased the remainder 
of Weizsaeeker!s telegram to Bergeri (June 22, 1942) here.
13Ibid.., 447,
ik-. I-bld.-, 450o Hitler used various, ruses, to avoid. 
Nuncio. Orsenigo-'s. pointed questions. He would amiably. ask 
about the.. Pope's-health, quickly turn to .greet, the. rest, of 
the diplomatic corps, or "fob him off on Lammers instead,” 
This is Hans Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
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broke through-at. Stalingrad,- The. German- attitude toward 
the Vatican.temporarily became-more tolerant,
Vatican , officials sensed the. .changed- atmosphere
and. retal.iatedl.wiih -.demands.-,, of. their own.' In October „ '
Maglione instructed Bergen to .warn the. German-government.
that if ...the-s.i.tuat.ion.,worsened- the-Holy .S.ee~ ^would.find
itself.-compelled to emerge, from the .attitude of. reserve
1<which it has so far ..maintained-,, 0 « The Papal
warning, was .directly related - to Hi11 ers'. June 22.. sever =•=
ance of.relations.-with the Vatican in the Incorporated
Territories., The Vatican made it clear that if Germany
made further demands in these areas„ the Holy See would 
begin making... public.,protests -against. the. Belch, A letter 
from the-Archbishop of Breslau to the Papal Secretary
of State—placed-.the blame .for. the. Reich’s...policy on the
National...Soclalis..t...P--arty.o Now., the=-Vat lean., looked, to. 
Hitler, and-the. Foreign Ministry to reverse, this,, .-policy,
 W.lth..,military...r.e.*ersals.-,plag.ulng.- Germany,.. ..i1.
looked.. as.--.tho-Ugh-Hitl.er-.would.re 1 ent.-.and.. al 1 ow the Catho­
lic Chur.ch-.mor..e..-fr.eedom of .action. The. Fuehrer-realized
the he ightene.d. .-prestige of the Church. at . this, time , He
told Weizsae.cker■-..that. the Pope was. .def initely the- strongest 
man in Borne,^ Although the official line still ignored
"^Friedlaender, 165=66,
•^Welzsaeeker„ 284, The Fuehrer respected the 
power of the Pope much more than that of either Mussolini 
or the Italian King,
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the Holy.. See r- -it..was tampered---by..an_.eas.ing. of . persecution
of Catholics.*.. Bormann. issued, orders, to avoid "petty
annoyance", of- the. Church* ̂  Ghabbels .adopted, tactics of
"going, easy on..the church quest-io.n"...and treated...requests.
by the_Po|)e:.:-.acc.ordingly... . Hitler, heartily .approved ..of-hls 
action*^® By. March.. 1943» Hitler wanted, to achieve..a....
covert true e....wlth,. all- churches*... . The truce..,would include
a cess at ion-..of-attacks.. on~ religion. and tolerate ...legal.
procedures. against., the ..c-Iergy.. only, upon express -authori^ 
zatlon., and. then. only, against, individuals rather than 
e11her Church as an-institut ion*1^
Hitler’s_. desire.-to achieve a covert, truce., never.
went. into. ef.fe.ct*   The... moat..outstanding.~r.eason—for. the,. .
failure., was—the .appointments, in April., of—Mar tin.. .Bormann.
as Secretary.-., to. the ...Fuehrer Bormann, ...now. decided to. whom
!
the Fuehrer-.-Sho.uld-talk-9.- .what-.. he....shoul.d...rea(i,..-.and.. what .
20ins true tions..-„ha_.shonld ..send. out.*.,. Ernst Kal.tenbrunner *
who had. just...succeeded He.ydrich...as_..C.hial...of the.. Reich
Security Main. Office.,, attempted to implement.-Hit! er,.’s
policy of-restraint...toward, the. churches* In.-fact,. he
wished to make it especially moderate in regard to the
1'7Lew.y.., 254,
18Goebbels,. .285*
19TMWC. XI, 28?*
20Ernst Kaltenbrunner (1903-1946): Austrian Nazi; 
Commander of S*S* in Austria, 1933”3̂ ; S»S. and Police
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Vatican0 Bormann, ..acting, in concert with.Heinrich. Himmler , 
not only blocked Kaltenbrunner's efforts but opposed 
Hitler's, policy and urged a continued fight with the 
Church,2 -̂ Wilhelm. Hottl, an advisor to the Reich on Vati­
can affairs, experienced the same set-back asdid.Kalten- 
brunner. -He wanted to make the government's policy, toward 
the Holy. See more lenient so that it could -be .-us.ed as a 
peace, negotiator, should the occasion arise., His., idea
came. to.nothing and Bormann placed him under sur- 
22veillarce-0-.
In April, another appointment rivalled Bormann's 
In importance, Ernst von Weizsaecker was sent to the 
Holy See to replace Bergen as Ambassador, The Pope and 
the Papal Secretary of State were surprised and upset, . 
Bergen .liad done a good job for both powers in this ca­
pacity, His reports were reliable, fair, and not often
influenced by the emotions of either side. Originally,
23Hitler had opposed this change, v However, Weizsaecker
Leader, of Austria and Chief of Security in Seyss-inquart 
government, 1939; Chief of the Security Police and S.D,, 
Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, 19^3-May 19*15,
21TMWC, XI, 288,
22Ibid,, XI, 238,
2-^Weizsaecker, 276-77» Weizsaecker thought that 
the Party leaders regarded him as a nuetral. Hitler, at 
first, surely thought that Weizsaecker was prone to en­
courage Vatican interests. At any rate, in April of 
19*1-3 s the new Ambassador pointed out that the Reich 
leaders "did not by any means trust our old diplomatic 
personnel,"
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had... been asking, for., this, post for over a. year-and. his
closeness to Ribbentrop resulted-in his., appointment*
When taking, leave of -the Fuehrer,, Weizsaecker outlined
his plan as..r .-"'Mutual non-intervention, no. discussions
7k.on f undamentalsno quarrels* * " Hi ti er..., agreed .*.
. Germany . had won ..another political victory over.
the-Vatican-* Bormann., with, or -without.-the consent, of ;
Hitler , , now-directed-a- Hational Socialist, campaign - to
keep, the - -Church., from, regaining- -anything.-it had .1 ost in
the previous years.,.. More, importantly, Hitler's, in­
sistence... of June -22.,. 19^2 that the Vatican have no
authority in the Incorporated Territories noŵ -beeame...a.
25reality* ^ The Reich had gained every point, proposed-.
by. Hitler at-that time* Diplomatic relations -between
the. Reich.and the Holy See were limited to the "old 
Reich", only* -Austria,, the. Sudetenland-, Bohemia-loravia., . 
and all. the—Western areas-were., included with.. the-: -regions 
taken - by—Germany...-since-September 1939« Germany ..recog­
nized no-Vatican-author.it,y in any of them*
. The. warning- that the- Vat.ican.-had-glven . the. Reich, 
about the Incorporated Territories in October 19^2, was
^We i.zsaecker., 2.8.̂.*..
2%olf Hoehhuth theorizes, that Hitler refused, to 
give. the.. Church, authority in the Incorporated, territories 
because he hoped to blackmail the Vatican into recog.- 
nition of the new borders* Rolf Hoehhuth, The Deputy 
(New York, 196*0, 295» Hereafter cited as Hoehhuth*
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now regarded as a hollow threat, The Holy See had failed 
to make any public protest concerning this area, A 
directive sent to Bergen by Ribbentrop earlier in the 
year..dearly outlined Germany's present feeling toward 
the-Vatican about negotiations in these territories: <
, , It seems that the Vatican, too, had not 
deemed it appropriate to translate into deeds 
the statements It made then because no indi- • 
cation has come to my knowledge of any attempt 
on the part of the Vatican to stir up feeling- 
against us by claiming that there has been any 
deliberate sharpening qf our attitude towards • 
the Catholic Church, , „ , If the Vatican 
wishes to see a sharpening of tension in the 
fact of our having limited diplomatic dis­
cussions with the Vatican to questions relating 
to the old Reieh, then the Vatican itself has - 
brought about this state of affairs by refusing 
; o o to recognize territorial changes that 
have occurred in recent years, The Government 
of the Reich has done nothing more than to draw- 
the appropriate conclusions from this attitude 
on the part of the Vatican,, 0 , „ However, 
should the Vatican, for its part , threaten to 
undertake, dr perhaps carry out, a. political 
or propaganda .gampaign against Germany, the 
Government of the Reich would naturally be compelled to react a c c o r d i n g l y , 2 6  J
II
Further problems arose in the Incorporated Terri­
tories, -because of Poland, Reich decrees often included 
all of Poland rather than either the annexed area or the 
Government General alone. Again, the Indus ion of annexed 
Poland in the same category as Austria, the Sudetenland,
2 6Frledlaender, l6?-68. Telegram from Ribbentrop 
to Bergen, January 13, 19%,,
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and. Bohemia^ Moravia caused confuslono -Poland Itself..
created, a situation unique to the Incorporated Terri­
tories ,
Germany, intended to establish. Poland, as an. integral 
part of its. New. Order, The New Order, as relative-to 
Eastern Europe-, was conceived of as early as November 5» 
1937p when- Hitler, outlined his plans for "living space"
to Goering and other military leaders in what is- -called.
P f\the Hossbach Document-, The Reich planned to exploit 
Poland.1 s. ..natural resources.. and resettle the inhabitants. . 
in an. effort to "..Germanize" this area* The western., area 
annexed to Germany underwent the process...first. The
Government-General- was. to. be used as. a refuge for-dis--
placed-persons^. that is,, persons who could not quickly 
be absorbed into the Reich or placed under controls 
sufficient- enough to "Germanize" them in their original 
location,.
In the second phase„ the Reich subjected the 
Government General to the same measures, Germany at­
tempted to eliminate the intellectual elite, including 
the clergy, to assure lowered resistance to Reich poli­
cies, Further measures provided for the pillage of
public and private property in Poland to increase assets
2 &-Poland.,,--Ministry of. Foreign Affairs, German 
Occupation of Poland (New York, n.d,), 4-, Hereafter 
cited as German Occupation,
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necessary- for the -war effort, .Various, laws....psr-tainlng- to
rates and taxes.:, exploitation of labor , and property
emitted from the Reich over the years following the in-
27vasion of Poland,, Polish inhabitants not capable of 
making a -personal contribution to the war effort were 
exploited for their labor ability,, The Reich considered 
this area as. a "territory accessory to the Reich?:' with a
2gstatus similar to a colonial possession.
The Vatican found Hitler's concept off a-New Order
repugnant, Pope Plus XII worried about Axis domination
of Europe because of It and believed that no-new;world 
order could be established without "superhuman wisdom to 
light up the way, . , , With Germany inmind^ he 
thought that those who try to set up a new order prepare 
the way for destruction of the people they allegedly 
serve and do so by the exploitation of human life. By 
December 23* 19391 Pius XII had violently crltlzed German 
persecution of the Church and accepted President Roosevelt's 
appointment of Myron C6 Taylor as his personal representa­
tive; to the Holy See„-^G
German Occupation, 8-9« The numerous laws insti­
tuted in Poland are well outlined in this work,
28Ibld,. 5.
2^Principles» 7^9; Cianfarra, 256,
^Germany never believed that Roosevelt wanted to 
establish close co-operation with the Vatican, The Reich 
thought it a tactical move for the upcoming elections.
See; DGFP„ VII, 579-80,
12**
One of the Pope8s Christmas addresses had enumerated 
the factors necessary for a reconciliations "but Germany was 
not ready, and Goebbels concealed the speech from the 
public.3-*- The Pope placed the responsibility for the 
German-Pollsh war on Germany and observed that the un­
compromising attitude of the Reich made it impossible to
32improve relations with Germany.^
During the winter of 1939^0, when little fighting 
took place in Europe, the Vatican took the leadership in 
seeking peace. At this time, the German Opposition again 
negotiated with the Vatican in an effort to achieve peace 
for Germany,33 in November 1939, Admiral Canards had 
transferred:his political intelligence network to the 
Vatican. ’The Abwehr„ a counter-intelligence branch of 
the 0KW„ did not have the authority to delve into politi­
cal intelligence, and the Vatican provided a safer refuge 
for this operation.. Canards then sent Joseph Mueller, 
the liaison for the Opposition’s warning to the Low
^Weizsaecker, 219; Friedlaender, 39“^1,
32Ciano, Diaries. 184,.
-^^It.must be remembered that the 0ppos.it.ion did 
not want to promote peace for the sake of making Germany, 
lose the wax but to save the nation from destruction and 
the suppressiVe policies of Hitler. They negotiated 
through the Vatican in an effort to get a guarantee from 
Britain that it would not mete out a harsh peace if the 
Army revolted against Hitler. A .revolt would cause con­
fusion and make Germany vulnerable to occupation.
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Countries, to make contact with the Pope.-' Negotiations 
went on from November 1939 to the beginning of February 
19^0„ Mueller not only kept the Vatican Informed of 
atrocities committed In Poland but collaborated with his 
old friend Father Robert Leiber, Leiber was the Secretary 
to the Pope, and the two began work on a peace, proposal, 
the "X-report," to be presented to the Allies,
The Vatican drafted the document and set forth 
the basis, for-negotiations„ Various accounts of the 
contents of the "X-report" do not agree, but the■under­
lying theme"is clear. The Nazis were to be eliminated 
from the government, and Britain promised not'to:take 
advantage of an internal political crisis should one 
arise, There-would be a solution of the Eastern terri­
torial problems favorable to Germany, This meant that 
Austria and the Sudetenland would remain annexed to 
Germany while Poland, and this point is vague, would 
simply remain in the German sphere.
Finally, there would have to be a German-avowal 
of Christian, morality, and the preliminaries ■,to. a peace 
and armistice agreement could not be negotiated directly,
Colvin, 98, Joseph Mueller is just as enigmatic 
of a charactei as is Canaris, He was a Munibh"lawyer 
brought into the Opposition for the express purpose of 
making eontact with the Vatican, This attempt for peace 
was called "Operation X," and Mueller was the confi­
dential agent known only as "X", His name is mentioned 
in none of the reports. See: Hassell, 125 fn,; Ritter,
1̂ 7 o
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but only through the Holy See.-'-' Inclusion of the Vatican 
placed the entire plan on an official diplomatic basis. 
Thus , the' British Secretary of State for Foreign■ Affairs , 
Lord Halifax,'and the British Ambassador to the Holy See 
negotiated with the Opposition,
Generals Hans Oster and Ludwig Beck offered the 
document to Ulrich von Hassell, the ex-Ambassador to 
Italy, and asked that he give it to General Franz. Haider, 
the Chief of* the Army General Staff, Haider reftised to 
see Hassell .and the job of explaining such a treasonous 
overture ;fell to General Georg Thomas, Haider studied 
the "X-report1," conferred with Beck, and then gave it to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Walter 
von Brauchitsch,3  ̂ Here the proposal failed, •Brauchitsch 
was mentally and spiritually unable to break from his 
Prussian heritage and give the full support of the Army 
to such a plan, Brauchitsch said that the younger offi­
cers and troops could not be relied iipoh to'take., action 
against the.Fuehrer because they rejoiced in his Polish 
victories,Without the Army no plot to overthrow the
 -33Hassell, 125; Ritter, 162; Jacques de Launay,
Secret Diplomacy of World War II (New York, 1963), 19-20, 
Hereafter cited'as De Launay, The full account of the 
course of these negotiations fell Into the hands of the 
Gestapo in September 19^1. It has not been seen since,
^Ritter, 162,
-^Hassell, 125-26, 136; Colvin, 100; De Launay,
1 9 -2 0 ,
38Colvin, 100; Ritter, 163-6^,
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regime could be successful. The German Opposition’s feeling 
that the Vatican could help them to return Germany to peace 
with a minimum of retribution from the Allies again met 
defeat.
Meanwhile, the S,S„ had begun to solve., the Polish 
problem by.executing the intelligentsia. The. clergy was 
the first to go. As early as September 219~1939  ̂ Cardinal 
Hlond, the Primate of Poland, personally informed Pope 
Pius XII of the atrocities. He told of the murder of 
priests, the sacking of churches, the sending of the 
clergy to concentration camps, and the use of the Church 
of the Lazar1st Fathers for Gestapo organized orgies with 
Polish girls.- Hlond also referred to the plight of the 
civilian population which consisted of the breaking up 
of families..,, brutal beatings, and indecent gynecological 
examinations of women who might be hiding valuables.
Those who could not be processed in annexed 1Poland were 
sent to the Government General where conditions-were 
worse. Hitler sent a sharp protest to the Vatican when 
it released excerpts of the report. 39 -
In January 19^0, Cardinal Hlond added a supplement 
to bring his report up to date. The new report offered 
detailed information concerning the murder, deportation, 
and ill-treatment of priests in Poland.**® The Vatican
■^Cianfarra, 193-97.
^HCA, V, 1078,
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radio also released excerpts of this report,, - By January
29, Ambassador Bergen had dellvered_another, sharp protest
from the German government. The Papal Secretary of State
inordered an Immediate suspension of the broadcasts.
Earlier in January , the Reich had begun, to take 
action to relieve the Vatican's abhorrence of communism. 
Pressure for this decision came from the Vatican, Italy, 
and Russia...as~a result of Germany's close relationship 
with the-Soviets, Political reports to the Reich in- 
dicated that., the Italians had an aversion to National 
Socialism because it disregarded the Catholic apprehension 
about communism. The Italian Foreign Minister was quite
hOexplicit on this point,
Italy also conducted diplomatic activity to pro­
tect the Balkans from communist infiltration because it 
feared the fall of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,
This would-place Russia next to Italian held Albania and 
the Adriatic. Sea, The result was an Italo-Vatican front 
based on the common bond of dread of communism* ( Still, 
Italy remained in the Axis with Germany. This caused
•i
Russian worries about Italo-German relations because of
kiLewy, 246, Incidents such as this, when the 
Vatican, far ho Apparent reason, yielded to!l Ger&An demands 
soon'gave way to beliefs that the Vatican was "fence- 
sitting...". .The Holy See did not seem to take a firm stand 
on the many inhumane circumstances that arose. Many ob­
servers began to think that Pius XII was biding his time 
so that he could join the victors, regardless of who they 
might be.
^2D G F P VII, 612; Ciano, Diaries, 151.
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the Vat.I-can..'s stand on communism and its influence in 
Italy. Russia s.o Informed the Reich
Hans Georg von Mackens'en, Ambassador to Italy, 
brought the problem to the attention of the State Secre­
tary. for. Foreign Affairs. The situation was so grave 
that Weizsaecker passed the information on to Ribbentrop.̂  
The Foreign Minister watched the Vatican's effojrts to 
degrade the German partnership with Russia very attentive­
ly. and pleaded his case for an understanding with the 
Holy See to Hitler. The Fuehrer refused to listen because 
of problems with the Church in Austria and lingering dis­
approval of the Vatican peace proposals at the time of, 
the Polish invasion.
Ribbentrop concluded that the dilemma stemmed 
from the. Reich's propaganda policy in Italy which boasted 
about German agreements with Russia. He worked out a 
"special, solution" for Italy. A more forceful propa­
ganda program to play down Germany's friendship with 
Russia was introduced to placate Italy and the Vatican.^
Germany's new propaganda policy failed to impress 
46the Vatican. However, the campaign helped bring Italy
^ DGFP, VII, 712. Russia did not want its Allies 
quarreling among themselves.
^Ibld.. 652-55.
Ibid. , 742-4?.
LiA^°The decision to introduce a propaganda policy 
in Italy that strongly played down Germany's closeness
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fully back Into the German fold. Hitler met with Mussolini 
on the Brenner Pass in March, and Italy joined Germany in 
the war In the West a few months later. In ..May 19^0, 
Germany invaded the Low Countries, and the attention of 
Vatican officials turned to that arena.
Regardless of the propaganda campaign, the Reich 
did not relax its efforts to make Poland a purely German 
territory in the months preceding May 19^0, 0n March 1, 
Germany extended its military system to the:annexed 
portion of Poland. A week later, Reich Minister’for 
Church Affairs Kerri approved Himmler's request; that 
Polish nationals attend special segregated church 
services. Kerri warned that the segregation-of Poles 
from Germans would be opposed by the Vatican,. To deter 
this probability, he "made appropriate state police 
measures to deal with any conduct of the clergy which 
is contrary to these principles."^7 This meant forceful 
suppression of any objections.
In the' first months of 19^1. the Reich decreed 
that no religious associations in the Incorporated Terri­
tories would.be recognized as corporations by public 
law. The decree further established that no collections
to Russia occurred in January 19̂ -0. Later that year, 
in March, Ribbentrop did indeed placate the Vatican by 
making a trip to Rome to see the Pope and Mussolini..
h.’yNCA, VIII, 259, 26?-68.
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could, be made In favor of the Church without Reich per-
hOmission,, By mid-summer, the Reich had accepted Governor 
General Hans Frank’s request that the Vatican,be stopped 
from making appointments to high Church offices, Germany 
thought the Vatican was taking advantage of the deficien­
cies of the Reich Concordat in these instances and warned 
the Holy See that such actions must be stopped,^
Further developments revolved around Himmler’s 
need f or • land.:" in Poland so that he could resettle the 
German oriented Poles in certain areas while using other 
land to -support the less promising Poles acting in a 
labor capacity, In May 19^13 the Foreign Ministry In­
formed Nuncio Orsenigo that Catholic lands would be 
taken over by the State under directions issued for the 
confiscation of property "whose administration whs pre­
dominantly influenced by members of the former Polish 
state, » Since there had always been such close
connections:between the Catholic Church and the Polish 
people, Germany considered that the Church qualified 
under this, rule.
The.next month, Germany invaded Russia, Just 
as Hitler had ordered Bormann to stop his Austrian
^NCA, V, 102*1-,
^DGFP „ XIII, 211-12,
5°Ibid,, XII, 915~16o
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antl-Chur.ch campaign to prepare that country for the war 
effort, he.now directed the head of the Party Chancellery 
to quit taking Church property in the East without the 
Fuehrer 'S personal permission.-^1 This, too,, was a measure 
to help boost the morale of the Catholic population in 
an attempt to-aid the war effort. Now, an uneasy truce 
existed between Germany and the Vatican.^2 ?
On June 6, 19^1, Martin Bormann caused a-predica­
ment that hindered this policy and cost the.Reich a 
great loss of prestige with the Catholics of-;.foreign 
countries; - Bormann wrote a circular to be sent to all 
Reich district leaders. He clearly stated that. National 
Socialist and Christian concepts were absolutely' irrecon­
cilable.. -He-also attributed "business shamelessness" 
or "naivete" to the belief that prayers could ...influence 
a world force-’ that was concerned with the fate, of every 
single being on earth.^3
Bormann said that the Church's influence limited 
the Fuehrer and the NSDAP in their leadership of; the 
people and must be elimin a t e d A l t h o u g h  he intended 
that the circular be secret, Catholic sources reproduced
51DGFP, XIII, 536.
52Lewy, 253-5^.
53NCA, VI, 1035-36.
-^Toynbee, Hitler's Europe, 36.
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It in great-...quantities, and distributed the message- through­
out the worldo-5-5 Only Bormann*s esteemed position as head 
of the Party Chancellery saved him from, the damning criti­
cism of other Reich leaders, Bormann managed to shroud 
the Reieh. in silence whenever the subject came -up* Vatican 
protests, never received answers.0
After publication of the circular, Clemens. von 
Galen, Bishop of Muenster, made numerous speeches, that 
came, close: to causing- a breech between Germany and. the 
Vatican, Although-the. Vatican gave, no open support, to 
his actions..,, the Bishop proceeded with the. blessing of 
the Fulda. Bishops' Conference which proposed to sponsor 
a line of increasingly sharp opposition to the Reich,
In July and early August 19^19 Galen harshly attacked 
the Gestapo for closing several Jesuit houses and many 
convents. He called Gestapo officials "thieves and 
robbers," Then, amid sermons against German, persecution 
of the Church, he denounced the Reich government for its 
use of euthanasia to rid the country of feeblemindedness, 
Bishop. Galen also claimed that the Reich killed its wounded 
soldiers^ because they were no longer productive to the 
State, ^
German.officials reacted in varying-ways, . but the 
concensus was that drastic measures must be taken against
5%CA, VI, 1035-^6; Goebbels, 98 ,
56NCA, VI, ^06-?; Hassell, 210,
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the Bishop, Hlmmler viewed the attack as a-violation of 
State security and asked thdt Galen be shot or disposed 
of by some other suitable meteins,-57 A JQivlslon .Director 
fpr Propaganda suggested that BoftMt asfjfi- the Fuehrer 
’whether., the camouflage of Euthanasia thus far in practice 
ought to he modified” So a. defehse against GalenAs claims 
could be...pfeepared, Walter TiesSler, Leader for National 
Socialist■Propaganda, did not think that such-an enlight- 
ment Campaign'would be sufficient and demanded..that Galen
be hanged,-5®. Bormann agreed with. Tiessler and-.wanted an
open breach with the Vatican, The matter rested' on what 
Hitler would instruct Bormann to dd„
Goebbels and Hitler acted more rationally? than 
anyone else in this instance. Both realized - the'necessity 
of Catholic, -.co-operation in furthering the wareffort„ 
Goebbels .feared that drastic measures against ...Galen would 
alienate.-the. population of Muenster, if not; .all.-of West­
phalia,. The. Propaganda Minister wanted, to . ’-'preserve 
appearances".and try to steer the Church according to 
the interests-.of the State, The Church, he.fe.lt, could 
be dealt with after the war,-59 in this belief, the Party 
Chancellery violently opposed Goebbels, Nevertheless, 
Hitler supported' Goebbels rather than Bormann,
57Hassell, 210,
58NCA, VI, *1-05-6,
59Ibld,. 408,
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The Fuehrer settled the matter by calling-Bormann 
in and "quite in line with trled-and-tested.procedures, 
held it to be. tactically correct to retreat ...a ...tew steps 
for the present, , » Hitler, believed that, the
attitude of Galen presented just one more reaaon why the
i
Concordat should be terminated, but he thought.It best 
to act "shrewdly" and bide his time. On orders, from 
Hitler, the Reich did not counter Bishop Galen is--speeches, 
but the Fuehrer-reiterated his belief that all problems 
with the Catholic Church could be solved with impunity 
after the war, and said that- he would extract retribution 
from Galen "to., the last farthing o'” L
Reich-;officials now increased the machinery to 
deal with political Catholicism, Most executive 'and 
intelligence, offices concerned with the Vatican, and the 
Catholic Church, in its. international role originally 
fell under the-jurisdiction of the Supreme Office for 
the Security of the Reich, In late 1939, this, agency 
set up Section IV B I to deal with political Catholi» 
cism, ---
In October 19^1, a new intelligence service 
emerged to deal with the political Church, Reinhard 
Heydrich, Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, under­
took the formation of a group of "Church Specialists"
60Haas.ell, 210,
^Hitler,. Conversations „ 7^, 451,
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to be organized..wit hin the State Police system- They were 
to keep the ’'opposition" under constant, observation and to 
undertake the study and treatment of the Catholic Chureh
in its struggle. ..with the Stated2 ___
The specialists sought to learn the identities of 
all Catholic ecclesiastics in Releh territories.,...in order 
to find which were employed as "agents" of .the.,..'Vatican, 
Heydrich also-demanded the names of ecclesiastics of 
German origin.:.who worked in important posts .atrthe Vati­
c a n . , ^  Presumably, he intended to recruit them for 
counter-intelligence work against the Holy .See, -Having 
stemmed the. opposite ends of communications -between the 
Vatican and.its. ioeal hierarchy, Heydrich intended to 
eliminate the: middlemen. The specialists were- to dis­
cover who the.papal couriers between the bishops and 
the Vatican were- and stop this method of reporting,^ 
Throughout 1941, the outlawing of religious 
associations and-the confiscation of Church property 
in Poland continued, Weizsaecker told Nuncio.Orsenlgo 
that he "would.hardly have the hope of prevailing" 
against Germany in the incorporated eastern territories 
because he, believed in canon law as a legal theory. The
62NCA.„ IV, 422,
^3Ibid,, 424,
6**Tbid,, 423,
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State Secretary pointed out that canon law. was void where 
no contractual agreement with the State exl'sted,8^
The Catholic Church lost all of Its corporative 
legal rights with the result that most of Its property in 
annexed Poland reverted to the Reich controlled "Roman 
Catholic Church of German Nationality in the Relchsgau 
Warthelando» Germany informed the Vatican .that it 
had transferred the Chureh’s property to "*a juridical 
person of a private character*" so that it could:be 
recognized as non-Polish property,. If it were non- 
Polish „ the Reich could not confiscate under the present 
laws„ However, by November, Secretary of State Maglione 
regarded the Polish property as lost.87
Germany continued to impose new measures- in 
Poland to win back the racial Germans and their children 
who had been "Polandized" by the Catholic Churchy The 
adults had to . join associations sponsored by .the NSDAP,
ZQand the children had to enroll in the Hitler■youth. 
Secretary Maglione and Nuncio Grsenlgo repeatedly pre­
sented their grievances to the Foreign Ministry, The
65DGFP„ XIII, 415o
66NCA, V, 1024-25o The Relchsgau Wartheland is 
annexed Poland only, 1 ;
67Ibid,, 1025,
68Ibido. VII, 110-12.
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Vatican also still ins. is ted-upon the-return of the confis­
cated. land, hut- now—added, restoration of freedom of 
religion to its pleas, All complaints by the Vatican met 
with .de-laying- tactics, from the -Reich,
Finally , on January 18, 1942, the Vatican took ‘ 
advantage of an opportunity to enforce, its rights,,
Germany had. .earlier -wanted the Holy See. to place only - 
German., priests-.,. or at least priests, of German origin, in 
the. Sees.- in Bohemia,.. Moravia, and Poland,. Now the govern-' 
ment. stated' that because of the importance, of conferringt
the high offices, of the Roman-Catholic. Church', it must 
demand, its rights.under Article 14 of the Reich Con­
cordat,^ This article allowed Germany to ascertain 
that "no objections-of a general political nature exist" 
before, the Vat lean.-appointed Archbishops, Coadjutors, or 
Praelates... Nulllus,
The Reich also wanted, to extend, this, right to 
include. Apostolic. Administrators, and Vicar. Capitulars ’ 
who administered these, offices .beyond a. reasonable time, 
Germanyrequested - that an "approprlate communi cat ion"
be sent to the government before.any of these offices
were filled "anywhere in the entire new territory of
69This is.before Hitler severed relations with 
the Vatican concerning the outside territories,' See: 
Chapter V, ll4c,
?°See Appendix A, 188 o
139
the R e i c h . B e r g e n ’s .note. made it clear that this would 
Include, the. Government .General., and It was later determined 
that.. Austria fell into this class ifi cat Ion,.
Although.. Germany did not ask. for. any great con­
cession from, the Vatican, the Holy See responded with a 
caustic, denial of the request. It. gave numerous reasons - • 
why the Church could not...grant..Germany's. wishes, First, 
the. Reich had Initiated -measures,and acts In Germany, 
the occupied territories, and the annexed countries 
which, violated the rights of the Church and the existing 
Concordats., 72
Secondly, the Roman. Catholic Church was founded 
by Christ which makes the Church., supreme, in-its juris-, 
diction by virtue- of. divine right. It then follows, .the 
denial explained., that a.state’s right to influence 
episcopal, appointments is a. privilege, granted by. the 
Vatican and does not establish a specific right for the 
civil authority. Therefore, the right of the govern- - 
ment to make objections of a political nature is a "pure 
concession" founded on the Reich Concordat, and Article■i
It expressly limited this concession to Archbishops,
71N.CA, V, 1037-38,
?2The Reich held firm to the opinion that the 
Reich Concordat did not extend to the. outside terri­
tories, The Vatican continued to insist, that it did, 
and that the Concordats with Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria 
still existed as contractual obligations.
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C oadjutnrs-,.-and..-P.rael-ates-.--Nnllids , 73
Finally , the- argument-as expressed in the German
request, that the, .choice of a candidate for. these offices
contributes to the .good of the State and thus has an
interest for the-government is not a sufficient reason
for the-State, to intervene,' Certainly, the Vatican ,
got.-gr-eafc-.-S-p±.isfac..tl.o-n from^-issuing-thls: long and sharply
worded..refusal..,, hut- it..als.o—strengt-hahed-the Reich’s -
decision to. sever, relafldns.--with- the.-..Vatican-In the
7 ̂outside., territories.. In June. 1942-, ...Orsenigo reported, 
that-, the-government had-not. responded-to the denial, but 
that Vatican communications relating-to-the new terri­
tories were, ’’submitted- to.-unusual- delays”' or lost in the 
"bur.eaucratic. procedure” of the Reich,
In October 19^2, the religious-situation in 
Poland reached its lowest.point, Maglione sent a spe­
cific, list of. tragic- conditions faced-.by. Polish Catholics 
to. the. German-.-Emhass.y.,. He. noted that. the. episcopate had
been..almost, entirely eliminated, the secular and regular
clergy, had been deported and exiled-to the. point that 
they were absolutely inadequate, education of clerics
73NCA, V, 1011-13,
^Ibldo , 1011,
*̂3 This occurred ©n June .22, 1942 , in communi”
cations relevant to Austria, See Chapter V, 114, *
76NCA, V , 1016- 17,
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was... forbidden^.. and-r- among-numerous. other, complaints , r- 
Catholic.- intellectual-.and..-.charltable. institutions had- -
been destroyed, 77 But., the.. Vatican could no longer
communicate through the German Embassy to the Holy See -
because its..chain of command, came... directly, through the-
Foreign...Ministry, The. Foreign,. Office....had lost whatever-
authority It-may...have had-to the. Party .Chancellery and
now had.-no- control of German policy „
German .circumvention of the Vatican, to negotiate 
only with the localhierarchy proved successful in 
Austria,, The- same- condition now prevailed in Poland, 
Having-received no response from the vReich government, 
Maglione resorted to the use of local Vatican repre­
sentatives.. to carry out the policy, of - the Holy See, 
Nuncio Orsenigo--had-..earlier requested- that interned 
Polish priests be.-allowed to emigrate to. America and 
neutral, countries- in. Europe , Germany . refused this 
request.but collected them all in the. one camp of Dachau 
and. promised that, they would be. treated better in the
n Qfuture. The Reich feared that emigrating: priests 
would spread news of the conditions- In Poland, which
would be detrimehtal to the government and the Party,??
Maglione now wrote to the Archbishop of Breslau,
77NCA„ V, 1017-18,
?8 Ibld,„ 1 0 3 0,
7 9Ibid,„ 1 0 3 6,
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i .  •Adolf Cardinal- Bertram* He... requested.. that Bertram Inter­
vene In favor of the priests at Dachau- and work toward 
securing- the right for Polish Catholics to profess their 
faith without hindrance,, Bertram-replied that he had 
been working-toward this goal- -allalong. and„ in his 
capacity .".as- spokesman for all the. hierarchyhad even 
sent a. formal document, to the: Fuehrer.0 All such attempts 
had been -met with silence*^0
■ On December- 7 „ 1941p Car-dinal-Bertram, gave his 
views.- -as-.to why this...-was., so. He ..stat.ed-.that all communi­
cations.- from, the- Vatican.,,. the bishops,,.-and., himself were
intercepted by. the Party.. Chancellery-and—the. S0S0 These ;
two-agencies now-executed, the -supreme. power in directing
the Reich’s Church policy„ Even attempts, to correspond
with the Fuehrer and the Supreme Office for the Security
of the Reich met frith negative replies because of this- 
Rlinterference-,, s.
On March- 2 , 1943e the Reich’s refusal to reply to
f - ‘ "Vatican complaints- about-conditions..-. in-Boland culminated
in a harshly worded letter from the Vatican to Ribbentrop0
8^NCA„ V, IO3I„ It is interesting to note Hassell’s 
diary entry for. November 1, 1941„ He thought of Bertram 
as. a pacifist who led the majority of the German episco­
pate. Hassell stated that: "People such as Bertram will 
get nowhere at all with people such as Hitler and Himmler." 
Thus.„ Hassell believed that the Church should conduct a 
"political" struggle with the Reich rather than a "re­
ligious" one.
81Ibid..-1032-33.
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The Holy See took this opportunity to unleash all of its 
hostility at one...time. Maglione sent the.-letter and 
stated that during the occupation of Poland...members of 
the secular...clergy were shot while hundreds..more were 
imprisoned,..:. He. observed that while priests...from annexed 
Poland, were, detained in Dachau , intensified.police 
measures c.aus.ecL..the imprisonment and depor.fcat.ion of ' 
hundreds more., and Of the six bishops residing., there■,,
O ponly one remained. He was Interned in his. .own home. 
Furthermore, the rights of the Catholic Church 
to education.and.religious Instruction of youth was 
usurped by Germany, and Catholic schools were c l o s e d , 8 ^ 
The Vatican’also‘denounced the segregation of Catholics 
of Polish nationality from those of German nationality 
because the-demand that they attend separate .services 
deprived many.-.of'"the faithful of religious, consolation. 
Finally, the:.letter noted that the "temporary" measure 
of placing nuns.in a special concentration camp at 
Bo janowo was..'.never rescinded.
Even though the Reich had severed.relations with 
the Vatican concerning the outside territories on June 
22., 19h2, Nuncio Orsenigo was instructed to deliver the 
letter, Weizsaecker, not knowing that the letter con­
tained demands about Poland, accepted it. Hitler thought
82NCA, V, 1018-20,
83Ibid,. 1021,
Iil4
the Foreign Ministry had. violated his order of severance 
"because of "its greed for fields of fresh authority" and
Qi.left the Ministry to handle the problem....in .its own way.
Having.reviewed the content of the...letter, the
Foreign Ministry adhered to the established policy for
such occasions.. -Weizsaecker w^s ins true ted. ...to. give the
letter back to Orsenigo with the instructions, that it
be returned -to the Vatican. The reason being, that he
could not present it to the Reich government, as it dealt
with matters-in. which the Holy See did not - have terri-
8 *5torial competence. Such an action would surely cause 
a termination of"relations between Germany and the 
Vatican.
The Holy See demanded that Orsenigo deliver the 
letter, and- .German policy just as steadfastly. demanded 
that it- not he accepted. Weizsaecker and .Orsenigo wanted 
to prevent a. .rupture of relations and somehow, clear 
themselves of the blame for this precarious situation. 
Orsenigo wanted an official statement that Weizsaecker 
had returned the letter to him. Weizsaecker refused
Sil-Hitler, Conversations, *j48„
®^Weizsaecker, 282-83. It is still uncertain 
who made the. decision to return the letter .to Orsenigo. 
Weizsaecker indicates that It was Ribbentrop. . At 
Nuremberg, Ribbentrop claimed that he could not recall 
the..-document, but-under further interrogation, remembered 
"a whole desk full of protests from the Vatican." Ulti- : 
mately, he decided that Hitler had told him what to do. 
Seet NCA, Supplement B, 1235, 1238-39.
145
and told Orsenigo that the best thing to. do. would be to 
treat the letter as. If it had never come.into his hands. 
Orsenigo did as the Foreign Secretary suggested but
86doubted that he would officially survive this, affair. 
Weizsaecker believed that he had warded off ’’.the evil 
which the breaking-off of relations would have brought 
on the thirty-five million German Catholics... . . . "87
The Vatican had no intention of letting, the matter 
rest. Magl.lo.ne instructed Nuncio Orsenigo to inform the 
Reich, in writing, that the Vatican considered. Weiz- 
saecker’s act. as.’"not a friendly one" and that it con­
sidered the document as having reached its destination. 
Orsenigo wrote to the Foreign Minister on May 5 ancl 
explained that..because of the "way in which the trans­
missal of the message was carried out and the time 
during which said message was retained, . , ."the 
Vatican considered it as accepted by the Reich.®®
Ribbentrop answered the letter of May 5 person­
ally, He denied that he had read the letter of March 
2, and stated that Weizsaecker had acted in accord with 
established Reich policy toward the Vatican. , The Foreign
8  f i 'Weizsaecker, 283* Orsenigo feared.that he would
be recalled to the Vatican. Rolf Hochhuth says that the
Nuncio was . p.ersona non grata at the Vatican after 1945 
so his fears may have been borne out. See; Hochhuth, 296.
87Ibld.
88NCA, V, 1042-43.
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Minister approved, his action and confirmed, the Reich’s
stand that it would, engage in no negotiations with the
Roly See over the Incorporated Territories.* Ribbentrop
was careful, to. point; out that such territories, included
annexed Poland as well as Austria*
He also referred to the Government. General as
8Qbeing in this, category* 7 This was the firs-t instance
in which the Government General was specifically named
as an area where the Vatican did not have authority to
deal with the government* Ribbentrop also adopted the
same solution to-the quandary as did Weizsaecker* He
told Orsenigo that it would be best for all concerned
90to regard- the-letter as non-existent. Here the matter 
ended.
By the. end of May 1943. Germany made it-absolutely 
clear to the: Vatican that it would harbor no-Interference 
from that lns.tltutlon in regard to the Incorporated Terri­
tories. This confirmed the position taken by the Reich 
in communications relevant to Austria. There.could be 
no doubt that Austria and annexed Poland were considered 
equally outside the Vatican’s sphere of influence and 
that negotiations could be carried on only between the 
old Reich and the Vatican. In slddition, the Government 
General was now included in the Incorporated Territories„
89NCA, V , 1 0 4 5 .
at least for purposes of eliminating diplomatic activity 
with the Holy See. The . Reich had...once, .more....won a victory 
over the Vatican by implementing its policies, while not 
losing the support of Catholics within its borders because 
of a final termination of relations between ...it and the 
Holy See.
1A8
III
Hitler’s plan t© build a new world order included 
the domination of Russia, Poland and Russia were to be 
the "great experimental field", in the East.^1 By 19^1» 
Hungary and Rumania had accepted the status of German 
satellites. German forces crossed these countries and 
forced. :Bulgaria to conform* On April 6, 19^1® Germany 
invaded Yugoslavia and Greece* On April 17, Yugoslavia 
capitulated and Greece, after a heroic resistance .to the 
Italians..,.:.followed suit a week later. - - -
In April, Joseph Mueller made another of his now
customary, trips to the Vatican to pass the word to
Britain that Germany intended to attack Russia on June 
9222, 19^1. Such a warning should not have been neces­
sary. Although no one believed the outlandish passages 
of Mein Kampf„ Hitler clearly expressed his belief that 
it was militarily Impossible for Germany to be allied 
with Russia in a long war with the West. The Fuehrer, 
believed-that the Reich could obtain no effective support 
from Russia: because the war would be fought on German 
soil.93
.On June...22, 19^1* Hitler turned his attention
^Hitler quoted In Bullock, 319«
92Colvin, 138.
^Hitler, Mein Kampf. 659.
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from the Battle of Britain to the invasion of Russia,, 
Territory occupied in Russia was generally to be treated 
the same as the Government General» Germany wanted to 
use part.of the native population for slave labor in 
iridustry and agriculture and keep all of the inhabitants 
completely at. the disposal of their overlords. Those 
of education or position who might form an effective
i
Q kcenter: of opposition were to be exterminated.
' On July I?, Hitle:|* noted that as soon as military 
operations were terminated the Army would yield its 
administrative capacity to the civil authorities.
Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer S.S., inherited the duty to 
lay the racial foundations of the New Order in this area. 
Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, 
claimed :.the right to organize the economic exploitation 
of the territories. To oversee this administrative 
network, Hitler appointed Alfred Rosenberg "Reich • 
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.".
Too many departments had competency, and ad- 
ministratlve functions overlapped until petty jealousV 
among the leaders made the operation completely chaotic. 
In August, the Fuehrer ordered the Army to keep abso­
lutely out of the religious activity of the popu- 
oc;lation, but the authorities never established to whom
^Bullock, 696.
95DGFP, XIII, 536.
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the direction of Church policy belonged,,
The German episcopate, again Influenced by patri­
otism, supported the invasion of Russia,^ The Vatican 
followed a more ambiguous course, Weizsaeeker repotted 
that the Holy See reacted favorably because a German 
victory would weaken communism,^ The Vatican radio, 
wishing not to harm the German effort, eliminated all 
unfavorable- references to the Reich and asked if there 
were any further complaints from Germany on this point, 
Further reports informed Berlin that Pius XII had earlier 
decided that he could no longer remain silent about the 
severeness of Reich Church policy, but that he refrained 
from taking appropriate steps because he did not want to 
hurt Germany's chances of defeating Soviet R u s s i a ,  99-.
Axis propagandists called the assault on Russia 
a benefit to the Church and tried to get the Pope to 
approve the Russian campaign and "even to declare it a 
holy war or c r u s a d e , T h e  Vatican would go no 
further than stopping its anti-German pronouncements.
The papal, refusal disappointed Germany and Italy,
9^Lewy, 230,
9?Friedlaender, 76.
08Ibid,, 77o Minute by Weizsaeeker, June 26,
19^1o
" PGFP, XIII, **89 o 
100Graham, 372,
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Although Germany reduced its anti-Catholic campaign in
both Austria and Poland at this time, the Holy See adopted
no clear position in favor of Germany's invasion of Russia.
In the following months, Germany adopted a more
tolerant attitude toward the Catholics in the Reich,
Dino Alfierl, ex-Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, ‘
told Goebbels that Reich policy against the Catholics;
caused ..a definite strain between Germany and Italy and
had an "intensely demoralizing effect" on the large
101number of German Catholic soldiers. Goebbels en­
couraged Hitler to declare a general truce with the 
Church. The Reich had been arbitrarily talcing the re­
maining Church property in Germany and, after the invasion 
of Russia, Hitler wanted to eliminate internal dissension 
anyway . : On July ?, Bormann followed the Fuehrer’s orders 
and told all district leaders to stop confiscating Church 
property.102
Germany entered into only one area of conflict" 
with the Vatican as a direct result of the Russian cam-i
paign. .On November 11, 19^1» Rosenberg denied access to
101 'Dino Alfierl, Dlctatbrs Face to Face (New York,
1955) * l2?-\28. This is one of the few sources that
detects an increase In persecution of Catholics In the
Reich Immediately after Germany's invasion of Russia.1 ~
See page 126.
102Frledlaender, 1^9« Hitler's order to stop the 
confiscation of Church property in the Reich is one part 
of the larger order to stop this practice all together.
The repercussions are seen in both Austria and Poland.
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the. recently occupied Russian lands to all Catholic 
priests with the exception of Army Bishops The Vati­
can had hoped that it would be permitted to function in 
these territories. It wanted to combat communism, and, 
more importantly, hoped to gain a foothold from which the 
Orthodox Eastern Church could be united with Rome.
The Vatican attempted to negate Rosenberg's order
by securing the aid1 of Bernardo Attolico, the Italian--
Ambassador to Germany. Attolico explained to Berlin
that the interests of the Church and the Reich were
identical in the fight against communism, and that a
proper settlement of this question '"was the ground on
which" a "‘rapprochement between the Reich and the Catholic
10&Church could take place."' Although Germany had 
allowed:‘Some priests to emigrate to the Russian terri­
tories,, it now refused to enlarge on this concession.-- 
- • -In December 19^1, the Foreign Ministry issued a 
memorandum to establish Reich policy on this question.
The Ministry warned that because of the importance to 
the Vatican of the uniflcat'lqni of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church with Rome, Nuncio Orsenigo would probably give 
the matter his special attention. The memorandum stated 
that the Nuncio should be told that Catholic priests had
103Friedlaender, 151..
T 0&Quoted in Friedlaender, 151~52.
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formerly been allowed to enter occupied Eussia by the 
Army authorities. But, since the Army no longer had 
competence in this matter, the practice would ’.cease.
The Ministry also pointed out that there were 
enough Catholic priests in the formerly Russian area to 
serve the Catholic population adequately.'*'^ However, 
Orsenigo should not be told the real reason why Catho­
lic priests would not be admitted. The actual reason 
was that the Reich did not want the Vatican to have 
re.as.on to. consider the Russian land as a "new terri­
tory. »106
" By March 19^2, some high-ranking Germans had 
become convinced that Hitler had no hope of defeating 
thecombined forces of Britain, America, and Russia. • 
Papen sent a representative to inquire through the 
Vatican about a possible peace with the Allies. Papal 
Secretary of State Maglione retorted that this was 
impossible because there was already fear that Joesph 
Stalin, who demanded a second front, might ally with 
Hitler again.
During the winter of 19^2-43, Hitler lost the
105DGFP. XIII, 952-53.
106Ibid. It is not clear whether "new territory" 
means, a new territory for the Church or a new territory 
for Germany. In either case, the Reich did not want the 
Vatican to gain any more Influence in German held lands.
10?Papen, *4-89.
-military initiative as' the British Eighth Army and the 
Allied combined forces made advances in North Africa.
Three Russian Army Groups also launched a huge frontal 
attack north and south of Stalingrad, and the German war 
economy faltered. Some observers believed the end to be 
near.
When Germany lost the Initiative the fear of
« *v
communist penetration of Central and Western Europe - 
began:plaguing the Vatican again. Rather than side with 
the'Allied democracies, combined with Russia, the Holy 
See continued to refrain from any action that would
■j'nQweaken Germany’s war effort.
Weizsaeeker, now Ambassador to the Holy See, began 
flooding the Foreign Ministry with reports of the Vati­
can’s desire for Germany to ward off Russian communism.
The-Ambassador stated that Pius XII thought that na 
powerful German Reich is quite indispensible for the 
future of the Catholic Church,?’10  ̂and wanted ”a strong 
and united Germany as a barrier against Soviet Russia,”11  ̂
while believing that ’’the fate of Europe depends on the 
victorious resistance by Germany on the Russian front.1’111
108Lewy, 2^9.
109priedlaender, 191. Telegram from Weizsaeeker 
to Berlin, September 3» 19^3.
110Ibid., 195. October ?, 19^3.
in Ibid., 190. September 23, 19^3. One cannot 
assume that the Vatican’s approval of a strong Germany
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Although the Immediate Iconsequence of the military 
defeat at Stalingrad was not as great as expected, and 
the German line remained deep in Russian territory,
Germany could take no advantage of the Vatican's willing­
ness to establish a rapprochement with the Reich, Hitler's 
"stand fast" order for all fronts resulted in a large 
loss, of men and deprived his generals of using their 
military skill. By the end of 19^3» the British blockade 
of Germany and the Allied,air strikes helped to dis­
organize and strain the Reich's war economy.
" The Fuehrer, having taken over the Supreme Command 
of the-’.Army, remained wholly preoccupied with the tacti­
cal and strategic demands of the war. Bormann, Goebbels, 
Goering; and the other Reich leaders attempted to keep 
the German war effort operative. This demanded all of 
their time and effort. All waited for the fulfillment 
of Hitler's belief that tension among the Allies would 
cause them to break apart. The German war effort was, 
now.total and ̂ esperate. Relations with the Vatican - 
became.a minor point. The questions of the Concordat 
and Vatican competency in the annexed and occupied
necessarily meant that it wanted Germany to win a 
complete military victory over the Allies. The Holy 
See's.. fear of communism was not so great that it would 
sacrifice the Catholics within Germany's border. More 
probably, the Vatican was trying to retain its neu­
trality so that it could protect the most Catholics 
regardless of how the war ended.
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territories had no validity in a changing situation for 
which the outcome was in doubt*
CHAPTER VI 
GERMANY ISOLATES THE VATICAN
Throughout 19^3» the war continued to turn against 
Germany despite some successful offensives„ Germany had 
moved into Unoccupied France as the Allied forces made 
gains in North Afria, and the Eastern Front threatened 
to collapse. The more pre-occupled. the Reich "became with 
the military aspects of total war, the less concern it 
had for diplomatic relations with the Vatican, Under 
these circumstances,, Reich-Vat lean relations were confined 
almost exclusively to Italy,
Pope Pius XII worried about the possibility of
the Allies bombing Rome and requested a statement that
this, would not happen, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo
Ciano recorded D ’Arcy Osborne’s reply that; ’’Rome is not
only the city of the Catholics, but also the headquarters
of the High Command, a large German command, many airports,
1. and a railway center. The Anglo-American staff
intended to retain the prerogative to bomb Rome if it 
became necessary. But, by January 2, 19^3o Pius XII, 
having received Mussolini’s confirmation that the German 
commands had been removed from Rome, believed that bomb­
ing of the Eternal City had been averted.^
^Ciano’s Diary, 552.
2Ibid.. 556, 565.
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-The Fuehrer made plans to place Italy fully under
German control,.This would necessitate occupation of Rome
and imprisonment of its leading figures. All Vatican
officials would have to be taken into custody too,
Goebbels spoke against this possibility and noted that
the Pope had stated that he had nothing to do with the
military goals of the Allies, Goebbels did not want to
provoke the Pope unnecessarily because he might be useful
at a later time. The Propaganda Minister and Ribbentrop
opposed Hitler's plan to seize the Vatican because they
did not -want the "whole of world, opinion" to turn against
Germany,  ̂ They convinced the Fuehrer to exempt the Holy
LlSee from occupation if the Reich moved into Italy,
On July 5» Weizsaeeker reported to Berlin about; 
his private audience with the Pope, Pius XII told Weiz- 
saecker, in confidence, that he had always felt close 
to Germany and that this feeling was Strengthened by the 
Reich’s'fight against the Communists, who were now 
extremely active in Northern Italy, Two weeks later, 
any possible basis for agreement that this audience may 
have had was negated by an Allied bombardment of Rome,
•^Goebbels, 303s 409,
/’ibid, , 416,
^Friedlaender, 1?9“80, This Is one of the few 
cases when Pius XII definitely condoned German Invasion 
of Russia,
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The Allies bombed because of Rome’s strategic value and 
the fact that German outposts had been left In tke suburbs. 
The Vatican now. worked for the removal of the outposts 
and, particularly, Field Marshal Albert Kes'selrlng’s 
headquarters.^
On July 25, the Fascist Grand Council, spurred on 
by Italian discontent with the German Alliance, met and 
persuaded the King to dismiss and imprison the Duce. The 
news, shocked the Fuehrer and put the Reich’s prestige 
at stake. Hitler quickly realized that Marshal Pietro 
Radogllo’s new non-Fascist government would proclaim its 
loyalty to the Axis only until it could make a deal with 
the'Allies. The Fuehrer rushed all available men to 
Northern Italy in preparation to occupy the peninsula.
The Vatican strove to secure the defeat of 
Mussolini and the establishment of the Badogllo govern­
ment. Reports of the Holy See’s activity reached Berlin'’ 
which, of course, wanted to re-establish Fascism to save 
face. On July 26, Germany moved troops toward Rome and 
completed plans for the occupation. At a two day confer­
ence on the matter a German advisor suggested that troops
^Friedlaender, 182-83. Albert Kesselring (1885~ 
i960): Commander-in-Chief of German forces in Italy and 
Military Commander of Italy, 19^3-^5; -Commander-in-Chief 
West,. Match 19^5; tried for war crimes, death sentence 
commuted to life imprisonment.
^Goebbels, ij-09-10.
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occupy all the exits to the Vatican, Hitler replied that:
That doesn’t matter; I’ll get into the Vatican 
any time I Do you think I worry about the Vati­
can? We can seize that straight away. . . .
Then we’ll say we’re sorry afterwards; we can 
easily do that. We’ve got a war on.°
Hitler...continued to think about a final reckoning, but 
Goebbels and Ribbentrop persuaded him to spare the Vati**
9can. ̂
On September 8, 19^3» the Badogllo government signed 
an armistice with the Allies. Hitler ordered Field Marshal
Kesselring, the Commander-in-Chlef of German forees in...
Italy, to prepare for action. Kesselring was relieved ~ 
when the Allied Fifth and Eighth Armies landed at Salerno* 
much: further south than Germany dared to hope for. Every­
one in Rome thought the Allies would arrive on September 
10 and~.were surprised when German soldiers disarmed the 
Italians..and occupied Italy, including Rome,
German troops did not enter the Vatican, but they 
immediately isolated it. Isolation of the Holy See re­
flected a politico-military decision for purposes of
stopping the Vatican’s flow of.Important intelligence
, \
information to the Allies, rather than an anti-Catholic„
8Walter Warllmont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 
1939-19^5 (New York, 1965)7 356<> Hereafter cited as Warlimont.
^Bullock, 708.
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gesture.^10 Despite the Vatican's support of the revolt 
against Mussolini, and its gathering of information for 
the Allies, the Fuehrer agreed to safeguard all rights 
of the Holy See during the occupation of Rome General 
Stahel, the commandant of Rome, posted guards around the 
Vatican to prevent any violation of the Holy See's extra­
territorial rights,1^
.The day before the occupation, Himmler had appointed 
S,S0 General Karl Wolff-*-3 to keep civil order in the area 
from, north of Naples to the Brenner Pass, Himmler made- 
Wolff, his personal representative in Italy and even cre- 
atfi.cL.--.fche new rank of "Highest S0S„ and Police Leader" : 
for:*him;- This title gave Wolff more importance in the : 
eyes of Mussolini and Kesselring and placed him on an 
equal basis with Kaltenbrunner. Wolff co-ordinated the 
disposition of S,S. forces with the Army, acted as policy.; 
advisor to Mussolini, and consultant to Kesselring, :Tales 
circulated in Berlin that if the Allies attempted to force
1 0Cianfarra, 290,
^Goebbels,
12Hochhuth, 32*4-.
13Karl Wolff (1900- ); General of Waffen S,S,
at Fuehrer Headquarters; Chief of Personal Staff of 
Reichsfuehrer S,S„ (under Himmler); Himmler's liaison, 
officer with Hitler's headquarters until 19*44; personal 
adjutant to Himmler, 19*4-1; Chief of S,S, and Police 
Commander in Italy, 19^3; founder and commander of 
Italian S.S. legion, 19^5.
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their way ..into Rome, the S. S. would take Vatican officials
as hostages„ Wolff established contact with the Vatican
14and.assured the Pope that this would not happen.
The foreign press picked up the story, and the 
Vatican'became extremely worried that Hitler would remove-
the Papal Court to Liechtenstein and hold the Pope in
1<captivity. The Holy See told Ambassador Weizsaeeker 
of its apprehension, and he drew, up a plan to counter 
any such "rash action."
In mid-October, as the Badoglio government de­
clared war on Germany and American troops crossed the 
Volturno, Joseph Goebbels discontinued his policy of 
defending the Vatican and seconded Hitler's plan to
i.
exile, the Pope.^ Walter SchellenbergChief of the
•^Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender (New York, 
1966), 6l. Hereafter cited as Dulles.
^Weizsaeeker, 290. Rolf Hochhuth notes that the 
foreign press sensationalized this story, but claims that 
his interviews with Vatican officials proved that they 
never expected Hitler to occupy the Vatican and exile the 
Pope. See: Hochhuth, 324, 329o On the other hand,
Hassell had received information that "if Rome falls, 
the Pope will be taken along ’for his own protection.’" 
See: Hassell, 32?. Walter Schellenberg believed that 
"Hitler was seriously considering the deportation of the 
Pope into a kind of exile at Avignon." See: Schellen- 
berg, 370.
^-^Weizsaeeker, 290. The Ambassador did not 
elaborate on the details of this plan.
^Schellenberg, 370®
^Walter Schellenberg (1910-1952): Chief of Amt 
VI of the Foreign Political Intelligence Service, 1941- 
45; Chief of the unified Intelligence Service (which took 
over military Intelligence functions from the Abwehr), 
1944-45; General of Police and of Waffen S.S.
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Foreign Political Intelligence Service (Amt VI)„ opposed
Goebbels on this point* He took up Goebbels' old line
that the exile of the Pope "would discredit Germany in the
eyes of the entire w o r l d * S c h e l l e n b e r g  approached his
superior* Heinrich Himmler* and urged him to avoid the
anti-Church policy of Goebbels and Bormann because it
would.:.cause him to lose the confidence of foreign nations-
should.;.he become hier to Hitler's Germany* Himmler' took
Schellenberg*s advice and pointed out to Hitler the degree
to. which-Catholics contributed to the German war effort.
Hitler:heeded HlmniX(er !s warning ahd gave up his plans to
20deport the Pope*
: The Vatican still worried that Rome would be bombed
by the Allies because of German facilities in that city*
It conveyed this anxiety to Weizsaeeker who Informed 
Kesselring. The Field Marshal* although reluctant to do 
so from a military standpoint* reduced the Rome garrison ; 
to about one battalion* Furthermore* he instructed German
troops- to detour around Rome rather than marching through
21 it* x
■^Schellenberg, 370.
20Ibid*
^Weizsaeeker, 291* Kesselring was most co- 
operative . during the occupation of Rome. In conjunction 
with the Vatican and the Italian Ministry of Education, 
he signed many orders to. protect cultural centers and 
art treasures * See: Albert Kesselring* Kesselring: A 
Soldier's Record (New York* 195^)8 36?« Hereafter cited 
as Kesselring*
\6h
When Germany occupied Rome, it withdrew its Italian 
. Embassy,, The Embassy at the Vatican was the only remain­
ing diplomatic authority. Ambassador Weizsaeeker honored 
Fapal Interests and reported that; "Our military authori­
ties.. respected as a matter of principle all these proper­
ties:, monasteries, etc,, for which our Vatican Embassy
22had issued letters of protection."
From May 12 to June 19^, the Allies fought their
way toward Rome. Kesselring and his troops, short of .
rations and munitions, retreated. On June the Allies 
marched quietly into Rome as the Germans departed from 
the other side. As Kesselring fell back to set up 
defensive positions, he designated many towns as. "open,"
"neutralized," or "hospital" cities to protect their
■ ' -  - 23cultural and ecclesiastical traditions, ^
.German occupation of Rome caused, the Vatican much 
diS-C-omfbrt, but caused no invasion of its neutralityor 
epctrû  territoriality, The S.S., knowing that Jews and 
political opponents of the German regime hid in some 
religious buildings while others served as broadcasting 
stations for Italian and American intelligence, did not
22Weizsaecker, 289-90, It Is doubtful that Hitler 
condoned these liberties. Speaking of the Vatican, he 
said: "The whole diplomatic corps will be in there. I 
donft care a damn but if the whole crew’s there, we'll 
get the whole lot of swine out." See: Warlimoht, 356.
^Kesselring, 368-69.
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24Invade the Vatican grounds, Long after the war, Father
Robert Leiber, the Pope’s personal secretary stated: -
I cannot remember the neutrality of the 
Vatican ever being violated,, German troops 
kept the line closed off so that no one 
could cross it who didn’t have a pass, The 
Pope, had, therefore , no reason to complain,, 
Everything proceeded in an orderly fashion, 
almost as a matter of course, Nothing everhappenedi25
Ifter the Allies occupied Rome, the German Embassy 
moved—into the Vatican,, The diplomats had achieved 
nothing in general political matters between the Reich 
and the Holy See since June 19̂ 3<> The Allied occupation 
severed the Embassy from German Supreme Headquartersi:
The Embassy received absolutely no information of a 
political nature from Germany, It was left to operate 
on its own because the attention of.officials in Berlin 
turned exclusively to the ”’uncompromising determination 
to continue the struggle’” against the Allies,
The German Opposition had been rendered in- ir 
effective as a result of numerous" ill-fated security 
leakages.. In December 19^2, customs officials had 
picked up an Abwehr agent on charges of smuggling curren­
cy into Switzerland, The agent confessed that he carried
^Hochhuth, 328,
25"plus XII and the Third Reich,” Look, (May 17, 
1966), 50,
2^Weizsaecker, 293-9^, 299,
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the money for a group of generals who used the Vatican to
27sound out the Allies on peace proposals0 ' The resulting 
investigation, carried out by Himmler's S.S. , led back 
to Admiral. Canaris. and General Hans Oster. In February 
19^3» Himmler closed down the Abwehr and took charge•of 
a unified. Intelligence Service,, r
On July 20, 19^» the Oppositions* plot to kill- 
Hitler failed, and the S.S, began to round up all persons 
suspected of conspiring against the Reich, The investi­
gation led to discovery of the Oppositions' correspondence 
with the Vatican and the "X-report," the Holy See's pro-
pOposed peace conditions of 19^0. Ultimately, Canaris, 
Beck, Oster, Haider, Hassell, Joseph Mueller, and many 
others were arrestedo2  ̂ Since the German Embassy to the 
Vatican had' been severed from the Reich and the Oppo­
sition folded, there seemed to be no influential German 
officials, to carry on contact with the Holy See,
Between December 1 9 ^  and January 19^5. a German
^Colvin, 188. Also see: William Shirer, The 
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Connecti- 
cut, 1962), 1329.
2®Colvin, 20^-05» For Information relating to 
the "X-report," see: Chapter V, 125-26.
2^Colvin 202-12; Bullock, 738-79. Canaris and 
Oster were among those convicted of high treason and 
executed at Flossenburg. Although Mueller was at the 
camp at the same time, the Reich never executed him.
It appears that either Himmler had another use for 
him. or an order went astray.
16?
offensive on the Western Front failed to reach Its goal, 
and Hitler reluctantly withdrew his forces from the : 
Ardennes * On January 12 , 19^5» the Bed Army opened an 
offensive on the. Eastern Front from the Baltic to the 
Carpathians* By the end of the month, Russia was less 
than one hundred, miles, from Berlin* On. April 12, the 
United States Ninth Army crossed the Elbe river and four 
days later the Russians opened the way to Berlin* Und.er 
these conditions, many Nazi leaders searched for the- 
means to make peace with the Allies to save Germany > 
from total destruction* The most likely place to origi­
nate such proposals was the Vatican, where Pius XII was
30receiving Allied diplomats and soldiers*-'
S*S* General Karl Wolff made the final German 
contact with the Vatican*. Wolff held the only important 
S*S* command outside. German territory and had been made 
military, plenipotentiary for Italy* He had proved his 
good faith by. releasing- many, prominent. Italians and 
ecclesiastics, from the Gestapo’s hands, at the Vatican’s 
request* In May 19^, Weizsaeeker. had arranged an 
appointment with the Pope for him. The details of the 
conversation are not known, but it is clear that this 
was Wolff’s first, attempt to be the prime mover for the 
/
30Dulles, ^9*
I
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surrender of German forces In Northern Italy.^
Wolff's direct access to the Vatican was inter­
rupted by the Allied occupation of Rome in June, so he 
negotiated with Ildefonso Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop 
of Milan, This channel led to the. Allies, through the 
Vatican and the Papal Nuncio in Berne, Switzerland 
where the United States had a large intelligence organ­
ization, It also led to the partisan authorities in
\
Northern Italy who worked for peace and the exclusion 
of the Germans from Italy.32
Wolff and Schuster conceived, of a. plan to bring 
peace on the Italian Front. The Northern Italian Com­
mittee for Liberation, a partisan group, was to sign-a 
proposed peace document for Italy, while Kesselring 
signed for Germany,33 Schuster used the Papal Nuncio 
in Berne and the Vatican to get the proposal to Allied 
headquarters in Rome. The terms of the proposal were' 
that the Germans would not destroy Italian Industrial
Dulles, 6l, 79o Wolff’s motive for negotiating 
through the Vatican will probably never be known, but it 
was not from any sense of humaneness. He had been ex­
tremely active in the persecution of Jews in Europe, At 
Nuremberg he received a four year suspended sentence for 
his S.S. activities. Finally, in 1964, a Munich court 
sentenced him to fifteen years at hard labor. See; 
"Bureaucrat of Death," Newsweek (October 12, 1964), 57- 
58.
32F. w. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Mussolini, 
Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism (New York, 1962), 
761-62. Hereafter cited as Deakin.
33Ibld.. 763c
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and public utility services not of Immediate military 
value, if the partisan forces agreed not to hinder the 
German withdrawal from Italy.3^ General Wolff later 
promised Schuster that the Germans would surrender un­
conditionally in Northern Italy,^5 Ecclesiastical ; ' 
authorities would act as middlemen, ~
The success of these negotiations depended on' 
the co-operation between Kesselring’s army forces and 
Wolff's S„S, Schuster and Wolff repeatedly contacted 
Kesselring, who seemed eager to negotiate a peace In 
Italy, but also continued to follow orders from Berlin, 
Just as the Field Marshal appeared ready to make the-’ - 
Army a part of Wolff’s plans he was made Commander-Im- 
Chief West, Moreover, the Central Committee of the 
National Committee for Liberation balked at making a 
deal with any German official hot an authority of Berlin 
at the supreme level.
On April 25 19^5 #• after much undercover (and
unrecorded) negotiations, Cardinal Schuster arranged a 
meeting of the. National Committee for Liberation. 
Mussolinihaving been reseued from the Badoglio govern­
ment by Germany, was to attend the meeting.; General 
Wolff secured the support of Kesselring's replacement,
3^Dulles, if-6.
-^Benito Mussolini, Memoirs . 19^-2-19^3; . With 
Documents Relating to the Period (London. 19^9). 259.
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Army General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, and planned to
o  / I
attend the meeting to sign the peace treaty. At this 
moment,, It appeared that a Reich official had finally 
used the Vatican to make a peace with the Allies that 
did not include the Hitler regime. Such was not the 
case.
Wolff had also been negotiating with Allen Dulles,
the head of the United States Office of Strategic
Services, in Switzerland, Dulles entered into negotl-
37ations with Wolff on the Pope’s recommendation.
Rather than attend the meeting sponsored by Cardinal' 
Schuster, Wolff traveled to Switzerland and met with 
Dulles’ representatives. On April 28, they made final 
plans for the surrender of all German troops in Northern 
Italy, The next day, representatives of Vietinghoff', 
Wolff, and Dulles, signed the document. Kesselring 
relieved Vietinghoff of his command and, on Hay 2, the
day the surrender went into effect, gave his personal
, 38 1approval.
On the same day, Germany announced Hitler’s 
36Dulles, 193; Deakin, 810.
^Dulles, 92-3. The subject of Wolff’s negoti­
ations with -Cardinal Schuster and Allen Dulles has been 
elaborately traced by many authorities. Most sources, 
and even the statements of witnesses, are contradictory. 
Allen Dulles’ The Secret Surrender, F. W. Deakin’s' The 
Brutal Friendship, and Jacques de Launay’s Secret 
Diplomacy of World War II are the best sources on this 
topic.
38Deakln, 77^.
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deatho The Fuehrer had committed suicide in his bunker 
as Russian forces arrived in Berlin, Five days later, 
May 7, 19^5» Admiral Donitz signed an unconditional 
surrender for Germany,
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
Germany's attitude toward the Vatican between 1933
and 19^5 did not reflect a pre-concelved policy formulated
by the National Socialist German Workers' Party or. any
one individual. Different factions within the Party held
divergent views, and each individual had his own opinion.
The preface to the Documents on German Foreign Policy
aptly expresses this point;
Readers of these documents will soon become 
aware of one peculiarity of German diplomacy 
under Hitlers the fact that for a long period 
of time there might be not one, but several,
German policies, and that the adherents of 
one policy might be in partial or complete, 
ignorance of what the adherents of other 
policies were doing.1
From the complex inter-action of the?e different positions, 
came a constantly changing policy toward the: Holy See that 
may be called the "German attitude."
Ambassador George S. Messersmith (Consul General 
in Berlin, 1930= 3*1% and Minister to Austria, 193^-3?) of 
the United States filed an affidavit to be used at Nurem­
berg. The statement accused all officials responsible to 
Ribbentrop of being ardent Nazis and "criminally responsi­
ble for the acts of the.German Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2during this period." One must know what beliefs these
1DGFP, I, XVI.
2NCA, V, k6a
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Individuals held in order to understand the complexity of 
the German attitude,,
Messersmlth specifically implicated Ernst von Weiz- 
saeeker as one of those criminally responsible for actions 
of the Foreign Ministry. Weizsaecker devotes his memoirs 
to the contradiction of this claim. The truth lies 
somewhere in between. In the years before April 19^3> 
when Weizsaecker was appointed Ambassador to the Holy 
See, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs definitely - 
lacked personal initiative. He tried to take a position 
midway between Nazi demands that he persecute the CathO” 
lie Church and actions that would not make’ him appear 
as an opponent of Christian morality. To a certain : 
extent, he was successful. Vatican officials never ■> 
chided him personally, nor did he get into any grave1 
trouble with his Nazi superiors.
Weizsaecker, as did all other Reich leaders, 
acted in. the best interests of Germany as dictated by 
his; own conscience. While, writing letters and sending 
telegrams, usually, drafted by. Rlbbentrop, to various 
agencies of the. Reich, the. State Secretary also kept 
the German Opposition informed of events, and political 
decisions in the Reich Chancellery.^ In this way, he 
fulfilled his duty to the Party while satisfying his 
own desire to maintain a personal peace with the
^Weizsaecker, 182; Colvin, 51o
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Vatican,,
Nevertheless-, Weizsaecker did not make, any decisions 
that represented his personal opinions,. He wanted to keep 
Germany free of the stigma of anti»Church- persecution but
took no active measures to do so until he arrived safely
at the Vatican, Only when Weizsaecker convinced Hitler 
and Ribbentrop that he should be Ambassador to the Holy
See did he take the intiative in protecting the Church's
rights and instigating peace proposalsWeizsaecker's 
primary consideration was not the defeat of Catholicism 
in. German territory but the desire to escape. the war
years without subjecting himself to adverse criticism
from any quarter,
Diego von Bergen, another representative of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs-, attained the highest degree 
of professionalism of any Reich official assigned to 
Vatican affairs, Bergen adopted the National Socialist 
belief that the Church be absolutely excluded from Reich 
politics but promoted this idea in a highly diplomatic 
manner. The Aabas-s-ador to the Holy See took a realistic 
point of view, unaffected by the emotional squabbles of 
either side. The furtherance of Reich policy was foremost 
In his mind, but he clearly saw the necessity for compro­
mise with the Holy See in order to carry out German
^Weizsaecker, 2?7, 258-59? Hassell, 332,
■wishes to limit Vatican influence in Germany and the 
world
Bergen never hesitated-to. give his personal opinion 
regardless of whether or not it conformed to Reich policy„ 
He wanted an exchange of explicit details concerning 
points of conflict between Germany and the Vatican at all 
times *.̂ By clarifying all issues, he thought there would 
be no misunderstanding', and each power would know exactly 
what was expected by the other0 Bergen’s prestige in 
Germany and the Vatican allowed him to remain as Ambassa­
dor until he was considerably past retirement age, despite 
attempts by his enemies to have Ribbentrop recall him,,'7 
Ribbentrop had some vague idea that National 
Socialism would somehow be substituted for Catholicism 
in German territory*® But he probably did not understand 
the basic tenets of National Socialism, let alone the 
intense ideological conflict between it and Catholicism*
The Foreign Minister was incapable of making any decision 
in relation to the Vatican that was not dictated by Hitler* 
Ribbentrop was- not a leader, nor even an effective follow­
er, in the Reich’s struggle to eliminate Vatican influence
5DGFP, I, 1039*
6Ibid** 936*
^Ibld* * Appendix III, 6ok0
®Weizsaecker, 281*
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In Germany,, He was a blind, adherent to orders whose stock 
answer a.t. Nuremberg.. was..: "We all believed, in. the. Fuehrer. "9
Not all agencies of the Reich were led by such weak 
and. irresponsible men. Some were dominated, by. strong, 
demanding leaders like Joseph Goebbels, the Minister for 
Propaganda and Public Enlightenment„ History has desig­
nated Goebbels as one of the infamous leaders of the Third 
Reich„ but this is not true in relation to his Church 
policy,.
He thought it was nonsense for a spiritual power 
to interfere with political and military questions and 
flew into a rage when the Vatican voiced its. complaints 
to the foreign...press rather than to Germany. lety exc.Cpt 
in a few. isolated cases, he did not take direct action 
against the Church for these "treasonable" offenses. 
Goebbels. believed in National Socialist doctrine com­
pletely but did not think that Catholicism should be 
eliminated during the war. The Propaganda Minister 
thought that the Vatican should be dealt with after the 
war.10
This position placed him in direct opposition 
to the extremist group of the Nazi Party which tried to 
uproot the Church during the war. When the Gestapo,
9NCAo -Supplement B, 1237.
10Goebbels , 166, 3,82.
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at the insistence of the Party;,, requisitioned Church
buildings, in Berlin against his orders, Goebbels repri-
11manded. .them, alio When, against his warnings, Party
members attempted to take over certain functions of the
Church that later proved unpleasant, he accused them
12of "driving:, out the devil with Beelzebub," His stand 
was that :.
The church question is as far as possible 
not to be discussed at all during, the entire 
war, no matter how recalcitrant the 'sky- 
pilots» may prove to be'in this or. that 
matter. After the war we shall certainly 
have other possibilities of making them see 
the light,13
Although the political leaders of Germany did not 
participate as a unit in the elimination of Vatican 
influence in Germany, the extremist group centering 
around Martin Bormann did. Of all the documents entered 
in evidence by the Prosecution at Nuremberg, the largest 
single author was Bormann, Most other contributions
I •
were made by: men and organizations that executed di- 
rections-nnmlng- from his Party Chancellery: Alfred
1 ̂Rosenberg-, Heinrich Himmler, the S, S,,, and the Gestapo, 
Baldur. von Shirach blamed him for preventing any agree­
ments between the youth leaders of the Reich and the
11Goebbels, 121,
12Ibid,. 2^2,
1 -3J b i d , ,  1 2 1 ,
^TM W C, X X I,  k 6 k a
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Churcho Hermann Goering--blamed Bormann, along with 
Himmler, for all persecution of the Church,
Bormann’s authorship of the June 6, 19^1 circular 
which rejected any possible reconciliation of National 
Socialism. .and religion made him exceptionally vulnerable 
to such, claimso Yet, Bormann truly could not find any 
place, fox. Catholicism in his concept of life. H. <R. 
Trevor-Roper, editor of Bormann's letters to his wife, 
believes that religion is the only area in which this 
man made a personal contribution, Botmann's hatred of 
religion spilled over into his personal life. His. 
letters to his wife demand that she "make sure that none 
of our children gets depraved and diseased by the poison 
of Christianity, in-whatever dosage.
He wrote'voluminously to Rosenberg, the author 
of The Myth of the, 20th Century, and increased the origi­
nal distaste that Rosenberg had for Christianity,
Bormann. wanted Rosenberg- to work toward substituting 
National Socialist principles for Catholic instruction 
in schools., increasing Catholic monetary contributions 
to. the State, and to reject all compromises between 
Christian teachings and National Socialist ideology.1  ̂
The leadership for anti-Church policy and refusal to
^Martin Bormann, The Bormann Letters (London,
195*0. 36.
l6NCA, III, 154-55. 153-59. 171-72.
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compromise wi th the- Vatican cannot lie . .mor e heavily on 
any..single person than Martin Bormann.
Nevertheless, final responsibility for Germany's 
attitude toward the Vatican must rest with Adolf Hitler 
simply because he was- the Fuehrer. Actually, Hitler 
hated all of the routine^work of government. Once he 
had. established National Socialism as the only accepta­
ble- German ideology and himself as the Reich's Fuehrer, 
Hitler only laid down general lines of policy toward 
the Church. The details of implementation of this, policy 
were.left up to the departmental Ministers while. Hitler 
pre-occupied himself with broad ideas in foreign, affairs 
and. preparation for war. Except in times of .arises., the 
Fuehrer...seldom voiced his opinion about Germany's policy 
toward the Vatican.
The Fuehrer respected the Catholic Church, because
it was. an international society directed by the Vatican,
an authority outside of Germany which was not subject to
the Reich's will. He also admired its hierarchical
structure that allowed the Vatican to control its vast
17membership with ease. ' The Church's ability to survive 
so long with so little change reminded him of his dream 
of a thousand year Reich, Hitler thought that National 
Socialism could learn from the Catholic Church by study­
ing, its capacity to maintain a changeless doctrine. He
1^Bullock, 312-lfc.
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thought an unchangeable, eternal doctrine should be the
1 O
aim of National Socialism,,
Even during the early years of co-ordination of
the German Catholic Church, Hitler did not want..a break
with the Vatican0 He foresaw that it would be useful
19in the-event of war. The Fuehrer knew that theChurch 
could.be strengthened by persecution and restrained any 
open.:.anti-clerical outbursts that might impair.:-.his. po­
litical power. Unlike Rosenberg and Bormann, he did
20not attack the Church publicly, - -
'After the invasion of Poland in September-1939,
he: continued to follow this policy. Hitler made a
point of not openly attacking the Church and camouflaged
his distaste for Vatican interference in German affairs
unless it obstructed German politics. His.constant goal
21was to maintain peace with the Vatican, Along with
Goering and Goebbels, he believed that the Church .problem
22should not be acute during wartime.
It was not that the Fuehrer felt sympathy, fpr 
Catholicism, On the contrary, he thought it was a,
l8Hitler, Mein Kampf, ^59,
■ ^ H e i n r i c h  Hoffmann, Hitler was my Friend (London,
1955), 129, '
20Bullock,: 389 o 
21Hochhuth, 310, 333,
22Goebbels, 1&L-42-.
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"filthy reptile" that struck at any sign of weakness in
the. State..and that it had but one desire.,....to destroy the
21Reicho Yet, he thought Catholicism so important to
the German nation that whenever he was held personally
responsible for persecution of the Church, he blamed it
24on'"irresponsible elements in the p r o v i n c e s ~ When 
he did give a direct order to punish members of the 
Church hierarchy, it was because he truly believed that 
they were guilty of political Catholicism, Hitler 
believed that the Church should be eliminated-after the
25war. - " :
,... . final analysis, these men and..their..:follow­
ers combined to use the Catholic Church in its.: .national 
form to wage political warfare against the Vatican.,
German policy toward the Vatican can be seen in two 
stages. Germany strove to gain complete control over 
the German Catholic Church and, later, the national 
Catholic Churches in the areas annexed by the Reich.
This control was used as a lever to persuade the Vati­
can to react in a manner favorable to German policy.
In the first stage, Germany made the first in­
roads against the Vatican by concluding the Reich 
Concordat. By manipulating this treaty, promising;to
^Hitler, Conversations, 508o 
^Papen, 282,
^Hitler, Conversations. 117.
182
uphold its guarantees when necessary and. narrowly in­
terpreting-them when advantageous, Germany kept, the 
Vatican constantly on the defensive* Meanwhile, the 
German Catholics were co-ordinated with the State.
* S'*They became a-part of thefjtoinalitarian concept of 
statehood.. No longer could they act independently.
If the clergy attempted to act without the authority 
of the Reich they were immediately suppressed.
In 1939* the beginning of warfare brought the 
Vatican into direct diplomatic contact with Germany 
because the Holy See was an international power avowed­
ly dedicated, to keeping peace. In this, the second 
stage, it was too late for the Vatican to make many 
demands against Germany, because the Reich had control 
of. the Catholics in Germany, the Sudetenland, Czecho­
slovakia., Poland, and other areas. The German empire
had authority over more Catholics than.any Other nation
26in the world. If the Vatican wanted to oppose German 
policy on the international level, it would have to be 
willing, to accept the consequences of the Nazi reaction 
at the national level. This it would not do.
When it looked as if the Holy See had reached 
the point where it might appeal to its world-wide Catho­
lic membership, the German government took steps to
26L. H. Lehmann, Vatican Policy in the Second 
World War (New York, 19^6 ) , ^3o
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paoify the Vatican. The most obvious example is the 
sending of Ribbentrop to the Vatican in March 19^0.
At this...time, the Reich convinced the Holy See that it 
did_not want to foster communism and, furthermore, 
want.ed....to promote a truce with the Church. After 
Ribbentrop's meeting with Pius XII, the Vatican again 
reacted favorably to German policy.
From 19^0 to 19^3» the Reich severed relations 
with the Vatican in the outside t e r r i t o r i e s T h e  
German government, which now consisted mostly of the 
Reich...Chancellery as the Foreign Ministry was nearly 
defunct, would accept negotiations over problems in the 
old..:Reich only. At this time, there were no outstanding 
problems in the Reich. The German Catholic Church had 
bean-almost fully co-ordinated, before 1939 c and any re­
maining disagreements that might arise with the Vatican
were- far. overshadowed by the ill-treatment of the clergy 
in Austria and Poland. The result was that the Holy See 
could negotiate only in an area where it could, accomplish 
very little.
Germany would allow negotiations in the outside 
areas only through the local authorities. Reich repre­
sentatives in these areas could have diplomatic contact
27‘Relations were severed in Austria by Hitler’s 
order of June 22, 19^2. Germany stopped relations with 
the Vatican in all outside territories, including the 
Government General, in March 19^3. See: Chapter V, 
sections I and II.
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only with the local Vatican representatives of these 
areas.-„ Thus, the Reich had come full circle* It had 
started, in 1933» "by securing the support of the national 
clergy and keeping the Vatican out of Internal political 
affairs. In 19^3» Germany by-passed the Holy See to deal 
only with its local authorities. Again, the Vatican was 
kept out of German political affairs. During the inter­
vening, ten years, Germany had increased its capacity to 
keep-the Vatican on the defensive by extending its control 
over_mo.re, and more Catholic countries.
;.Relch leaders generally followed the policy toward 
the*Vatican that Hitler and Goebbels established. They 
didi_not provoke the Vatican to the extent that it would 
completely sever relations with Germany, They bided 
their..-time with the thought in mind that the Reich could 
entirely eradicate the Church and eliminate the Vatican's 
influence in German territories after the war. Since 
the Holy See did not break off relations with Germany, no 
impetus was given to the lower Catholic hierarchy to 
condemn German policy against the Catholics or in aggressive 
warfare. The Reich's political victory over the Vatican 
was.-t.otal.
On the other hand, Germany lost a spiritual war 
with the Vatican. National Socialism became the predomi­
nant...ideology in Germany and the outside territories, but 
it was only a superstructure. Underneath, in the hearts
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of the individuals of the totalitarian State., Catholicism 
never died*, It was never., "replaced" by National Socialism 
as most Nazi leaders had hoped,
Vatican officials used the Concordat as "a juridical 
basis.for their defense, a stronghold behind which to
pOshield themselves, in their opposition, , , ," Despite - 
Germany's-constant breeches of the Concordat, the Holy See 
continued., to use. it as an instrument for negotiation in 
Germany and. the outside territories. The. Vatican did not 
want to break off diplomatic negotiations with Germany 
because it wished to continue protecting all Catholics by-- 
whatever methods remained.
The Catholic Church takes a long range view of 
historical, events and knows that situations ehangd with 
time. Although the Vatican may experience setbacks and 
its membership may suffer persecution, centuries of 
experience... have proved that more favorable conditions 
will, eventually present themselves. As one prominent 
Cat hoi ic... stated:
v -The Vatican places no limit of time, on the 
achievement of its ends. It thinks of itself 
in terms.;of eternity, and. its dealings, with 
foreign powers are, therefore, based, on the
assumption that the Holy See can afford to
wait since men are mortal and the Church is eternal,29
28.T_. TT _NCA, V, 1039o These are the words of Pope Pius
XII,
2^Cianfarra, 68,
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The Vatican could afford to wait patiently and- watch the
rise—and fall of the Third Reich from a dis tance„. It did,
and. the Eternal Church survived Adolf Hitler’s National 
Socialist dream.
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SELECTED ARTICLES
CONCORDAT BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND THE 
GERMAN REICH1
His Holiness Pope Pitas XI and the President of the German 
Reich, moved by a common desire to consolidate and enhance 
the friendly relations existing between the Holy See and the 
German Reich, wish to regulate the relations between the 
Catholic Church and the State for the whole territory of the 
German Reich in a permanent manner and on a basis acceptable 
to both parties, They have decided to conclude a solemn 
agreement, which will supplement the Concordats already con­
cluded with certain individual German states, and will ensure 
for the remaining states fundamentally uniform treatment of 
their respective problems, , , «
Article 1,— The German Reich guarantees freedom of pro­
fession and public practice of the Catholic religion.
It acknowledges the right of the catholic Church, within 
the limit of those laws which are applicable to all, to 
manage and regulate her own affairs independently, and, 
within the framework of her own competence, to publish laws 
and ordinances binding on her members.
ArticleJ2,-— The Concordats concluded with Bavaria (192if), 
Prussia (1^29) and Baden (1932) remain in force, and the 
rights and privileges of the Catholic Church recognized 
therein are secured unchanged within the territories of the 
states concerned. For the remaining states the agreements 
entered into in the present Concordat come into force in 
their entirety. These last are aliso binding for those 
states named above in so far as they affect matters not 
regulated by the regional Concordats or are complementary 
to the settlement already made.
In future, regional Concordats with states of the German 
Reich will be concluded only with the agreement of the 
Reich Government, , , ,
Article ij-» — In its relations and correspondence with the 
bisfiops j clergy and other members of the Catholic Church in 
Germany, the Holy See enjoys full freedom. The same applies 
to the bishops and other diocesan officials in their dealings 
with the faithful in all matters belonging to their pastoral
1NCA, V, 1080-90,
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office,
Instructions, ordinances, Pastoral Letters, official 
diocesan gazettes, and other enactments regarding the 
spiritual direction of the faithful issued by the ecclesi­
astical authorities within the framework of their compe­
tence (Art, 1, Sec, 2) may be published without hindrance 
and brought to the notice of the faithful in the form 
hitherto usual, , , ,
Article 11,— The present organization and demarcation 
of dioceses of the Catholic Church in the German Reich 
remains in force. Such rearrangements of a bishopric or 
of an ecclesiastical province or of other diocesan demar­
cations as shall seem advisable in the future, so far as 
they involve changes within the boundaries of a German 
state, remain subject to the agreement of the government 
of the state concerned.
Rearrangements and alterations which extend beyond the 
boundaries of a German state require the agreement of the 
Reich government, to whom it shall be left to secure the 
consent of the regional government in question. The same 
applies to rearrangements or alterations of ecclesiastical 
provinces involving several German states. The foregoing 
conditions do not apply to such ecclesiastical boundaries 
as are laid down merely in the interests of local pastoral 
care.
In the case of any territorial reorganization within 
the German Reich, the Reich government will communicate 
with the Holy See with a view to rearrangement of the 
organization and demarcation of dioceses, , , •
Article lit.,—  , , , , 2, The Bull nominating
Archbishops, Coadjutors cum jure successionis, or appoint­
ing a Praelatus nullius, will not be issued until the name 
of the appointee has been submitted to the representative 
of the National Government in the territory concerned, and 
until it has been ascertained that no objections of a 
general political nature exist, , , ,
Article 16,— Before bishops take possession of their 
dioceses they are to take an oath of fealty either to the 
Reich representative of the state concerned, or to the 
President of the Reich, according to the following formula;
"Before God and'on the Holy Gospels I swear and promise, 
as becomes a bishop, loyalty to the German Reich and to
the State of, , , I swear and promise to honor the
legally constituted government and to cause the clergy of 
ray diocese to honor it. In the performance of my spiritual
office and in my solicitude for the welfare and the inter­
ests of the German Reich, I will endeavor to avoid all 
detrimental acts which might endanger it,"
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Article 17 #— The property and other rights of public 
corporationsj, institutionsp foundations and associations 
of the Catholic Church regarding their vested interests*, 
are guaranteed according to the common law of the land#
Ho building dedicated to public worship may be de- 
stroyed for any reason whatsoever without the previous 
consent of the ecclesiastical authorities concerned® * # »
Article 200— Where other agreements do not exist*, the 
Church has the right to establish theological and philo- 
sophical colleges for the training of its clergy*, which 
institutions are to be wholly dependent on the ecclesi­
astical authorities if no State subsidies are sought® « # *
Article 21#— Catholic religious instruction in ele­mentary*, senior*, secondary and vocational schools consti­
tutes a regular portion of the curriculum*, and is to be 
taught in accordance with the principles of the Catholic 
Church® In religious instruction*, special care will be 
taken to inculcate patriotic*, civic and social conscious­
ness and sense of duty in the spirit of the Christian 
Faith and the moral code*, precisely as in the case of 
other subjects® The syllabus and the selection of 
textbooks for religious instruction will be arranged by 
consultative agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities*, 
and these latter have the right to investigate whether 
pupils are receiving religious instruction in accordance 
with the teachings and requirements of the Church# 
Opportunities for such investigation will be agreed upon 
with the school authorities# # # •
Article - 23#— The retention of Catholic denominational 
schools and the establishment of new ones*, is guaranteed#
In all parishes in which parents or guardians request it*, 
Catholic elementary schools will be established,, provided 
that the number of pupils available appears to be suf­
ficient for a school managed and administered in accordance 
with the standards prescribed by the State*, due regard 
being had to the local conditions of school organi­
zations# » # «
Article 27#°=°The Church will accord provision to the
German army for the spiritual guidance of its Catholic
officers, personnel and other officials*, as well as for
the families of the same#
The administration of such pastoral care for the army - 
is to be vested in the army bishop# The latter*s ecclesi­
astical appointment is to be made by the Holy See after 
contact has been made with the Reich government in order 
to select a suitable candidate who is agreeable to both 
parties# # 0 «
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Article 31q-»Those Gatholic organizations and societies 
which pursue exclusively eharitable*, cultural or religious 
ends* and* as such* are placed under the ecclesiastical 
authorities* will be protected in their institutions and 
activities»
Those Catholic organizations which to their religious* 
cultural and charitable pursuits add others* such as social 
or professional interests* even though they may be brought 
into national organizations* are to enjoy the protection of 
Article 31* Section 1* provided they guarantee t© develop 
their activities outside all political parties®
It is reserved to the central government and the German 
episcopate* in joint agreement* to determine which organi­
zations and associations come within the scope of this 
article®
In so far as the Reich and its constituent states take 
charge of sport and other youth organizations* care will 
be taken that it shall be possible for the members of the 
same regularly to practice their religious duties on 
Sundays and feast days* and that they shall not be required 
to do anything not in harmony with their religious and 
moral convictions and obligations®
^tible_32®-*-In view of the special situation existing 
in Germany, and in view of the guarantee provided through 
this Concordat of legislation directed to safeguard the 
rights and privileges of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
Reich and its component states* the Holy See will prescribe 
regulations for the exclusion of clergy and members of 
religious orders from membership of political parties* and 
from-engaging in work on their behalf®
Article 33®°°a’All matters relating to clerical persons 
or ecclesiastical affairs* which have not been treated of 
in the foregoing articles* will be regulated for the 
ecclesiastical sphere according to current Ganon Law®
Should differences of opinion arise regarding the in­
terpretation or execution of any of the articles of this 
Concordat* the Holy See and the German Reich will reach 
a friendly solution by mutual agreement® ® * ®
The Supplementary Protocol®
At the signing of the Concordat concluded'today■between 
the Holy See and the German-Reich* the undersigned* being 
regularly thereto empowered* have adjoined the following 
explanations which form an integral part of the Concordat 
itself®'
In res ® « ®
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A r t i c l e F a P i  go^It is understood that when ©b~ 
jections of a general political nature exist, they shall 
he presented within the shortest possible time® If after 
twenty days such representations have not been made, the 
Holy See may be justified in assuming that no objections 
exist to the candidate in question® The names ©f the 
persons' concerned'will be hept confidential until the 
announcement of the appointment. Ho right- of the State' 
t© assert a vet© is t© be derived from this article. . . .
"Article' 32«l — It is understood "that similar provisions 
regarding activity in party polities will be introdmced 
by the Reich -government f or' members ©f non=Gath©lic 
denominations, fhe conduct, which has been mad© obliga­
tory for "the clergy and "members ■ ©f religions- orders" in 
Germany in virtue "of Artiel©"32, does hot involve .any 
sort of limitation -of official and prescribed preaching 
and Interpretation of the dogmatic and moral teachings 
and principles of the Church.
Signed? Eugenio, Cardinal Paeelli.
Signed? Franz v©n Papen.
At the’Vatican City, July 20th, 1933®
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APPENDIX B
THE GERMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPATE 
IN SEPTEMBER 1933
A 0 Church Province Breslau
1 , Adolf Cardinal Bertram ,. Archbis~@id%of Breslau 
2, Maximilian Kaller, Bishop of Ermland 
3o Christian Schreiber, Bishop of Berlin 
4, Franz Hartz, Prelate Nullius of Schneidemuhl
B, Church Province Munich and Freising
5o Michael Cardinal Faulhaber, Archbishop of 
Munich and. Freising
6, Joseph Kumpfmuller, Bishop of Augsburg
7. Sigismund Felix von Ow-Felldorf, Bishop of 
Passau
8, Michael Buchberger, Bishop of Regensburg,
C, Church Province Bamberg
9. Jakobus von Hauck, Archbishop of Bamberg 
10, Konrad von Preysing, Bishop of Eichstatt 
11 , Ludwig Sebastian,, Bishop of Speyer
12, Matthias Ehrenfried, Bishop of Wurzburg
D, Church Province Cologne
13o Karl Joseph Cardinal Schulte, Archbishop of 
Cologne
14,. Joseph Vogt, Bishop of Aachen
15o Antonius Hilfrich, Bishop of Limburg
16. Clemens; August von Galen, Bishop, of Munster
17, Wilhelm .Bernlng. Bishop of Osnabruck
18„ Franz. Rudolf Bormewas-s er, Bishop of Trier
E, Church Province Paderborn
19o Kaspar. Klein, Archbishop of Paderborn 
20o Joseph Damian Schmitt, Bishop of Fulda
21, Nikolaus Bares, Bishop of Hildesheim
F, Upper Rhenish Church Province
22, Konrad Grober, Archbishop of Freiburg i, Br„
23, Ludwig Maria Hugo, Bishop of Mainz
24, Johannes Baptista Sproll, Bishop of Rottenburg 
25o Petrus Legge, Bishop of Meissen (exempt diocese)
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APPENDIX B 
GERMAN DIOCESAN BOUNDARIES 19331
BERLIN
ICR
' f t  A
GERMANY
From The Catholic Church and Mazl Germany by 
Guenter Lewy. Copyright 19^. McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Used by permission,
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DOCUMENTS
Ciano, Count Galeazzo0 Cianofs Diplomatic Papers. . Edited 
by Malcolm Muggeridge. Long Acre , London. Odhams 
Press, 19^80
The Papers, examine the Italian attitude, .toward 
Germany which is often inseparably linked with the 
degree of relations between Germany and the Vati­
can. However little mention is made of the Vati­
can, and the Papers add nothing new to the study 
of the German attitude. Ciano was anti^German.
Documentary Background of World War II., 1931-19*H<,
Edited by James W. Gentenbein. New York;
Columbia University Press, 19^8.
An excellent collection of pre-World> War II 
documents. It should be used to understand the 
internal and external German political activities 
during this period. -Nothing on the Vatican, but 
there is much useful material on German relations 
'With all the major,powers. Includes speeches, 
treaties, agreements, etc.
Documents on German History. •. Edited by Louis L* Synder. 
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, . 1 9 5 8  ̂_ 1
A very representative selection of-“documents 
from 9 A.D. to 1955s "but nothing in detail. A 
broad and general coverage of the period Judder 
study which includes material on the Reichstag 
fire, propaganda, the Nuremberg Laws, etc. '
Nothing on the German attitude, but useful for 
finding major documents quickly.
19^
Friedlander, Saul, Plus .XII and the Third Reich; A
Dooumentat1on. Translated by Charles Pullman.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
Here Is a presentation of the most Important 
documents found In the DGFP with a narrative text 
that ties, them together in a comprehensive fashion. 
It is. bound, to become a standard work in the study 
of the German attitude toward the. Vatican if only 
because., it introduces hithertofore unpublished 
materials-.which are found in the Foreign Ministry 
archives, at Bonn. The work is indispensible 
although -Friedlander seems to strain to fit the 
documents, into his-preconceived idea of historical 
pattern. He also over-emphasizes the Vatican's 
fear of communism.
Germany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Documents and
Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World 
War, 1938-1939o Vol. II. New York: Inter- 
nati onal Publis hers, 1948.
Also called the "Dirksen Papers." These were 
captured and published by the Russians. Nothing 
on the German attitude toward the Vatican. Very 
useful in understanding the development of events 
prior to World War II.
Great Britain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Documents. Concerning- Gebman-Pollsh Relations and 
the Outbreak-.of Hostilities Between Great Britain 
and Germany on September 3, 1939° New York:
Farrar &. Rhinehart, 1939.
These documents are of no use to examine the 
German point of view. They are indispensible in 
the study of the invasion of Poland, however, as 
the. British, were, inextricably involved..
Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-
1939. Third Series. 9 vols. London: His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1949-1950.
This series covers the period of 1938-1939. 
Volumes VI and VII show that Britain knew more about 
Reich relations with the Vatican than did the German 
Foreign Ministry. These volumes,contain much infor­
mation pertaining to British-Vatican diplomatic 
relations. They also disclose what Britain thought 
of Germany’s negotiations with the Holy See,
Hitler, Adolf., Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944. 
Translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens.
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New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953»
This is the stenographic record of. Hitler's 
"table-talksMuch of his religious philosophy 
can be gleaned. His observations are mainly 
sweeping generalizations concerning an alleged 
Jewlsh-Christianity-Bolshevik connection and 
science as superior to religion. His attitude 
toward, a- few specific incidents is apparent.
Hitler's philosophy concerning the church changes 
disturbingly, depending upon to whom he is talk­
ing.
.' The Testament, of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler- 
Bormann Documents. February-Apr11 19^5« Trans­
lated by R. H, Stevens. London: Cassell & Company, 
1961.
These are the last passages ever written by 
Hitler (19^5)» He now knew that the war was ending 
so he compiled a sort of supplement to his Conver­
sations,. Hitler attempts to examine- where he went 
wrong,-and-some of his conclusions, and reflections 
are interesting... There are few statements, about 
Christianity, but they are in final form in his 
mind., not rambling, like Conversations. His thoughts 
seem to have jelled in many areas. Not necessary 
for the topic under study.
Pacelli, Eugenio (Pope Pius XII) and Roosevelt, Franklin
D. Wartime. Correspondence. Between President 
Roosevelt and Pone Plus XII. Explanatory^notes 
by Myron C. Taylor. New York: Macmillan 'Company, 
19*7.The letters are of little value exclusive of 
illuminating the scanty diplomatic relations between 
the United States and the Vatican. Myron Taylor’s 
textual additions are very interesting, although not 
always correct. They show that the United States 
was the only major power with a large Catholic popu­
lation that did not take full advantage of the 
Vatican's power to further its policies.
Polish Information Center. Documents- Relating to the Ad­
ministration of Occupied Countries in Eastern 
Europe.. Issue No. V. New York: Polish Information 
Center, 19^1 <>
Here is a reiteration of Cardinal Hlond’s memo­
randum. of 1939 and other documents commonly availa­
ble . Nothing, new is added. It is a compilation of 
documents,, issued by the Reich which were restrictive 
to Poland. Thus an anti-German approach is pre­
sented.
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Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Occupation 
of Poland, New York: The Greystone Press, n,d.
Also called the Polish White Book, A docu­
mentary compilation, with text, of all German laws 
and degrees enacted to deal with Poland during and 
after the invasion,. Laws which caused suppression 
of the Polish, clergy and their property are in­
cluded and commented on in the text. It is meant 
to be anti-German and is. The documents presented 
can be found in any of the standard works in this 
field such as NCA and DGFP,
Principles for Peace Selections, from- Papal Documents ,
Leo XIII to Plus XII, Edited by Reverend Harry 
C, Koenig-, Washington: National Catholic Welfare 
Conference., 19*4-3 »,
This is a very good compilation of the published 
speeches, and. decrees of both Pius XI and Pius XII,
It. must be read in order to understand the corre­
sponding reactions the Popes * words caused in the 
Reich,
United Nations, The United Nations Review; a Bi-monthly 
Selection of Official Statements, and Documents, 
(January 19*4-l=December 31, 19*4-5), 5 vols, New
York: United Nations Information Office, 19*4-1“
19*4-5«In 19*4-3, the name of this set was changed to 
the United Nations Review from the Inter-Allied 
Review, Herein is presented the text of documents, 
radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, declarations 
by diplomats, excerpts from diplomatic speeches, 
and statements of Allied leaders. At the end of 
most articles "Press References" are given—  
synopses of numerous press articles on the subject 
covered.. The general view and "feeling" of indi­
vidual countries, can be grasped through this set, 
and there are articles dealing with Church problems 
on the state level.
United States,- Civil Affairs Department, Trial of Major 
War-. Criminals, before the. International Military 
Tribunal^ *4-2 vols, Nuremberg: International 
Military Tribunal, 19*4-7=19*4-9*
Includes some testimony of witnesses and the 
accused which is valuable. Much material is 
entered in evidence: documents, excerpts from 
decrees, orders, letters, etc, • Presents a sche­
matic Interpretation of these documents. From 
these the general picture of many phases of Nazi
religious activity can be determined.,, A necessity 
in any study of Germany durihg this period,. The 
documents, found here are all- in NCA- and. DGFP 0
United States, Civil Affairs, Trials of War Criminals 
before the Nuremberg- Military Tribunals. Under
Control Gounel1 Law No, 10, 15 vols, Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 194?- 
49, The trial of the lesser Reich functionaries . 
who .were not tried under the Trials of the. Ma.ior 
War Criminals., Volumes XII-XIV are appropos to 
this field of study as they concern the "Minis­
tries Case" which includes Weizsaecker, However, 
they are mainly concerned- with, the breech of 
International Law and the Jewish Question, 
together with membership in Nazi organizations. 
Some general conclusions are drawn by the Prose­
cution,
United States, Department of State, Documents on German 
Fore1fen Policy, 1918-1945, Series C (1933-1937).
5 vols, Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1957o
Series C is the best source for Germany's 
attitude toward the Vatican in the years between 
1933 and 1937o The series includes abundant 
material on the Reich's "co-ordination" of the 
German. Catholic- Church and- the repercussions 
caused at. the Holy See, The documents concern 
the German. Foreign Ministry and were captured 
by the. Allies.- after the war,- Although the 
published-material is selected, from a very large 
amount of captured material, it is thoroughly 
.representative of German policy in these years.
United States, Department of State, Documents, on German 
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945).
42 vols, Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1950-1964,
Series D continues where Series C left off in 
1937 continues through December 1941, Many 
Nuremberg- documents are repeated, but the trans­
lations are better and the source given where 
possible. Both series present correspondence 
between the Foreign Ministry and the German Am­
bassador at the Vatican as well as pertinent 
political reports and Reich degrees, This 
collection is the basic source for studies in 
this area until 1941 and is extremely valuable
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because most German negotiations with the Holy See 
Were conducted through the Ministry at this time.
United States, War Department,, Nazi Conspiracy and Ag­
gression, 10 vols, Washington: Office of United 
States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis 
Criminality, United States Government Printing 
Office, 1946,
This collection contains- the full text of the 
majority -of documents entered in evidence at the 
first- Nuremberg-, trial „ It also-includes in­
dictments.-,- oral. arguments-, .and- useful appendices ,
Supplements-A-and B contain statements-by the
defendants, arguments, by the defence, counsel, and
interrogations, There is a great deal of material 
relating-to the. Vatican, and muc.h circumvention by 
the defendants while determing where to place the 
blame for German policy toward the Catholic Church,
United States, War Department, Nazi Conspiracy and Ag­
gression:- Opinion and-Judgment., Washington: Office 
of United.States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution 
of Axis Criminality, United.States Government 
Printing Office, 194?,
This volume sums up the reasoning, judgments, 
and sentencing of the defendants tried at Nurem­
berg, It helps the reader define the categories 
of religious persecution for which the German 
leaders were tried.
DIARIES, MEMOIRS,
AND OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES
Alf ieri,-Dino-„ -Dictators -Face to Pace, Translated by
David Moote ,. New York: New York University Press, 
1955. ,Alfieri was the Italian Ambassador, to the Vati­
can in 1939 and transferred to Berlin in May 1940, ■ 
It is amazing that he does not say more about the 
German attitude toward the Vatican, His few refer­
ences to this attitude are in general terms and not 
at all indispensible. The work is important, In 
this respect, only in its examination of the person­
alities of various high ranking Germans such as
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Hitler, Weizsaecker, Mackensen, Ribbentrop, Goebbels, 
etc,
Badoglio, Pietro.. Italy In the Second World War. Trans­
lated by Muriel. Currey. London: Oxford. University 
Press, 1948.
A poorly written, dull chronological presen­
tation of Italy's role in World War II, and statisti­
cally encumbered documents that might prove of some < 
value. No psychological background at all. The 
documents, are bolstered by Badoglio's personal re­
collections which are of value as a primary source 
and might be used in a future comprehensive study.
Bormann, Martin. The Bormann Letters: The Private Corre­
spondence Between Martin Bormann and His Wife from 
January 1943 to Apr11 1945» Edited by H. R. Trevor- 
Roper. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954,
The Letters offer a profound examination of 
Bormann's personality in connection with_his family 
life but have little value in this field," -There 
are a few. indications of his extreme anti-Christi­
anity. and. his-.desire to bring up his. children in 
the same tradition. Of greater value to the student 
of Bormknn than the student of history in any other . 
area. .
Churchill, Winston S. Memoirs of the Second World War. 
Boston:. Houghton. Mifflin Company, 1959«
No information on the German attitude, but it 
adds, many details external to the situation and 
gives the. Allied.thoughts Inmany cases. Of 
course, Churchill is his usual self and the only 
thing portrayed as more correct and valiant than 
England is Churchill himself.
Cianfarra, Camille M. The Vatican and- the War. New York:
E. P. Dutton, 19^4.
Himself a Catholic, Cianfarra has written an 
earnest, sympathetic account treating Popes Pius 
XI and XII during the 1933-1943 period. This 
journalistic-view disregards, polemic and. records 
first-hand, observations concerning the Vatican's 
attitude, toward- the war- and Germany,. Many of the 
authorTs.-remarks... are not substantiated by available 
German- documents., and must be used with- care.
Cianf arra-also has the reporter * s. .malady of not 
naming his source. All things considered, it is 
a good source.
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Ciano, Galeazzo, The Ciano.. Diaries, 1939̂ -1-9̂ 3-? The -Complete 
Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo-Ciano,. Italian 
Minister for. Foreign- Affairs., 1936-19^3» Edited and 
translated by Hugh Gibson, Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 19^6,
Ciano was anti-German and well thought of by the 
Vatican-, His daily entries throw little light on 
the German attitude toward the Church, He could 
have contributed, very much to this problem, but 
actually recorded very little, The Foreign Minis­
ter does record some of the Pope’s conversations 
with the Duce concerning the Helch,
Dietrich, Otto, Hitler, Translated by Richard and Clara 
Winston, Chicago-: Regnery Company.,. 1955»Another personal-.account- by a..~close associate 
of Hitler.’.s, Not much. on. Hitler’s attitude toward ■ 
the. Vat lean,-and-what, there is is not new, but a 
reiteration of statements' found throughout Mein 
Kampf and- Conversations,
Dodd, William. E., Ambassador.- Dodd’s. Diary, 1933-38,
Edited, by W, E, Dodd, Jr, and. Martha Dodd, New 
York: - Harcourt, Brace, 19^1,
This. is., a-good, work for the 1933=37 period as 
Dodd records his conversations with many high rank­
ing German and Catholic leaders. Much insight can 
be gained as his observation of the church question 
is acute. It is too bad that he is antl-Catholic 
as well as anti-German and concentrates more heavi­
ly on the Protestant Church, Dodd is a Baptist,
Dulles, A^len, The Secret Surrender, New York: Harper 
and Row, 19^6, ” ~~
Herein is presented some insight into the 
attitude, of the German authorities in Italy at the 
time, the Vatican, was- instrumental-in peace negoti­
ations which ties together the memoirs of Walter 
Schellenberg- and. Albert Kesselring.,
Goebbels,. Joseph^ . The... Goe.b.b&ls- -Djap i e s : 19k2 -19̂ - 3» 
Translated....by; Louis P, Lochner,- New York:
Doubleday &. Company, 19^8,
.. . The...Diaries - -give much insight-, into the beliefs, 
actions..,, and policies of members, of the Nazi Party, 
Goebbels. was. among- the leaders of the. opposition to 
the Church and second only to Martin Bormann in 
closeness to Hitler, His attitude toward propa­
ganda aimed at the Vatican is apparent and he is
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somewhat of a weather-gauge of the upper echelon 
Reich officials who desired to rid Germany of the 
'•politically active" church0 The Diaries is one 
of the best personal narratives available for the 
study of the German attitude, He was a Catholic 
and quite aware of the problems Germany had with 
the Church„
Has.sell9 Ulrich vonc The Von Hassell DiarieS: 1938-19^4, 
New York: Doubleday & Company,, 19̂ -7»
Hassell touchs on the attitude of both the 
Nazi Party and the internal German opposition to 
the Vatican, He was in a position to observe the 
situation, and his Diaries indicate that he did 
just that, Hassell traces, in detail, the German 
oppositions negotiation for peace through the 
Vatican, Information he has gleaned from various 
contacts, as well as from Hitler and Bormann, are 
recorded as is his contact with generals who sought 
peace for Germany, A necessary source which far 
over-shadows that of Papen and Weizsaecker,
Heiden, Konrad, Per Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power,
Translated fey Ralph Manheim, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 19^<>
A view of the' rise of the Fuehrer within the 
framework of National Socialism, Little infor­
mation on the German attitude toward the Church 
but should be read to help garner the feeling of 
the period. He does not omit the part played by 
the Vatican and the Catholic hierarchy In bring­
ing Hitler to power however, Heiden is recognized 
as knowing more about the rise of Hitler and 
Nazism than any other objective historian, but it 
must be remembered that he was anti-Hitler,
Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, Translated by Ralph Manheim, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^3°
Mein Kampf is, of course, a basic work to be 
examined in the pursuit of an understanding of the 
German attitude. His religious beliefs are 
scattered throughout the work and blended with 
principles of National Socialism, It is compara­
ble to Conversations in that Hitler's attitude is 
exposed in generalized, often quixotic terms. It 
can generally be said that he is consistent in his 
belief that the Church must give way to National 
Socialism, but he varys in his thoughts as to when, 
how far, and in what manner.
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Hoffmann, Heinrich,, Hitler was my Friend, Translated by 
E„ H, Stevens, London: Burke, 1955®
Hoffmann was Hitler’s official photographer- 
and always present at great occasions as well as 
at dinner parties, etc. He often comments on the 
religious attitude of Hitler, Bormann, and others 
and has a sympathetic view. He was, however, so 
deeply influenced by the National Socialist feeling 
around him that his judgment was inaccurate, Hoff­
mann is self-serving, but the work should be read 
to help grasp the attitude of Hitler and Bormann,
Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948,
This work shows that the German attitude 
toward the Vatican was correct in its awareness 
of the importance of the Vatican in international 
affairs. It also throws light on America's nega­
tive attitude toward the guarantee of not bombing 
Rome, Hull writes extensively and covers a. 
tremendous span of years in two volumes. Relations 
with the Vatican and Germany make up a very minor 
portion of the work. Still, to understand the . 
German attitude one must understand the power the 
Vatican possessed and part of that power was 
concentrated in the United States,
Kesselring, Albert, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record,
Translated by Lynton Hudson, New York: William ■ 
Morrow & Company, 1954®
The bulk of the Record is taken up with German 
tactical and strategic decisions, and maneuvers of 
which Kesselring had knowledge. However, for the 
period from 1944-45 he gives a detailed account 
of the German and Allied activities in Italy, He 
describes the aid that, he and other German soldiers 
gave to the Italian population, the Vatican, and 
the saving of art treasures. He also sheds light 
on the activities engaged In by himself and S,S. 
General Wolff in negotiating a peace with the 
Americans for the surrender of German troops in 
Italy, The Vatican often acted as intermediary 
in all of these activities, and it appears that 
Kesselring co-operated fully,
Murphy, Robert, Diplomat Among. Warriors, Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964,
Murphy, a Foreign Service Career Officer with 
the United States State Department, traveled and 
worked throughout Europe during World War II, He
203
I
is a Catholic and many times gives interesting 
side-lights on the activities of prominent Catho­
lics during this period0 His hook is written with 
a good deal of hindsight, hut does offer some fresh 
and contemporary conclusions. Very little dis­
cussion ahout high ranking personalities who were 
concerned with the German. attitude.
Mussolini, Benito. Memoirs. 19^2-19^3: With Documents 
Relating to the Period. Translated hy Frances 
Lohh. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 19^9,
The Memoirs are apologetic and propagandists; 
obviously written to influence world opinion in 
favor of Mussolini. Useless for Germany's atti- • 
tude toward the Vatican except that significant 
material on S.S. General Wolff's negotiations for 
unconditional surrender of the German forces in 
Italy is presented. The appended documents are 
of much more value than the memoir Itself. There 
is also useful information on the hombing of Rome 
by the Allies. Mussolini consistently grossly 
exaggerates his case.
Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. Translated by Brian Connell. 
New Yorks E. P. Dutton & Company, 1953o
Papen was always in a position to view the 
German feeling toward the Church. His Memoirs.; 
is an autobiographical defense of his activities 
for the Reich and can generally be criticized for 
lack of Intellectual honesty. Nevertheless, the 
work must be considered a basic source in this 
area because of Papen»s intimate relationship . 
with the top Nazis and his more than average con­
cern with the Vatican.
Rosenberg, Alfred. Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg. Commen­
taries by Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck. 
Translated by Eric Posselt. Chicago: Ziff-Davis 
Publishing Company, 19^9»
The work is mainly a commentary on Rosenberg's 
final testament and fragmentary memoirs which have 
been partially rewritten to assure readability.
The commentators have attempted to interpret Rosen­
berg's words in the "light of history," but, as it 
was written in 19^9® have not taken a very objective 
view. It Is evident that Rosenberg never felt that 
he was guilty of any excesses and that, to the end, 
he was the ideological embodiment of National 
Socialism. He followed a politically expedient
20^
policy toward the Church although his words were 
often violently directed against it.
Schacht, HJalmar Horace Greeley. Confessions of "The Old 
Wizard.’> Translated by Diana Pyke. Boston; 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 1956*
The Confessions are predominantly concerned 
with the administration of finances within the 
Reich, but Schaeht was a devote Christian (Protes­
tant) who was against the Reich’s church policy.
He spoke openly against the Reich’s church,policy, 
but his activities in this area are completely 
overshadowed by his concentration on finance.
The work presents a good' example( of a man who is 
German by nationality but anti-Reich in ideology, 
and the tribulations this dichotomy eaused him 
in regard to loyalty and, to a lesser degree, the 
church. 1
Schellenberg, Walter. The Labyrinth; Memoirs of Walter 
Schellenberg. Translated by Lopis Hagen. New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1956.
Schellenberg wrote direct and honest, as well 
as intriguing, memoirs I His familiarity with the 
S.S. and S.D. set-up gave him the background to 
evaluate events in minute detail wlqile observing 
the' reactions of higher Reich leaders and the . 
entire SD/S. entourage. Many details can be added 
to the circumstances surrounding the death of 
Heydrich and the disclosure of the German Western 
invasion plans to the Allies. He often delves 
into the attitude of Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler-, 
Heydrich, Bormann, Canaris, and himself toward^ 
the Church. Very good. Veĵ y interesting. - •
Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters,- 1939- 
1945. Translated by R. H. Barry. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.
Particularly good for an examination of the 
development of Hitler's war plans. The work 
includes the dialogue of conversations between 
Hitler and other important personages in the 
Third Reieh. Very few passages relate to German 
regard for the Vatican, but these are quite 
important.
CO COWeizsacker, Ernst. Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsacker.
Translated by John Andrews. Chicago: Regnery, 
1951oThe former German Ambassador to the Vatican
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presents an apologetic and distorted account of 
his activities, He discusses only the periphery 
of the great events that surrounded him. There 
is much discrepancy between Weizsaecker’s account 
of his activities and information found in the 
German documents and other memoirs0 Still, he 
adds much detail to major events (eog0 the 
Maglione letter in 19^3) that had been obscure 
before.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Bullock, Alan, Hitler; A Study in Tyranny, Completely 
Revised Edition, New York; Harper & Row, 1962,
The study is a definitive biography of Hitler 
and Interweaves most political development In 
detail. But, as Bullock points out, the regime’s 
attitude toward the churches does not fall within 
the scope of the book, A fine source for study­
ing the background to the Reich-Vatican conflict,
Cochrane, Arthur C, The Church’s Confession Under Hitler, 
Philadelphia; The Westminster Press, 1962,
Cochrane devotes his work to Protestantism but 
shows the degree to which it and Catholicism were . 
Involved together In the struggle against German 
suppression of religion. The most useful material 
is concerned with the Catholic opposition within 
Germany, One of the author’s conclusions is that 
the two Churches worked together effectively, i 
This thesis is contradicted by the Dodd Diaries 
and Hitler's claims, in Conversations, that it 
was a brilliant maneuver to keep the two from 
working together,
Colvin, Ian, . Chief of Intelligence, London; Victor 
Gollancz, 1951 o
Colvin places his emphasis on Canarls’s oppo­
sition to Hitler, Much of his evidence relies on 
circumstantial evidence and speculative thought, 
Canaris’s encounters with the Vatican are mentioned, 
but In such general terms as to be nearly worth­
less ,
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Deakin, F, W„ The Brutal Friendship; Mussolini„ Hitler, 
and the Fall of Italian Fascism, New York; Harper and Row, 19^2 , "-™" ~—
Deakin?s work is one of the most scholarly 
studies available on the relationship between 
Hitler and Mussolini0 Many documents not else­where published are included,,
De Launay, Jacques, Secret Diplomacy of World War II,
Translated by Edouard Nadier„ New York; Simmons- 
Boardman, 1963 <>
Relates briefly to the surrender negotiations 
carried on by Dulles and S,S, General Wolff in 
19^5 o
Gilbert, Go Mo The Psychology of Dictatorship; Based on 
an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany,
New York; The Ronald Press Company, 1950o
Here is found much information concerning the 
attitude of German leaders, particularly Papen, 
toward Catholicism, The work is most important 
to this subject because it helps the reader to 
understand the influence the psychological back­
ground of the leaders had on their policy making 
capacity during World War II, Since many of these 
men were Catholic, their religious environment' 
as children is part of the explanation of their 
ambivalence toward Catholicism as adults. Curi­
ously, ambivalence toward Catholicism is quite 
characteristic of the leaders of the Reich,
Goris, Jan-Albert, Belgium in Bondage, New York; L, B, 
Fischer, 19^3 <>
A pro-Belgium chronicle that examines the 
German occupation of Belgium and the Belgian 
resistance. Very Interesting reading but short 
on specific details. No mention is made of the 
Vatican although a great deal of space is given 
to the Catholic clergy. Good for getting the 
feel of the period and the Catholic resistence in 
churches and unions,
Graham, Robert A, Vatican Diplomacy; A Study of Church 
and State on the International Plane, Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959*
A well-researched documented tracing of Papal 
diplomatic machinery from the fifteenth century 
on. There is concern for the legal ideas behind 
the Internationality of the Church, particularly 
in regard to the United States and the Soviet
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Union, This dispassionate study suffers from the 
lack of available sources in the Vatican and national 
archives,
Halecki, Oscar, Eugenio Pacelll: Pope of Peace, New York 
Creative Age Press, 1951 <>
A very good work which examines the trials and 
tribulations of Pius XII in detail and adds much 
interesting, fully developed information to many 
of the obscure incidents that occurred between^the 
Reich and the Holy See, However, it is, as the 
title suggests, quite biased. Many of the opinions 
set forth by the author are grossly incorrect if 
one is to believe the German documents. All in 
all, a very interesting-book but open to a great 
deal of debate,
Heiden, Konrad, A History of National Socialism, Trans­
lated by Ralph Manheim, New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 
1935o ' ■A detailed examination of National Socialism, 
and its aims and actions particularly in 1932-33° 
There is useful discussion about the problems posed 
by the specific demands of National Socialism in 
relation to the German Catholic Church and the 
ideological conflict precipitated by the Concordat, 
The broader, diplomatic picture which concerns, the 
Vatican is not discussed,
Hochhuth, Rolf, The Deputy, Translated by Richard and 
Clara Winston, New York: Grove Press, 1964,
Hochhuth presents a morality play which cari­
catures the motives of Pope Plus XII during the 
Second World War, A compound of fiction and fact 
is rendered more valuable by the author's "Side­
light on History* which documents much of the work. 
Moral issues abound,
Lehmann, L, H, Vatican Policy in the Second World War,
New York: Agora Publishing Co,, 19^6,
Lehmann’s work is of no merit concerning the 
German attitude. Although a Catholic, priest, his.v 
thesis is that there was a Jesuit conspiracy to 
spread Catholic political totalitarianism through^ 
out national totalitarian governments. His con­
clusion that the Church is disregarding its 
spiritual mission and becoming dedicated to po­
litical ultramontanism deserves consideration.
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Lewy, Guenter0 The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,, 196^0
This is the most comprehensive and well-done 
work available on the relationship of the Nazi 
hierarchy to the German Catholic Church,, There 
is1 also much Information on the German attitude, 
both individually and collectively, toward the 
Vatican, However, it is mainly concerned with 
the internal Church, Lewy makes use of a great 
amount of unpublished material and his sources 
are generally unimpeachable, It is a well- 
balanced, objective work, Lewy not only made use 
of unpublished Foreign Ministry material but 
gained access to many diocesan archives which con­
tained communications to and from the Holy See, 
Finally, he held personal Interviews with many of 
the important surviving personalities. His con­
clusions are, of course, open to discussion,
Manvel1, Roger and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr, Goebbels :- 
His Life and Death, New York: Simon and 
Schuster, i960,
A portrait of the career and character of 
Hitler's Minister for Propaganda and Public 
Enlightenment, It is a biography based upon 
letters, diaries, and the oral testimony of 
.those who knew him. Not a definitive biography, 
but it helps to understand the man. Nothing on 
the Church that cannot be found in better sources,
Namier, L, B, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938^-1939, London: 
Macmillan & Co, Ltd,’, 19^8.
Inter-relationship of the Vatican with any 
power is mentioned only in regard to Mussolini 
and then is very brief. This is a very specific 
work which is valuable for its delineation of 
events Immediately prior to the invasion of 
Poland,
Peers, E„ Allison, The Spanish Dilemma, London: Methuen 
& Co., 19^0,
Peers is predisposed to favor Spain and wrote 
in 19^0 which was very close to the subject. The 
work is couched in generalizations, as was the 
intent, which show the extent to which Catholicism 
and Russia influenced the possibility of a German- 
Spanish alliance. It Is valuable for this study 
in that is shows, to a degree, the problem Germany 
faced with Spanish Catholicism and therefore with 
the Vatican,
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Ritter, Gerhardo The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's 
Struggle Against Tyranny, Translated by Rc T, 
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